リソース · 41
脆弱性開示の調整:報告、修正、および情報提供
外部報告のための安全な経路を構築し、影響を評価し、関係者を調整し、有用なガイダンスを公開する。
更新済み · 17 min
このガイドが達成するのに役立つこと
- 報告を可能にし、安全にする。
- すべての報告に担当者を割り当てる。
- 検証可能な修正を調整する。
- ユーザーに実行可能なガイダンスを提供する。
クイックチェック
- 顧客アカウントなしで報告を送信できるか?
- 範囲と許可されたテストは明確ですか?
- 主要連絡担当者が不在の場合、誰が対応しますか?
- どの製品とサプライヤーがこの脆弱性を共有していますか?
- どのような暫定的な緩和策が有効ですか?
- アドバイザリには、実際に影響を受けるバージョンが明記されていますか?
手順
- 1
明確なポリシーを公開してください。
範囲、避けるべきテスト、連絡チャネル、有用なレポートの詳細、および対応プロセスを明記してください。 ポリシーは、貴社の状況に合わせてレビューしてください。
成果物:公開されたポリシーと監視対象のチャネル。
- 2
証拠の確認と保護
受領を確認し、識別子を割り当て、機密情報の配布を制限し、問題の再現に必要な証拠のみを要求してください。
成果物:担当者を明記した日付入りのレポート。
- 3
範囲の評価と拡大
システムに損害を与えることなく再現してください。 他の製品またはサプライヤーと共有されている悪用可能性、資産、バージョン、データ、およびコンポーネントを調査してください。
成果物:影響評価とステークホルダーマップ
- 4
是正措置の調整
報告者および保守担当者と定期的に対話する。 検証のマイルストーンを合意し、リスクや情報伝達状況の変化に応じてコミュニケーション方法を調整する。
成果物:共有タイムライン、修正テスト、回帰テスト
- 5
公開とフォローアップ
影響を受けるバージョン、修正または緩和策、ユーザーの対応、および不確実性について説明する。 展開状況を確認し、事実の変化に応じてアドバイザリを更新する。
成果物:バージョン管理されたアドバイザリと配布状況の証拠
架空の事例
具体的な状況
研究者から、古いAPIバージョンにおけるアクセス制御の不具合が報告された。 チームはこれを確認し、承認された環境で再現テストを行った結果、共有コンポーネントが2つの製品に影響を与えていることがわかった。
決定と期待される証拠
計画では、保守担当者、バージョン、修正テスト、および暫定的な緩和策を関連付ける。 最終的なアドバイザリでは、ユーザーに明確な対応策を示し、合意に基づき研究者の功績を明記する。
管理指標
| 指標 | 測定対象 | 最初のアクション |
|---|---|---|
| 受領状況の追跡 | 報告者と初回対応日を明記 | サイレントチャネルの修復 |
| スコープの確立 | 影響を受ける製品、バージョン、依存関係の確認 | 最終アドバイスの前に検索範囲を拡大 |
| 修正の検証 | リリース済みバージョンで元のケースと関連ケースを再現 | 脆弱性のあるバージョンをクローズしない |
| ユーザーへの通知 | ガイダンスが影響を受けるユーザーに届く | 必要なチャネルと翻訳の更新 |
よくある間違い
- リスクに関係なく期限を1つだけ約束する
- 報告者から過剰な個人データを要求する
- 確認を是正措置とみなす
- 使用可能な緩和策の前に詳細な悪用証拠を公開する
- パートナーによって埋め込まれたバージョンを忘れる
よくある質問
開示ポリシーはバグ報奨金制度に該当するか?
いいえ。ポリシーで報告と調整の方法を定めます。 報酬には別途ルールとリソースが必要です。
コミュニケーションは常に修正完了まで待つべきでしょうか?
いいえ。タイミングはリスク、暫定措置、関係者によって異なります。 決定事項を記録し、再検討してください。
コーディネーターはいつ支援すべきでしょうか?
複数のベンダーが影響を受けている場合、担当者からの応答がない場合、または共通のスケジュール調整が難しい場合に、コーディネーターが支援できます。
参照資料:データ・用途・限界
資料確認日 .
