Recursos · 41
Divulgación coordinada de vulnerabilidades: recibir, reparar e informar
Construir una ruta segura para informes externos, evaluar impacto, coordinar a las partes afectadas y publicar orientaciones útiles.
Actualizado · 8 min
Lo que esta guía ayuda a lograr
- Hacer posible y seguro el reporte
- Darle un propietario a cada informe
- Coordinar un arreglo verificable
- Brindar a los usuarios orientación práctica
Comprobación rápida
- ¿Se puede enviar un informe sin cuenta de cliente?
- ¿Están claros el alcance y las pruebas permitidas?
- ¿Quién responde si el contacto principal está ausente?
- ¿Qué productos y proveedores comparten el defecto?
- ¿Qué mitigación provisional es útil?
- ¿El aviso identifica las versiones realmente afectadas?
Método paso a paso
- 1
Publicar una política clara
Indique alcance, pruebas a evitar, canal de contacto, detalles útiles del informe y proceso de respuesta. Haga revisar la política para su contexto.
Entregable: política publicada y canal monitoreado.
- 2
Reconocer y proteger evidencia
Confirmar recepción, asignar un identificador, limitar la circulación de datos sensibles y solicitar sólo las pruebas necesarias para reproducir el problema.
Entregable: informe fechado con propietario.
- 3
Evaluar y ampliar alcance
Reproducir sin dañar los sistemas. Examinar la explotabilidad, los activos, las versiones, los datos y los componentes compartidos con otros productos o proveedores.
Entregable: evaluación de impacto y mapa de stakeholders.
- 4
Coordinar la remediación
Mantener diálogo regular con el reportero y mantenedores. Acordar hitos de validación y adaptar la comunicación si el riesgo o la difusión cambian.
Entregable: línea de tiempo compartida, pruebas de corrección y regresión.
- 5
Publicar y dar seguimiento
Explicar las versiones afectadas, correcciones o mitigaciones, acciones del usuario e incertidumbres. Verifique la implementación y actualice el aviso a medida que cambien los hechos.
Entregable: evidencia versionada de asesoramiento y distribución.
Ejemplo trabajado ficticio
Situación ilustrativa
Un investigador reporta un fallo en el control de acceso en una versión antigua de API. El equipo lo reconoce, reproduce el caso en un entorno autorizado y comprueba que un componente compartido afecta a dos productos.
Decisión y pruebas esperadas
El plan conecta mantenedores, versiones, pruebas de arreglo y una mitigación provisional. El aviso final brinda a los usuarios una acción clara y acredita al investigador según lo acordado.
Indicadores de gestión
| Indicador | Qué mide | Primera acción |
|---|---|---|
| Recibo rastreado | Informes con propietario y fecha de primera respuesta | Reparar canales silenciosos |
| Alcance establecido | Productos afectados, versiones y dependencias confirmadas | Ampliar la búsqueda antes del consejo final |
| Corrección verificada | Casos originales y relacionados reproducidos en versiones publicadas | No cerrar una variante vulnerable |
| Usuarios informados | La orientación llega a los públicos afectados | Actualizar canales y traducciones requeridos |
Errores comunes
- Prometer un plazo único sin importar el riesgo
- Solicitar datos personales excesivos al denunciante
- Tratar el reconocimiento como remediación
- Publicación de evidencia de explotación detallada antes de la mitigación utilizable
- Olvido de versiones integradas por socios
Preguntas frecuentes
¿Es una política de divulgación una recompensa por errores?
No. Una política explica cómo informar y coordinar. Las recompensas necesitan reglas y recursos separados.
¿La comunicación debe esperar siempre a una solución?
No. El tiempo depende del riesgo, las medidas provisionales y las partes afectadas. Registre y revise la decisión.
¿Cuándo debe ayudar un coordinador?
Un coordinador puede ayudar cuando varios proveedores se ven afectados, un contacto no responde o se dificulta compartir un horario.
Referencias: datos, usos y límites
Documentación consultada el .
