Risorse · 41
Divulgazione coordinata delle vulnerabilità: ricevere, correggere e informare.
Creare un percorso sicuro per le segnalazioni esterne, valutare l'impatto, coordinare le parti interessate e pubblicare linee guida utili.
Aggiornato · 8 min
Obiettivi di questa guida
- Rendere la segnalazione possibile e sicura.
- Assegnare un responsabile a ogni segnalazione.
- Coordinare una soluzione verificabile.
- Fornire agli utenti indicazioni pratiche.
Verifica rapida
- È possibile inviare una segnalazione senza un account cliente?
- L'ambito e i test consentiti sono chiari?
- Chi risponde in caso di assenza del contatto principale?
- Quali prodotti e fornitori presentano la vulnerabilità?
- Quali misure di mitigazione provvisorie sono utili?
- L'avviso identifica le versioni effettivamente interessate?
Metodo passo passo
- 1
Pubblicare una policy chiara
Indicare l'ambito, i test da evitare, il canale di contatto, i dettagli utili per la segnalazione e la procedura di risposta. Far rivedere la policy in base al proprio contesto.
Risultato: policy pubblicata e canale monitorato.
- 2
Confermare e proteggere le prove
Confermare la ricezione, assegnare un identificativo, limitare la diffusione di dettagli sensibili e richiedere solo le prove necessarie per riprodurre il problema.
Risultato: report datato con un responsabile.
- 3
Valutare ed estendere l'ambito
Riprodurre senza danneggiare i sistemi. Esaminare la sfruttabilità, le risorse, le versioni, i dati e i componenti condivisi con altri prodotti o fornitori.
Risultato atteso: valutazione d'impatto e mappatura degli stakeholder.
- 4
Coordinamento delle attività di correzione.
Mantenere un dialogo costante con il segnalatore e i manutentori. Concordare le tappe fondamentali della validazione e adattare la comunicazione in caso di variazioni del rischio o della diffusione.
Risultato atteso: cronologia condivisa, correzione e test di regressione.
- 5
Pubblicazione e monitoraggio.
Spiegare le versioni interessate, le correzioni o le misure di mitigazione, le azioni degli utenti e le incertezze. Verificare l'implementazione e aggiornare l'avviso in base all'evolversi della situazione.
Risultato atteso: avviso versionato e documentazione della distribuzione.
Esempio pratico fittizio
Situazione illustrativa
Un ricercatore segnala un errore di controllo degli accessi in una vecchia versione dell'API. Il team ne prende atto, riproduce il caso in un ambiente autorizzato e scopre che un componente condiviso interessa due prodotti.
Decisione e prove attese
Il piano collega i manutentori, le versioni, i test di correzione e una soluzione di mitigazione provvisoria. L'avviso finale fornisce agli utenti un'azione chiara e riconosce il merito al ricercatore come concordato.
Indicatori di gestione
| Indicatore | Cosa misura | Prima azione |
|---|---|---|
| Ricevuta tracciata | Segnalazioni con responsabile e data di prima risposta | Riparare i canali silenziosi |
| Ambito definito | Prodotti, versioni e dipendenze interessati confermati | Ampliare la ricerca prima di fornire un parere definitivo |
| Correzione verificata | Casi originali e correlati riprodotti sulle versioni rilasciate | Non chiudere una variante vulnerabile |
| Utenti informati | Le linee guida raggiungono il pubblico interessato | Aggiornare i canali e le traduzioni necessari |
Errori comuni
- Promettere una scadenza indipendentemente dal rischio
- Richiedere dati personali eccessivi al segnalatore
- Trattare la conferma di ricezione come soluzione
- Pubblicare prove dettagliate dello sfruttamento prima di una mitigazione utilizzabile
- Dimenticare le versioni incorporate dai partner
Domande frequenti
Una politica di divulgazione è un bug bounty?
No. Una politica spiega come segnalare e coordinarsi. I premi richiedono regole e risorse separate.
La comunicazione deve sempre attendere la risoluzione del problema?
No. I tempi dipendono dal rischio, dalle misure provvisorie e dalle parti interessate. Registrare e rivedere la decisione.
Quando è opportuno l'intervento di un coordinatore?
Un coordinatore può essere d'aiuto quando sono coinvolti diversi fornitori, un contatto non risponde o è difficile concordare una tempistica condivisa.
Riferimenti: dati, usi e limiti
Documentazione consultata il .
