Bronnen · 11
Identiteits- en accountherstel: beheer de volledige levenscyclus
Koppel accountaanmaak, -wijziging, -rechten, -herstel en -sluiting aan verifieerbaar bewijs en geoefende beslissingen.
Bijgewerkt · 8 min
Wat deze handleiding helpt bereiken
- Koppel elk account aan een persoon of service
- Beperk permanente privileges
- Bescherm herstelverzoeken
- Trek snel in zonder continuïteit te verliezen
Snelle controle
- Wie keurt de aanmaak en rolwijziging goed?
- Kan een oude factor het account zelfstandig resetten?
- Zijn acties van gedeelde accounts toewijsbaar?
- Verlopen privileges?
- Is er een controle uitgevoerd bij verlies van de telefoon?
Stapsgewijze methode
- 1
Inventariseer identiteiten en afhankelijkheden
Maak een lijst van accounts voor personen, services, gedeelde accounts, gefedereerde accounts en noodaccounts. Koppel deze aan applicaties, eigenaren, authenticatiemethoden en toegankelijke gegevens.
Resultaat: register van identiteiten, accounts, systemen en eigenaren.
- 2
Koppel de levenscyclus aan gebeurtenissen
Definieer triggers voor onboarding, mobiliteit, afwezigheid, rolwijziging, vertrek en verwijdering. Meet de vertraging tussen de gebeurtenis en de daadwerkelijke wijziging van de toegang.
Resultaat: gebeurtenis- en actiematrix.
- 3
Beperk privileges
Scheid dagelijks gebruik van beheer, beperk de duur van verhoogde toegang en beoordeel rechten op basis van servicerisico.
Resultaat: rolcatalogus en gedateerde uitzonderingen.
- 4
Versterk herstel
Gebruik onafhankelijk bewijs, een veilig communicatiekanaal, een geschikte vertraging en menselijke escalatie voor ongebruikelijke verzoeken.
Resultaat: herstelbeslissingsboom.
- 5
Bereid je voor op verlies en compromittering
Plan sessie-, factor- en apparaatintrekking, servicedeskcommunicatie, fallback-toegang en proportionele tracering.
Resultaat: lockout- en herstelhandleiding.
- 6
Oefenen en verbeteren
Test een noodvertrek, verloren telefoon en poging tot identiteitsfraude. Observeer beslissingen, timing, bewijs en operationele impact.
Resultaat: oefenrapport en herstelplan.
Fictief uitgewerkt voorbeeld
Illustratieve situatie
Een beheerder verliest een authenticatieapparaat tijdens een dienst. De supportafdeling controleert een vooraf overeengekomen bewijs, verkrijgt een tweede goedkeuring voor herstel en maakt de getroffen sessies ongeldig.
Beslissing en verwachte bewijs
De oefening controleert de continuïteit van de service en bewaart het verzoek, de goedkeuring, de vervangen factor en de evaluatie na het incident.
Managementindicatoren
| Indicator | Wat het meet | Eerste actie |
|---|---|---|
| Toegewezen accounts | Accounts gekoppeld aan een actieve eigenaar | Accounts zonder eigenaar eerst behandelen |
| Vertraging bij intrekking | Tijd tussen gebeurtenis en verwijdering van toegang | Betrouwbare stappen automatiseren |
| Tijdelijk privilege | Verhoogde toegang met duur en onderbouwing | Recht standaard laten verlopen |
| Geverifieerd herstel | Verzoeken na elk verwacht bewijs | Elke omzeiling beoordelen |
Veelvoorkomende fouten
- Persoonlijke vragen als sterk bewijs behandelen
- Ondersteuning toestaan om MFA te omzeilen zonder dubbele controle
- Serviceaccounts vergeten
- Privileges behouden na toewijzing
Veelgestelde vragen
Is MFA voldoende?
Nee. Het vermindert sommige risico's, maar de levenscyclus, het herstel, sessies en privileges kunnen nog steeds kwetsbaar blijven.
Moet elk gedeeld account worden verboden?
Geef de voorkeur aan individuele identiteiten. Als een gedeeld account noodzakelijk blijft, documenteer dan waarom, beperk het gebruik ervan en maak elk gebruik traceerbaar.