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
| Fuente y finalidad | Dato o referencia verificada | Cómo utilizarla | Límite que debe conservarse |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE Program Link discussions to the same vulnerability record. |
A JSON schema defines the CVE record format. An identifier and the published contents of its record are distinct things. | Open the record and references; check its state, described affected versions and supplier information. Keep the identifier in action tracking. | A CVE identifier is neither a severity score nor proof that your installation is affected. |
security.txt y divulgación
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
security.txt: find a reporting channel and check its context
A researcher may find a flaw without finding the right recipient. A security.txt file makes reporting channels and disclosure policies easier to discover. Its value then depends on monitored contacts, current information and a process that connects the report to the affected product.
This reference explains the format described in RFC 9116, an IETF Informational publication dated April 2022. The eight fields below are those defined by that RFC, rather than an exhaustive list of later extensions. Examples are fictional, using .example domains reserved for documentation. This page retrieves, validates, signs and publishes no real security.txt file.
Six discovery and publication checks
| Check | RFC 9116 reference point | Useful record |
|---|---|---|
| Location | For a web service, publish at /.well-known/security.txt. If both root and well-known files exist, use the well-known version. | Retrieved URL, response and any difference from /security.txt at the root. |
| Transport | Retrieve using HTTPS with HTTP 1.0 or later; referenced web URIs also use HTTPS. | Certificate check and retrieval result, separately from checks of the file’s fields. |
| Format | UTF-8 plain text; Content-Type text/plain with charset=utf-8. Each field occupies its own line. | Received header, observed encoding and a dated copy of the text examined. |
| Scope | The file applies to the domain or IP address in its retrieval URI; parent domains and subdomains are not inherited automatically. | Exact host, affected product and scope explained in the linked policy. |
| Redirects | A redirect may be legitimate but needs further inspection. The RFC recommends keeping a record. | Redirect chain, host changes and the reason for using an external provider. |
| Maintenance | Expires is mandatory. Contacts, links and keys need to remain accessible and controlled by the organisation. | Publication owner, verification date and a local review deadline before expiry. |
Eight fields defined by RFC 9116
| Field | Presence and repetition | Useful interpretation | Pitfall |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contact | Required; one or more occurrences. | Contact URI, such as mailto: or an HTTPS page. Occurrences should follow the publisher’s preference order. | An email address without mailto: is not a conforming Contact URI. Publishing a channel does not establish that it is monitored. |
| Expires | Required; exactly one occurrence. | RFC 3339 timestamp after which the data is stale and should not be used. A date less than one year ahead is recommended. | That recommendation is neither a mandatory one-year duration nor a vulnerability remediation deadline. |
| Canonical | Optional; may repeat. | Canonical URIs where the file is published. If the retrieval URI is absent from these fields, the RFC recommends not trusting the contents. | Listing several Canonical URIs does not authenticate every listed host. An additional trust mechanism remains useful. |
| Encryption | Optional; may repeat. | URI locating an encryption key; the key itself must not appear in this field. | The referenced key is not necessarily the file’s signing key. Its presence proves neither authenticity nor that a report was encrypted. |
| Policy | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the disclosure policy: scope, reporting practices and conditions explained by the organisation. | The file does not replace that policy or by itself define a reward, response deadline or testing permission. |
| Preferred-Languages | Optional; at most one occurrence, containing at least one language. | Comma-separated language tags with equal priority regardless of order. If absent, English may be assumed. | fr, en does not prioritise French. Several Preferred-Languages lines do not replace a single list. |
| Acknowledgments | Optional; may repeat. | Link to a page recognising people who helped remediate vulnerabilities. | Coordinate public credit; it does not authorise premature disclosure of flaw details. |
| Hiring | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the organisation’s security-related vacancies. | Do not confuse a hiring link with the reporting channel. |
Annotated fictional example: contact, time, origin and policy
Training reading at the fictional instant 22 October 2026, 10:00 UTC. The two Contact occurrences are ordered; the two languages have equal priority. Expiry is six months later. This is not Cyber Intelligence Embassy’s security.txt file and provides no real reporting channel.
# Fictional training example, not this site's reporting policy
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Contact: https://publisher.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Policy: https://publisher.example/disclosure-policy
Preferred-Languages: fr, en
This example remains unsigned. Canonical identifies the expected URI but does not replace authenticity evidence. Before sending a sensitive report, verify the recipient, policy and appropriate transmission protections.