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
| Fonte e finalità | Dato o riferimento verificato | Come utilizzarlo | Limite da conservare |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE Program Link discussions to the same vulnerability record. |
A JSON schema defines the CVE record format. An identifier and the published contents of its record are distinct things. | Open the record and references; check its state, described affected versions and supplier information. Keep the identifier in action tracking. | A CVE identifier is neither a severity score nor proof that your installation is affected. |
security.txt e divulgazione
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
security.txt: find a reporting channel and check its context
A researcher may find a flaw without finding the right recipient. A security.txt file makes reporting channels and disclosure policies easier to discover. Its value then depends on monitored contacts, current information and a process that connects the report to the affected product.
This reference explains the format described in RFC 9116, an IETF Informational publication dated April 2022. The eight fields below are those defined by that RFC, rather than an exhaustive list of later extensions. Examples are fictional, using .example domains reserved for documentation. This page retrieves, validates, signs and publishes no real security.txt file.
Six discovery and publication checks
| Check | RFC 9116 reference point | Useful record |
|---|---|---|
| Location | For a web service, publish at /.well-known/security.txt. If both root and well-known files exist, use the well-known version. | Retrieved URL, response and any difference from /security.txt at the root. |
| Transport | Retrieve using HTTPS with HTTP 1.0 or later; referenced web URIs also use HTTPS. | Certificate check and retrieval result, separately from checks of the file’s fields. |
| Format | UTF-8 plain text; Content-Type text/plain with charset=utf-8. Each field occupies its own line. | Received header, observed encoding and a dated copy of the text examined. |
| Scope | The file applies to the domain or IP address in its retrieval URI; parent domains and subdomains are not inherited automatically. | Exact host, affected product and scope explained in the linked policy. |
| Redirects | A redirect may be legitimate but needs further inspection. The RFC recommends keeping a record. | Redirect chain, host changes and the reason for using an external provider. |
| Maintenance | Expires is mandatory. Contacts, links and keys need to remain accessible and controlled by the organisation. | Publication owner, verification date and a local review deadline before expiry. |
Eight fields defined by RFC 9116
| Field | Presence and repetition | Useful interpretation | Pitfall |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contact | Required; one or more occurrences. | Contact URI, such as mailto: or an HTTPS page. Occurrences should follow the publisher’s preference order. | An email address without mailto: is not a conforming Contact URI. Publishing a channel does not establish that it is monitored. |
| Expires | Required; exactly one occurrence. | RFC 3339 timestamp after which the data is stale and should not be used. A date less than one year ahead is recommended. | That recommendation is neither a mandatory one-year duration nor a vulnerability remediation deadline. |
| Canonical | Optional; may repeat. | Canonical URIs where the file is published. If the retrieval URI is absent from these fields, the RFC recommends not trusting the contents. | Listing several Canonical URIs does not authenticate every listed host. An additional trust mechanism remains useful. |
| Encryption | Optional; may repeat. | URI locating an encryption key; the key itself must not appear in this field. | The referenced key is not necessarily the file’s signing key. Its presence proves neither authenticity nor that a report was encrypted. |
| Policy | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the disclosure policy: scope, reporting practices and conditions explained by the organisation. | The file does not replace that policy or by itself define a reward, response deadline or testing permission. |
| Preferred-Languages | Optional; at most one occurrence, containing at least one language. | Comma-separated language tags with equal priority regardless of order. If absent, English may be assumed. | fr, en does not prioritise French. Several Preferred-Languages lines do not replace a single list. |
| Acknowledgments | Optional; may repeat. | Link to a page recognising people who helped remediate vulnerabilities. | Coordinate public credit; it does not authorise premature disclosure of flaw details. |
| Hiring | Optional; may repeat. | Link to the organisation’s security-related vacancies. | Do not confuse a hiring link with the reporting channel. |
Annotated fictional example: contact, time, origin and policy
Training reading at the fictional instant 22 October 2026, 10:00 UTC. The two Contact occurrences are ordered; the two languages have equal priority. Expiry is six months later. This is not Cyber Intelligence Embassy’s security.txt file and provides no real reporting channel.
# Fictional training example, not this site's reporting policy
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Contact: https://publisher.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Policy: https://publisher.example/disclosure-policy
Preferred-Languages: fr, en
This example remains unsigned. Canonical identifies the expected URI but does not replace authenticity evidence. Before sending a sensitive report, verify the recipient, policy and appropriate transmission protections.