Wat moet als eerste worden uitgevoerd?
Verlies van de primaire factor en het plotselinge vertrek van een persoon met hoge privileges leggen snel reële afhankelijkheden bloot.
Identiteit: factoren, sessies en herstel
De uitgebreide toelichtingen zijn in deze editie beschikbaar in het Engels.
An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.
References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.
Sources consulted on .
Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
| Method and reference | Property and conditions | Recovery and dependencies | Evidence to request |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entered password | Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret. | Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path. | Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey. |
| Manually entered TOTP | Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session. | Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups. | Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant. |
| SMS or voice code | PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant. | The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies. | Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure. |
| Simple push approval | Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance. | Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling. | Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient. |
| Syncable WebAuthn with UV | Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology. | The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary. | Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export. |
| Device-bound WebAuthn with UV | Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection. | Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery. | Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients. |
| WebAuthn key without UV | Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV). | Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation. | UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA. |
| Biometrics considered alone | In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms. | Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately. | Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof. |
No method matches the filters.
Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
| Level and factors | Resistance and key export | Overall reauthentication timeout | Inactivity |
|---|---|---|---|
| AAL1 One factor can suffice at this level. | Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted. | At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation. | No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy. |
| AAL2 Two distinct factors. | A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions. | At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory. | At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation. |
| AAL3 Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor. | Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required. | At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement. | At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation. |
These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →
Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points
- Single factor
- Minimum 15 characters required.
- Within MFA
- Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
- Accepted length
- Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
- Composition
- No imposed mixture of character types.
- Replacement
- No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
- Secrets to reject
- Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
- Entry assistance
- Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.
Recovery: four classes and their conditions
- Previously saved code
- At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
- Code issued on demand
- Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
- Recovery contact
- Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
- Repeated identity proofing
- An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.
Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →
Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
| Stage | Proposed practical check | Observable evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Enrol | Check who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path. | Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis. |
| Authenticate | Check the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access. | Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated. |
| Manage the session | Define overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation. | Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests. |
| Report loss | Identify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise. | Report timeline and observed access result after handling. |
| Recover | Follow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks. | Successful recovery case and refused bypass case. |
| Leave the service | Remove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too. | Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies. |
WebAuthn: verify the response at the service
The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →
Include people who use a different journey
WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →
Continue with identity governance →
Primary references and scope
Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication · Publication :
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels · Publication :
§2.1–2.3 - NIST · Authenticators and password requirements · Publication :
§3.1.1; §3.2.3; §3.2.5 - NIST · Authenticator Event Management · Publication :
§4.1; §4.2; §4.6 - NIST · Session Management · Publication :
§5 - NIST · Syncable Authenticators · Publication :
Appendix B - W3C · WebAuthn Level 3 · Publication : · W3C Recommendation
§6.1; §7.1–7.2 - W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum) · Publication :
WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 · AA
Extensies: rechten en toegang
De uitgebreide toelichtingen zijn in deze editie beschikbaar in het Engels.
Robust authentication does not describe extension access
Phishing resistance does not remove the need to examine what runs in the browser after a session opens. A manifest provides clues about cookies, scripting, debugging and identity without establishing collection.
- Test approved extensions in a profile dedicated to sensitive operations.
- For identity, inspect OAuth scopes and recipients; this permission does not enumerate identity-provider rights.
- Distinguish session revocation, token revocation, extension disablement and native-component removal.
Read the permission directory and manifest examples →
Google Chrome · Stay secure · Documentation consulted 2026-10-23; browser behaviour remains version-dependent
Officiële referenties
Referenties ondersteunen de methode. Pas controles aan uw context aan; ze zijn geen certificering. Originele referentietitels en brondocumenten kunnen in een andere taal zijn.
Bronnen geraadpleegd op .
- NIST — SP 800-63B, Authentication and Lifecycle Management
- NIST — Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels
- NIST · Authenticators and password requirements
- NIST · Authenticator Event Management
- NIST · Session Management
- NIST · Syncable Authenticators
- W3C · WebAuthn Level 3
- W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum)
- Google Chrome · Declare permissions
- Google Chrome · Stay secure
