Resources · 41
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure: receive, fix and inform
Build a safe route for external reports, assess impact, coordinate affected parties and publish useful guidance.
· 8 min
What this guide helps achieve
- Make reporting possible and safe
- Give every report an owner
- Coordinate a verifiable fix
- Give users actionable guidance
Quick check
- Can a report be sent without a customer account?
- Are scope and permitted tests clear?
- Who replies if the main contact is absent?
- Which products and suppliers share the flaw?
- What interim mitigation is useful?
- Does the advisory identify actually affected versions?
Step-by-step method
- 01
Publish a clear policy
State the scope, tests to avoid, contact channel, useful report details and response process. Have the policy reviewed for your context.
Deliverable: published policy and monitored channel.
- 02
Acknowledge and protect evidence
Confirm receipt, assign an identifier, limit circulation of sensitive details and request only evidence needed to reproduce the issue.
Deliverable: dated report with an owner.
- 03
Assess and expand scope
Reproduce without harming systems. Examine exploitability, assets, versions, data and components shared with other products or suppliers.
Deliverable: impact assessment and stakeholder map.
- 04
Coordinate remediation
Keep regular dialogue with the reporter and maintainers. Agree validation milestones and adapt communication if risk or dissemination changes.
Deliverable: shared timeline, fix and regression tests.
- 05
Publish and follow through
Explain affected versions, fixes or mitigations, user actions and uncertainties. Verify deployment and update the advisory as facts change.
Deliverable: versioned advisory and distribution evidence.
Worked example
Illustrative situation
A researcher reports an access-control failure in an old API version. The team acknowledges it, reproduces the case in an authorised environment and finds that a shared component affects two products.
Decision and expected evidence
The plan connects maintainers, versions, fix tests and an interim mitigation. The final advisory gives users a clear action and credits the researcher as agreed.
Management indicators
| Indicator | What it measures | First action |
|---|---|---|
| Receipt tracked | Reports with an owner and first-response date | Repair silent channels |
| Scope established | Affected products, versions and dependencies confirmed | Expand the search before final advice |
| Fix verified | Original and related cases replayed on released versions | Do not close a vulnerable variant |
| Users informed | Guidance reaches affected audiences | Update required channels and translations |
Common pitfalls
- Promising one deadline regardless of risk
- Requesting excessive personal data from the reporter
- Treating acknowledgement as remediation
- Publishing detailed exploitation evidence before usable mitigation
- Forgetting versions embedded by partners
Frequently asked questions
Is a disclosure policy a bug bounty?
No. A policy explains how to report and coordinate. Rewards need separate rules and resources.
Must communication always wait for a fix?
No. Timing depends on risk, interim measures and affected parties. Record and revisit the decision.
When should a coordinator help?
A coordinator can help when several vendors are affected, a contact is unresponsive or a shared timetable is difficult.
References: data, uses and limitations
Documentation reviewed on .
| Source and purpose | Verified data or benchmark | How to use it | Limitation to retain |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE Program Link discussions to the same vulnerability record. |
A JSON schema defines the CVE record format. An identifier and the published contents of its record are distinct things. | Open the record and references; check its state, described affected versions and supplier information. Keep the identifier in action tracking. | A CVE identifier is neither a severity score nor proof that your installation is affected. |
security.txt and disclosure
security.txt: find a reporting channel and check its context
A researcher may find a flaw without finding the right recipient. A security.txt file makes reporting channels and disclosure policies easier to discover. Its value then depends on monitored contacts, current information and a process that connects the report to the affected product.
This reference explains the format described in RFC 9116, an IETF Informational publication dated April 2022. The eight fields below are those defined by that RFC, rather than an exhaustive list of later extensions. Examples are fictional, using .example domains reserved for documentation. This page retrieves, validates, signs and publishes no real security.txt file.
Six discovery and publication checks
| Check | RFC 9116 reference point | Useful record |
|---|---|---|
| Location | For a web service, publish at /.well-known/security.txt. If both root and well-known files exist, use the well-known version. | Retrieved URL, response and any difference from /security.txt at the root. |
| Transport | Retrieve using HTTPS with HTTP 1.0 or later; referenced web URIs also use HTTPS. | Certificate check and retrieval result, separately from checks of the file’s fields. |
| Format | UTF-8 plain text; Content-Type text/plain with charset=utf-8. Each field occupies its own line. | Received header, observed encoding and a dated copy of the text examined. |
| Scope | The file applies to the domain or IP address in its retrieval URI; parent domains and subdomains are not inherited automatically. | Exact host, affected product and scope explained in the linked policy. |
| Redirects | A redirect may be legitimate but needs further inspection. The RFC recommends keeping a record. | Redirect chain, host changes and the reason for using an external provider. |
| Maintenance | Expires is mandatory. Contacts, links and keys need to remain accessible and controlled by the organisation. | Publication owner, verification date and a local review deadline before expiry. |
Eight fields defined by RFC 9116
| Field | Presence and repetition | Useful interpretation | Pitfall |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contact | Required; one or more occurrences. | Contact URI, such as mailto: or an HTTPS page. Occurrences should follow the publisher’s preference order. | An email address without mailto: is not a conforming Contact URI. Publishing a channel does not establish that it is monitored. |
| Expires | Required; exactly one occurrence. | RFC 3339 timestamp after which the data is stale and should not be used. A date less than one year ahead is recommended. | That recommendation is neither a mandatory one-year duration nor a vulnerability remediation deadline. |
| Canonical | Optional; may repeat. | Canonical URIs where the file is published. If the retrieval URI is absent from these fields, the RFC recommends not trusting the contents. | Listing several Canonical URIs does not authenticate every listed host. An additional trust mechanism remains useful. |
| Encryption | Optional; may repeat. | URI locating an encryption key; the key itself must not appear in this field. | The referenced key is not necessarily the file’s signing key. Its presence proves neither authenticity nor that a report was encrypted. |
| Policy | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the disclosure policy: scope, reporting practices and conditions explained by the organisation. | The file does not replace that policy or by itself define a reward, response deadline or testing permission. |
| Preferred-Languages | Optional; at most one occurrence, containing at least one language. | Comma-separated language tags with equal priority regardless of order. If absent, English may be assumed. | fr, en does not prioritise French. Several Preferred-Languages lines do not replace a single list. |
| Acknowledgments | Optional; may repeat. | Link to a page recognising people who helped remediate vulnerabilities. | Coordinate public credit; it does not authorise premature disclosure of flaw details. |
| Hiring | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the organisation’s security-related vacancies. | Do not confuse a hiring link with the reporting channel. |
Annotated fictional example: contact, time, origin and policy
Training reading at the fictional instant 22 October 2026, 10:00 UTC. The two Contact occurrences are ordered; the two languages have equal priority. Expiry is six months later. This is not Cyber Intelligence Embassy’s security.txt file and provides no real reporting channel.