Eight situations separating format, freshness and trust
Each excerpt isolates one question; no conclusion is a complete file validation. Observations and proposed next steps are editorial guidance. Addresses shown in excerpts are not links to contact.
Essential fields are present
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
A contact, future expiry and the expected canonical URI appear in this excerpt.
Continue checking transport, recipient identity and policy. These fields prove neither mailbox operation nor testing permission.
Contact contains a bare email address
Contact: security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The mailto: scheme is missing; the value lacks the URI form required for Contact.
Correct the source publication. A tool’s possible tolerance does not establish format conformity.
Expires occurs twice
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-01-22T10:00:00Z
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Two occurrences conflict with the Expires uniqueness rule.
Publish one expiry after correcting the file. Silently choosing the more convenient date conceals the publication defect.
The expiry date has passed
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2026-10-21T10:00:00Z
At the fictional evaluation instant the file expired twenty-four hours earlier.
Treat its data as stale and seek a verified current channel. Retain the old copy as history without presenting it as a current contact.
Canonical omits the retrieval URI
Fictional retrieval URI : https://api.publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Canonical: https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
The file retrieved for api.publisher.example lists only publisher.example in Canonical.
Apply the recommendation not to trust these contents in this context and request publication verification. Similar hostnames do not resolve the mismatch.
The report concerns a subdomain
Fictional retrieval URI : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt
Host concerned by the report : https://api.publisher.example/
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The file belongs to publisher.example; the reported asset is api.publisher.example.
Do not infer subdomain coverage. Check its own discovery location and the product scope explicitly described in the policy.
The file redirects to a provider
Fictional redirect chain : https://publisher.example/.well-known/security.txt → https://intake.partner.example/security.txt
Contact: https://intake.partner.example/report
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
The redirect chain changes host and ends at intake.partner.example.
Document each hop and verify the channel delegation. Using a provider proves neither fraud nor authenticity.
An encryption key is referenced, but not authenticated
Contact: mailto:security@publisher.example
Expires: 2027-04-22T10:00:00Z
Encryption: https://publisher.example/report-key.asc
Encryption supplies an HTTPS key URI without local evidence of the key’s identity.
Authenticate the key through an appropriate means before use. Separate report encryption, file signing and actual protection of the submitted message.
From discovered channel to disclosure case: six useful records
The CERT/CC guide distinguishes finding a contact, providing a useful report and coordinating disclosure. The following outline is a local working proposal, imposing neither a universal fix deadline nor automatic publication.
| Record | How it helps | Limit to state |
|---|---|---|
| Product and version | Connect the report to a team and affected releases. | A website and an embedded component may have different owners. |
| Observed behaviour | Explain expected and actual results with appropriate reproduction steps. | Separate reproduced facts, impact hypotheses and untested conditions. |
| Channel and recipients | Keep the discovery URL, chosen contact and consulted policy. | Send sensitive evidence only after verifying the recipient and transmission protection. |
| Owner and follow-up | Record acknowledgement, case identifier and agreed next contact. | Acknowledgement confirms neither impact nor remediation. |
| Affected parties | Identify maintainers, suppliers and products sharing the component. | A supplier’s fix does not establish deployment by every consumer. |
| Fix and communication | Connect fixed versions, remaining limits and actions expected from users. | Record the agreed timetable and revisit it as facts change; Expires does not dictate a public disclosure date. |
Three limits to keep visible
- The presence or absence of security.txt alone neither grants nor denies testing permission; applicable conditions need separate verification.
- RFC 9116 recommends an OpenPGP signature for the file; verifying a signature and establishing trust in its key remain distinct questions.
- A compromised site can publish a false contact. Intrusions or suspected file tampering may call for an independent channel; this mechanism primarily addresses vulnerability response.
Primary sources and scope
- IETF · RFC 9116 · security.txt · Informational · 2022-04
§2.3–2.5, §3–3.1, §4, §5.1–5.7 - CERT/CC · How to Coordinate Vulnerability Disclosures · Living guide · reviewed 2026-10-22
Initiating CVD · Providing Useful Reports · Finding Vendor Contacts · Unresponsive Vendor - IETF · RFC 2606 · Reserved Top Level DNS Names · BCP 32 · 1999-06
§2 · .example for documentation
Sources checked on
Riferimenti ufficiali
I riferimenti supportano il metodo. Adattare i controlli al proprio contesto; non costituiscono una certificazione. I titoli dei riferimenti originali e i documenti di origine potrebbero essere in un'altra lingua.
Riferimenti consultati il .