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
| 出典と目的 | 確認済みのデータ・指標 | 利用方法 | 留意する限界 |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE Program Link discussions to the same vulnerability record. |
A JSON schema defines the CVE record format. An identifier and the published contents of its record are distinct things. | Open the record and references; check its state, described affected versions and supplier information. Keep the identifier in action tracking. | A CVE identifier is neither a severity score nor proof that your installation is affected. |
security.txtと脆弱性開示
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
security.txt: find a reporting channel and check its context
A researcher may find a flaw without finding the right recipient. A security.txt file makes reporting channels and disclosure policies easier to discover. Its value then depends on monitored contacts, current information and a process that connects the report to the affected product.
This reference explains the format described in RFC 9116, an IETF Informational publication dated April 2022. The eight fields below are those defined by that RFC, rather than an exhaustive list of later extensions. Examples are fictional, using .example domains reserved for documentation. This page retrieves, validates, signs and publishes no real security.txt file.
Six discovery and publication checks
| Check | RFC 9116 reference point | Useful record |
|---|---|---|
| Location | For a web service, publish at /.well-known/security.txt. If both root and well-known files exist, use the well-known version. | Retrieved URL, response and any difference from /security.txt at the root. |
| Transport | Retrieve using HTTPS with HTTP 1.0 or later; referenced web URIs also use HTTPS. | Certificate check and retrieval result, separately from checks of the file’s fields. |
| Format | UTF-8 plain text; Content-Type text/plain with charset=utf-8. Each field occupies its own line. | Received header, observed encoding and a dated copy of the text examined. |
| Scope | The file applies to the domain or IP address in its retrieval URI; parent domains and subdomains are not inherited automatically. | Exact host, affected product and scope explained in the linked policy. |
| Redirects | A redirect may be legitimate but needs further inspection. The RFC recommends keeping a record. | Redirect chain, host changes and the reason for using an external provider. |
| Maintenance | Expires is mandatory. Contacts, links and keys need to remain accessible and controlled by the organisation. | Publication owner, verification date and a local review deadline before expiry. |
Eight fields defined by RFC 9116
| Field | Presence and repetition | Useful interpretation | Pitfall |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contact | Required; one or more occurrences. | Contact URI, such as mailto: or an HTTPS page. Occurrences should follow the publisher’s preference order. | An email address without mailto: is not a conforming Contact URI. Publishing a channel does not establish that it is monitored. |
| Expires | Required; exactly one occurrence. | RFC 3339 timestamp after which the data is stale and should not be used. A date less than one year ahead is recommended. | That recommendation is neither a mandatory one-year duration nor a vulnerability remediation deadline. |
| Canonical | Optional; may repeat. | Canonical URIs where the file is published. If the retrieval URI is absent from these fields, the RFC recommends not trusting the contents. | Listing several Canonical URIs does not authenticate every listed host. An additional trust mechanism remains useful. |
| Encryption | Optional; may repeat. | URI locating an encryption key; the key itself must not appear in this field. | The referenced key is not necessarily the file’s signing key. Its presence proves neither authenticity nor that a report was encrypted. |
| Policy | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the disclosure policy: scope, reporting practices and conditions explained by the organisation. | The file does not replace that policy or by itself define a reward, response deadline or testing permission. |
| Preferred-Languages | Optional; at most one occurrence, containing at least one language. | Comma-separated language tags with equal priority regardless of order. If absent, English may be assumed. | fr, en does not prioritise French. Several Preferred-Languages lines do not replace a single list. |
| Acknowledgments | Optional; may repeat. | Link to a page recognising people who helped remediate vulnerabilities. | Coordinate public credit; it does not authorise premature disclosure of flaw details. |
| Hiring | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the organisation’s security-related vacancies. | Do not confuse a hiring link with the reporting channel. |
Annotated fictional example: contact, time, origin and policy
Training reading at the fictional instant 22 October 2026, 10:00 UTC. The two Contact occurrences are ordered; the two languages have equal priority. Expiry is six months later. This is not Cyber Intelligence Embassy’s security.txt file and provides no real reporting channel.
# Fictional training example, not this site's reporting policy
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Contact: https://publisher.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Policy: https://publisher.example/disclosure-policy
Preferred-Languages: fr, en
This example remains unsigned. Canonical identifies the expected URI but does not replace authenticity evidence. Before sending a sensitive report, verify the recipient, policy and appropriate transmission protections.
