リソース · 11

IDとアカウントの復旧:ライフサイクル全体を管理する

アカウントの作成、変更、権限、復旧、閉鎖を、検証可能な証拠と事前に準備された決定事項に結びつける。

更新済み · 18 min

セキュリティキー2個、白紙のカード、えんじ色の資料がある架空の無人本人確認室 AIで生成した編集用イラスト

このガイドが達成するのに役立つこと

  • すべてのアカウントを個人またはサービスに紐付ける
  • 常時付与権限を削減する
  • 復旧要求を保護する
  • 継続性を損なうことなく迅速に権限を取り消す

クイックチェック

  • 作成と役割変更を承認するのは誰か?
  • 旧ファクターが単独でアカウントをリセットできるか?
  • 共有アカウントの操作は帰属可能か?
  • 権限は期限切れになるか?
  • 電話紛失時の対応は実施されたか?

手順

  1. 1

    IDと依存関係をインベントリする

    人間、サービス、共有、フェデレーション、緊急アカウントを一覧表示する。 それらをアプリケーション、所有者、認証方法、アクセス可能なデータに紐付ける。

    成果物:ID、アカウント、システム、所有者の登録簿

  2. 2

    ライフサイクルをイベントに紐付ける

    オンボーディング、モビリティ、不在、役割変更、退職、削除のトリガーを定義する。 イベント発生から有効なアクセス変更までの遅延を測定する。

    成果物:イベントおよびアクションマトリックス

  3. 3

    権限の削減

    日常的な使用と管理を分離し、特権アクセス期間を制限し、サービスリスクに応じて権限を見直す。

    成果物:ロールカタログと日付付き例外

  4. 4

    復旧の強化

    異常な要求に対しては、独立した証拠、安全なチャネル、適切な遅延、および人的エスカレーションを用いる。

    成果物:復旧決定ツリー

  5. 5

    損失と侵害への備え

    セッション、要素、デバイスの失効、サービスデスクとのコミュニケーション、フォールバックアクセス、および適切なトレース保持を計画する。

    成果物:ロックアウトおよび復旧ランブック

  6. 6

    演習と改善

    緊急出発、電話の紛失、なりすましの試みをテストする。 決定、タイミング、証拠、および運用への影響を観察する。

    成果物:演習レポートと是正計画

架空の事例

具体的な状況

管理者が通話中に認証デバイスを紛失しました。 サポートは事前に合意された証明を確認し、復旧のための2回目の承認を取得し、影響を受けたセッションを無効化します。

決定と期待される証拠

この演習では、サービスの継続性を確認し、リクエスト、承認、代替認証要素、およびインシデント後のレビューを記録します。

管理指標

指標測定対象最初のアクション
属性付きアカウントアクティブな所有者に関連付けられたアカウント所有者のいないアカウントを優先的に処理する
失効の遅延イベント発生からアクセス削除までの時間信頼性の高い手順を自動化する
一時的な特権期間と根拠を指定した昇格アクセスデフォルトで権限を失効させる
検証済みの復旧想定されるすべての証明に続く要求各バイパスをレビューする

よくある間違い

  • 個人情報に関する質問を強力な証拠として扱う
  • 二重認証なしでサポート担当者がMFAをバイパスできるようにする
  • サービスアカウントを忘れる
  • 割り当て後も特権を保持する

よくある質問

MFAだけで十分か?

いいえ。MFAはリスクを軽減しますが、ライフサイクル、復旧、セッション、特権は依然として脆弱なままです。

すべての共有アカウントを禁止すべきか?

個人のIDを優先します。 共有アカウントが必要な場合は、その理由を文書化し、使用を制限し、各使用を識別できるようにします。

最初に実施すべきことは何ですか?

主要認証要素の喪失と、高度な権限を持つ担当者の緊急退職は、真の依存関係を迅速に明らかにします。

ID:認証要素、セッション、復旧

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.

References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.

Sources consulted on .

無人のサイバー研究室に置かれた無印のセキュリティキー2本 AIで生成した編集用イラスト
Two unbranded keys in an empty lab. Appearance proves neither key non-exportability nor assurance level.

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
Method and referenceProperty and conditionsRecovery and dependenciesEvidence to request
Entered password

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret.Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path.Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey.
Manually entered TOTP

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session.Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups.Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant.
SMS or voice code

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant.The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies.Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure.
Simple push approval

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance.Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling.Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient.
Syncable WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Syncable Authenticators

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology.The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary.Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export.
Device-bound WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection.Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery.Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients.
WebAuthn key without UV

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV).Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation.UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA.
Biometrics considered alone

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms.Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately.Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof.

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
Level and factorsResistance and key exportOverall reauthentication timeoutInactivity
AAL1

One factor can suffice at this level.

Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted.At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation.No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy.
AAL2

Two distinct factors.

A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions.At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory.At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation.
AAL3

Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor.

Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required.At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement.At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation.

These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →

Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points

Single factor
Minimum 15 characters required.
Within MFA
Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
Accepted length
Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
Composition
No imposed mixture of character types.
Replacement
No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
Secrets to reject
Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
Entry assistance
Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.

NIST §3.1.1.2 →

Recovery: four classes and their conditions

Previously saved code
At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
Code issued on demand
Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
Recovery contact
Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
Repeated identity proofing
An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.

Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
StageProposed practical checkObservable evidence
EnrolCheck who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path.Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis.
AuthenticateCheck the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access.Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated.
Manage the sessionDefine overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation.Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests.
Report lossIdentify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise.Report timeline and observed access result after handling.
RecoverFollow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks.Successful recovery case and refused bypass case.
Leave the serviceRemove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too.Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies.

WebAuthn: verify the response at the service

The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →

Include people who use a different journey

WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →

Continue with identity governance →

Primary references and scope

Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.

拡張機能:権限とアクセス

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

Robust authentication does not describe extension access

Phishing resistance does not remove the need to examine what runs in the browser after a session opens. A manifest provides clues about cookies, scripting, debugging and identity without establishing collection.

  • Test approved extensions in a profile dedicated to sensitive operations.
  • For identity, inspect OAuth scopes and recipients; this permission does not enumerate identity-provider rights.
  • Distinguish session revocation, token revocation, extension disablement and native-component removal.

Read the permission directory and manifest examples →

Google Chrome · Stay secure · Documentation consulted 2026-10-23; browser behaviour remains version-dependent

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