# Fictional training example, not this site's reporting policy
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Contact: https://publisher.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Policy: https://publisher.example/disclosure-policy
Preferred-Languages: fr, en
This example remains unsigned. Canonical identifies the expected URI but does not replace authenticity evidence. Before sending a sensitive report, verify the recipient, policy and appropriate transmission protections.
Eight situations separating format, freshness and trust
Each excerpt isolates one question; no conclusion is a complete file validation. Observations and proposed next steps are editorial guidance. Addresses shown in excerpts are not links to contact.
Essential fields are present
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
A contact, future expiry and the expected canonical URI appear in this excerpt.
Continue checking transport, recipient identity and policy. These fields prove neither mailbox operation nor testing permission.
Contact contains a bare email address
Contact: security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The mailto: scheme is missing; the value lacks the URI form required for Contact.
Correct the source publication. A tool’s possible tolerance does not establish format conformity.
Expires occurs twice
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-01-22T10:00:00Z
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Two occurrences conflict with the Expires uniqueness rule.
Publish one expiry after correcting the file. Silently choosing the more convenient date conceals the publication defect.
The expiry date has passed
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2026-10-21T10:00:00Z
At the fictional evaluation instant the file expired twenty-four hours earlier.
Treat its data as stale and seek a verified current channel. Retain the old copy as history without presenting it as a current contact.
Canonical omits the retrieval URI
Fictional retrieval URI : https://api.publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
The file retrieved for api.publisher.example lists only publisher.example in Canonical.
Apply the recommendation not to trust these contents in this context and request publication verification. Similar hostnames do not resolve the mismatch.
The report concerns a subdomain
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Host concerned by the report : https://api.publisher.example/
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The file belongs to publisher.example; the reported asset is api.publisher.example.
Do not infer subdomain coverage. Check its own discovery location and the product scope explicitly described in the policy.
The file redirects to a provider
Fictional redirect chain : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt → https://intake.partner.example/security.txt
Contact: https://intake.partner.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The redirect chain changes host and ends at intake.partner.example.
Document each hop and verify the channel delegation. Using a provider proves neither fraud nor authenticity.
An encryption key is referenced, but not authenticated
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Encryption: https://publisher.example/report-key.asc
Encryption supplies an HTTPS key URI without local evidence of the key’s identity.
Authenticate the key through an appropriate means before use. Separate report encryption, file signing and actual protection of the submitted message.
From discovered channel to disclosure case: six useful records
The CERT/CC guide distinguishes finding a contact, providing a useful report and coordinating disclosure. The following outline is a local working proposal, imposing neither a universal fix deadline nor automatic publication.
| Record | How it helps | Limit to state |
|---|---|---|
| Product and version | Connect the report to a team and affected releases. | A website and an embedded component may have different owners. |
| Observed behaviour | Explain expected and actual results with appropriate reproduction steps. | Separate reproduced facts, impact hypotheses and untested conditions. |
| Channel and recipients | Keep the discovery URL, chosen contact and consulted policy. | Send sensitive evidence only after verifying the recipient and transmission protection. |
| Owner and follow-up | Record acknowledgement, case identifier and agreed next contact. | Acknowledgement confirms neither impact nor remediation. |
| Affected parties | Identify maintainers, suppliers and products sharing the component. | A supplier’s fix does not establish deployment by every consumer. |
| Fix and communication | Connect fixed versions, remaining limits and actions expected from users. | Record the agreed timetable and revisit it as facts change; Expires does not dictate a public disclosure date. |
Three limits to keep visible
- The presence or absence of security.txt alone neither grants nor denies testing permission; applicable conditions need separate verification.
- RFC 9116 recommends an OpenPGP signature for the file; verifying a signature and establishing trust in its key remain distinct questions.
- A compromised site can publish a false contact. Intrusions or suspected file tampering may call for an independent channel; this mechanism primarily addresses vulnerability response.
Primary sources and scope
- IETF · RFC 9116 · security.txt · Informational · 2022-04
§2.3–2.5, §3–3.1, §4, §5.1–5.7 - CERT/CC · How to Coordinate Vulnerability Disclosures · Living guide · reviewed 2026-10-22
Initiating CVD · Providing Useful Reports · Finding Vendor Contacts · Unresponsive Vendor - IETF · RFC 2606 · Reserved Top Level DNS Names · BCP 32 · 1999-06
§2 · .example for documentation
Sources checked on
Official references
References consulted: . The method and worksheet propose checks to adapt to your context; they do not constitute certification.