Eight situations separating format, freshness and trust
Each excerpt isolates one question; no conclusion is a complete file validation. Observations and proposed next steps are editorial guidance. Addresses shown in excerpts are not links to contact.
Essential fields are present
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
A contact, future expiry and the expected canonical URI appear in this excerpt.
Continue checking transport, recipient identity and policy. These fields prove neither mailbox operation nor testing permission.
Contact contains a bare email address
Contact: security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The mailto: scheme is missing; the value lacks the URI form required for Contact.
Correct the source publication. A tool’s possible tolerance does not establish format conformity.
Expires occurs twice
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-01-22T10:00:00Z
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Two occurrences conflict with the Expires uniqueness rule.
Publish one expiry after correcting the file. Silently choosing the more convenient date conceals the publication defect.
The expiry date has passed
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2026-10-21T10:00:00Z
At the fictional evaluation instant the file expired twenty-four hours earlier.
Treat its data as stale and seek a verified current channel. Retain the old copy as history without presenting it as a current contact.
Canonical omits the retrieval URI
Fictional retrieval URI : https://api.publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
The file retrieved for api.publisher.example lists only publisher.example in Canonical.
Apply the recommendation not to trust these contents in this context and request publication verification. Similar hostnames do not resolve the mismatch.
The report concerns a subdomain
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Host concerned by the report : https://api.publisher.example/
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The file belongs to publisher.example; the reported asset is api.publisher.example.
Do not infer subdomain coverage. Check its own discovery location and the product scope explicitly described in the policy.
The file redirects to a provider
Fictional redirect chain : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt → https://intake.partner.example/security.txt
Contact: https://intake.partner.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The redirect chain changes host and ends at intake.partner.example.
Document each hop and verify the channel delegation. Using a provider proves neither fraud nor authenticity.
An encryption key is referenced, but not authenticated
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Encryption: https://publisher.example/report-key.asc
Encryption supplies an HTTPS key URI without local evidence of the key’s identity.
Authenticate the key through an appropriate means before use. Separate report encryption, file signing and actual protection of the submitted message.
From discovered channel to disclosure case: six useful records
The CERT/CC guide distinguishes finding a contact, providing a useful report and coordinating disclosure. The following outline is a local working proposal, imposing neither a universal fix deadline nor automatic publication.
| Record | How it helps | Limit to state |
|---|---|---|
| Product and version | Connect the report to a team and affected releases. | A website and an embedded component may have different owners. |
| Observed behaviour | Explain expected and actual results with appropriate reproduction steps. | Separate reproduced facts, impact hypotheses and untested conditions. |
| Channel and recipients | Keep the discovery URL, chosen contact and consulted policy. | Send sensitive evidence only after verifying the recipient and transmission protection. |
| Owner and follow-up | Record acknowledgement, case identifier and agreed next contact. | Acknowledgement confirms neither impact nor remediation. |
| Affected parties | Identify maintainers, suppliers and products sharing the component. | A supplier’s fix does not establish deployment by every consumer. |
| Fix and communication | Connect fixed versions, remaining limits and actions expected from users. | Record the agreed timetable and revisit it as facts change; Expires does not dictate a public disclosure date. |
Three limits to keep visible
- The presence or absence of security.txt alone neither grants nor denies testing permission; applicable conditions need separate verification.
- RFC 9116 recommends an OpenPGP signature for the file; verifying a signature and establishing trust in its key remain distinct questions.
- A compromised site can publish a false contact. Intrusions or suspected file tampering may call for an independent channel; this mechanism primarily addresses vulnerability response.
Primary sources and scope
- IETF · RFC 9116 · security.txt · Informational · 2022-04
§2.3–2.5, §3–3.1, §4, §5.1–5.7 - CERT/CC · How to Coordinate Vulnerability Disclosures · Living guide · reviewed 2026-10-22
Initiating CVD · Providing Useful Reports · Finding Vendor Contacts · Unresponsive Vendor - IETF · RFC 2606 · Reserved Top Level DNS Names · BCP 32 · 1999-06
§2 · .example for documentation
Sources checked on
公式参照文献
参照文献はメソッドを裏付けるものです。 チェックは状況に合わせて調整してください。 これらは認証ではありません。 元の参照文献のタイトルやソース文書は別の言語で書かれている場合があります。
参照資料の確認日 .
