Recursos · 11

Recuperação de identidade e conta: governe todo o ciclo de vida.

Conecte a criação, alteração, privilégios, recuperação e encerramento de contas a evidências verificáveis ​​e decisões ensaiadas.

Atualizado · 8 min

Sala fictícia vazia de verificação de identidade com duas chaves de segurança, cartão em branco e pasta bordô Ilustração editorial gerada com IA

O que este guia ajuda a alcançar

  • Conectar cada conta a uma pessoa ou serviço
  • Reduzir privilégios permanentes
  • Proteger solicitações de recuperação
  • Revogar rapidamente sem perder a continuidade

Verificação rápida

  • Quem aprova a criação e a alteração de função?
  • Um antigo fator de redefinição da conta sozinho?
  • As ações em contas compartilhadas são atribuíveis?
  • Os privilégios expiram?
  • A perda do telefone foi exercida?

Método passo a passo

  1. 1

    Inventariar identidades e dependências

    Listar contas humanas, de serviço, compartilhadas, federadas e de emergência. Conectá-las a aplicativos, proprietários, métodos de autenticação e dados acessíveis.

    Entregável: registro de identidade, conta, sistema e proprietário.

  2. 2

    Conectar o ciclo de vida a eventos

    Definir gatilhos para integração, mobilidade, ausência, alteração de função, desligamento e exclusão. Medir o atraso entre o evento e a alteração de acesso efetiva.

    Entregável: matriz de eventos e ações.

  3. 3

    Reduzir privilégios

    Separar o uso diário da administração, limitar a duração do acesso privilegiado e revisar as permissões de acordo com o risco do serviço.

    Entregável: catálogo de funções e exceções datadas.

  4. 4

    Reforçar a recuperação

    Usar evidências independentes, um canal seguro, atraso adequado e escalonamento humano para solicitações incomuns.

    Entregável: árvore de decisão de recuperação.

  5. 5

    Preparar-se para perdas e comprometimento

    Planejar revogação de sessão, fator e dispositivo, comunicação com a central de serviços, acesso alternativo e retenção proporcional de rastreamento.

    Entregável: manual de bloqueio e recuperação.

  6. 6

    Exercitar e aprimorar

    Testar uma saída urgente, perda de telefone e tentativa de personificação. Observar decisões, tempo, evidências e impacto operacional.

    Entregável: relatório do exercício e plano de remediação.

Exemplo prático fictício

Situação ilustrativa

Um administrador perde um dispositivo de autenticação durante uma chamada. O suporte verifica uma prova previamente acordada, obtém uma segunda aprovação para recuperação e invalida as sessões afetadas.

Decisão e evidências esperadas

O exercício verifica a continuidade do serviço e retém a solicitação, a aprovação, o fator substituído e a revisão pós-incidente.

Indicadores de gestão

IndicadorO que medePrimeira ação
Contas atribuídasContas conectadas a um proprietário ativoPriorizar contas sem proprietário
Atraso na revogaçãoTempo entre o evento e a remoção do acessoAutomatizar etapas confiáveis
Privilégio temporárioAcesso elevado com duração e justificativaExpirar o direito por padrão
Recuperação verificadaSolicitações após cada comprovação esperadaRevisar cada exceção

Erros comuns

  • Tratar perguntas pessoais como evidência forte
  • Permitir que o suporte ignore a MFA sem controle duplo
  • Esquecer contas de serviço
  • Manter privilégios após uma atribuição

Perguntas frequentes

A MFA é suficiente?

Não. Ela reduz alguns riscos, mas o ciclo de vida, a recuperação, as sessões e os privilégios ainda podem permanecer vulneráveis.

Todas as contas compartilhadas devem ser proibidas?

Prefira identidades individuais. Quando uma conta compartilhada ainda for necessária, documente o motivo, restrinja seu uso e torne cada utilização atribuível.

O que deve ser feito primeiro?

A perda do fator primário e a saída urgente de uma pessoa com altos privilégios expõem rapidamente as dependências reais.

Identidade: fatores, sessões e recuperação

As notas detalhadas desta edição estão disponíveis em inglês.

An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.

References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.

Sources consulted on .

Duas chaves de segurança sem marca num laboratório cibernético vazio Ilustração editorial gerada com IA
Two unbranded keys in an empty lab. Appearance proves neither key non-exportability nor assurance level.

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
Method and referenceProperty and conditionsRecovery and dependenciesEvidence to request
Entered password

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret.Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path.Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey.
Manually entered TOTP

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session.Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups.Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant.
SMS or voice code

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant.The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies.Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure.
Simple push approval

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance.Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling.Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient.
Syncable WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Syncable Authenticators

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology.The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary.Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export.
Device-bound WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection.Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery.Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients.
WebAuthn key without UV

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV).Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation.UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA.
Biometrics considered alone

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms.Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately.Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof.

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
Level and factorsResistance and key exportOverall reauthentication timeoutInactivity
AAL1

One factor can suffice at this level.

Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted.At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation.No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy.
AAL2

Two distinct factors.

A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions.At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory.At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation.
AAL3

Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor.

Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required.At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement.At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation.

These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →

Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points

Single factor
Minimum 15 characters required.
Within MFA
Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
Accepted length
Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
Composition
No imposed mixture of character types.
Replacement
No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
Secrets to reject
Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
Entry assistance
Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.

NIST §3.1.1.2 →

Recovery: four classes and their conditions

Previously saved code
At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
Code issued on demand
Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
Recovery contact
Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
Repeated identity proofing
An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.

Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
StageProposed practical checkObservable evidence
EnrolCheck who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path.Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis.
AuthenticateCheck the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access.Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated.
Manage the sessionDefine overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation.Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests.
Report lossIdentify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise.Report timeline and observed access result after handling.
RecoverFollow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks.Successful recovery case and refused bypass case.
Leave the serviceRemove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too.Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies.

WebAuthn: verify the response at the service

The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →

Include people who use a different journey

WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →

Continue with identity governance →

Primary references and scope

Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.

Extensões: permissões e acesso

As notas detalhadas desta edição estão disponíveis em inglês.

Robust authentication does not describe extension access

Phishing resistance does not remove the need to examine what runs in the browser after a session opens. A manifest provides clues about cookies, scripting, debugging and identity without establishing collection.

  • Test approved extensions in a profile dedicated to sensitive operations.
  • For identity, inspect OAuth scopes and recipients; this permission does not enumerate identity-provider rights.
  • Distinguish session revocation, token revocation, extension disablement and native-component removal.

Read the permission directory and manifest examples →

Google Chrome · Stay secure · Documentation consulted 2026-10-23; browser behaviour remains version-dependent

Referências oficiais

As referências apoiam o método. Adapte as verificações ao seu contexto; elas não são uma certificação. Os títulos das referências originais e os documentos de origem podem estar em outro idioma.

Referências consultadas em .