Eight situations separating format, freshness and trust
Each excerpt isolates one question; no conclusion is a complete file validation. Observations and proposed next steps are editorial guidance. Addresses shown in excerpts are not links to contact.
Essential fields are present
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
A contact, future expiry and the expected canonical URI appear in this excerpt.
Continue checking transport, recipient identity and policy. These fields prove neither mailbox operation nor testing permission.
Contact contains a bare email address
Contact: security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The mailto: scheme is missing; the value lacks the URI form required for Contact.
Correct the source publication. A tool’s possible tolerance does not establish format conformity.
Expires occurs twice
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-01-22T10:00:00Z
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Two occurrences conflict with the Expires uniqueness rule.
Publish one expiry after correcting the file. Silently choosing the more convenient date conceals the publication defect.
The expiry date has passed
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2026-10-21T10:00:00Z
At the fictional evaluation instant the file expired twenty-four hours earlier.
Treat its data as stale and seek a verified current channel. Retain the old copy as history without presenting it as a current contact.
Canonical omits the retrieval URI
Fictional retrieval URI : https://api.publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
The file retrieved for api.publisher.example lists only publisher.example in Canonical.
Apply the recommendation not to trust these contents in this context and request publication verification. Similar hostnames do not resolve the mismatch.
The report concerns a subdomain
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Host concerned by the report : https://api.publisher.example/
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The file belongs to publisher.example; the reported asset is api.publisher.example.
Do not infer subdomain coverage. Check its own discovery location and the product scope explicitly described in the policy.
The file redirects to a provider
Fictional redirect chain : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt → https://intake.partner.example/security.txt
Contact: https://intake.partner.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The redirect chain changes host and ends at intake.partner.example.
Document each hop and verify the channel delegation. Using a provider proves neither fraud nor authenticity.
An encryption key is referenced, but not authenticated
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Encryption: https://publisher.example/report-key.asc
Encryption supplies an HTTPS key URI without local evidence of the key’s identity.
Authenticate the key through an appropriate means before use. Separate report encryption, file signing and actual protection of the submitted message.
From discovered channel to disclosure case: six useful records
The CERT/CC guide distinguishes finding a contact, providing a useful report and coordinating disclosure. The following outline is a local working proposal, imposing neither a universal fix deadline nor automatic publication.
| Record | How it helps | Limit to state |
|---|---|---|
| Product and version | Connect the report to a team and affected releases. | A website and an embedded component may have different owners. |
| Observed behaviour | Explain expected and actual results with appropriate reproduction steps. | Separate reproduced facts, impact hypotheses and untested conditions. |
| Channel and recipients | Keep the discovery URL, chosen contact and consulted policy. | Send sensitive evidence only after verifying the recipient and transmission protection. |
| Owner and follow-up | Record acknowledgement, case identifier and agreed next contact. | Acknowledgement confirms neither impact nor remediation. |
| Affected parties | Identify maintainers, suppliers and products sharing the component. | A supplier’s fix does not establish deployment by every consumer. |
| Fix and communication | Connect fixed versions, remaining limits and actions expected from users. | Record the agreed timetable and revisit it as facts change; Expires does not dictate a public disclosure date. |
Three limits to keep visible
- The presence or absence of security.txt alone neither grants nor denies testing permission; applicable conditions need separate verification.
- RFC 9116 recommends an OpenPGP signature for the file; verifying a signature and establishing trust in its key remain distinct questions.
- A compromised site can publish a false contact. Intrusions or suspected file tampering may call for an independent channel; this mechanism primarily addresses vulnerability response.
Primary sources and scope
- IETF · RFC 9116 · security.txt · Informational · 2022-04
§2.3–2.5, §3–3.1, §4, §5.1–5.7 - CERT/CC · How to Coordinate Vulnerability Disclosures · Living guide · reviewed 2026-10-22
Initiating CVD · Providing Useful Reports · Finding Vendor Contacts · Unresponsive Vendor - IETF · RFC 2606 · Reserved Top Level DNS Names · BCP 32 · 1999-06
§2 · .example for documentation
Sources checked on
Referencias oficiales
Las referencias respaldan el método. Adapte los controles a su contexto; no constituyen certificación. Los títulos de referencia originales y los documentos fuente pueden estar en otro idioma.
Referencias consultadas el .
