Recursos · 11
Recuperación de identidad y cuenta: rigen el ciclo de vida completo
Conecte la creación, cambio, privilegios, recuperación y cierre de cuentas con evidencia verificable y decisiones ensayadas.
Actualizado · 8 min
Lo que esta guía ayuda a lograr
- Conectar cada cuenta a una persona o servicio
- Reducir privilegio de estar de pie
- Proteger solicitudes de recuperación
- Revocar rápidamente sin perder continuidad
Comprobación rápida
- ¿Quién aprueba la creación y cambio de rol?
- ¿Un factor antiguo puede resetear la cuenta solo?
- ¿Son atribuibles las acciones de cuentas compartidas?
- ¿Caducan los privilegios?
- ¿Se ha ejercido pérdida del teléfono?
Método paso a paso
- 1
Identidades y dependencias del inventario
Listar cuentas humanas, de servicio, compartidas, federadas y de emergencia. Conéctelos a aplicaciones, propietarios, métodos de autenticación y datos accesibles.
Entregable: identidad, cuenta, sistema y registro de propietarios.
- 2
Conectar ciclo de vida a eventos
Definir triggers de incorporación, movilidad, ausencia, cambio de rol, salida y eliminación. Mida el retraso entre el evento y el cambio de acceso efectivo.
Entregable: matriz de eventos y acciones.
- 3
Reducir privilegios
Separe el uso diario de la administración, limite la duración del acceso elevado y revise los derechos según el riesgo del servicio.
Entregable: catálogo de roles y excepciones fechadas.
- 4
Reforzar la recuperación
Utilizar evidencia independiente, canal seguro, demora adecuada y escalamiento humano para solicitudes inusuales.
Entregable: árbol de decisión de recuperación.
- 5
Prepárese para la pérdida y el compromiso
Plan de sesión, revocación de factor y dispositivo, comunicación con la mesa de servicio, acceso alternativo y retención de seguimiento proporcional.
Entregable: runbook de bloqueo y recuperación.
- 6
Ejercitar y mejorar
Prueba de salida urgente, pérdida de teléfono e intento de suplantación de identidad. Observe las decisiones, los tiempos, la evidencia y el impacto operativo.
Entregable: informe del ejercicio y plan de remediación.
Ejemplo trabajado ficticio
Situación ilustrativa
Un administrador pierde un dispositivo de autenticación durante una llamada. El soporte verifica una prueba previamente acordada, obtiene una segunda aprobación para la recuperación e invalida las sesiones afectadas.
Decisión y pruebas esperadas
El ejercicio verifica la continuidad del servicio y retiene la solicitud, aprobación, factor reemplazado y revisión post-incidente.
Indicadores de gestión
| Indicador | Qué mide | Primera acción |
|---|---|---|
| Cuentas atribuidas | Cuentas conectadas a un propietario activo | Manejar primero las cuentas sin propietario |
| Retraso de revocación | Tiempo desde la eliminación del evento hasta el acceso | Automatizar pasos confiables |
| Privilegio temporal | Acceso elevado con duración y justificación | Caducar derecho por defecto |
| Recuperación verificada | Solicitudes siguiendo cada prueba esperada | Revisar cada bypass |
Errores comunes
- Tratar las preguntas personales como evidencia sólida
- Permitir que el soporte omita MFA sin control dual
- Olvido de cuentas de servicio
- Mantener privilegios después de una asignación
Preguntas frecuentes
¿Es suficiente la MFA?
No. Reduce algunos riesgos, pero el ciclo de vida, la recuperación, las sesiones y los privilegios aún pueden seguir siendo vulnerables.
¿Debería prohibirse toda cuenta compartida?
Prefiere identidades individuales. Cuando una cuenta compartida siga siendo necesaria, documente el motivo, restríjala y haga que cada uso sea atribuible.
¿Qué se debe ejercitar primero?
La pérdida del factor primario y la salida urgente de una persona muy privilegiada exponen rápidamente dependencias reales.
Identidad: factores, sesiones y recuperación
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.
References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.
Sources consulted on .
Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
| Method and reference | Property and conditions | Recovery and dependencies | Evidence to request |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entered password | Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret. | Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path. | Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey. |
| Manually entered TOTP | Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session. | Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups. | Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant. |
| SMS or voice code | PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant. | The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies. | Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure. |
| Simple push approval | Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance. | Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling. | Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient. |
| Syncable WebAuthn with UV | Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology. | The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary. | Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export. |
| Device-bound WebAuthn with UV | Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection. | Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery. | Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients. |
| WebAuthn key without UV | Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV). | Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation. | UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA. |
| Biometrics considered alone | In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms. | Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately. | Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof. |
No method matches the filters.
Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
| Level and factors | Resistance and key export | Overall reauthentication timeout | Inactivity |
|---|---|---|---|
| AAL1 One factor can suffice at this level. | Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted. | At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation. | No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy. |
| AAL2 Two distinct factors. | A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions. | At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory. | At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation. |
| AAL3 Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor. | Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required. | At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement. | At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation. |
These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →
Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points
- Single factor
- Minimum 15 characters required.
- Within MFA
- Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
- Accepted length
- Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
- Composition
- No imposed mixture of character types.
- Replacement
- No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
- Secrets to reject
- Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
- Entry assistance
- Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.
Recovery: four classes and their conditions
- Previously saved code
- At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
- Code issued on demand
- Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
- Recovery contact
- Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
- Repeated identity proofing
- An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.
Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →
Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
| Stage | Proposed practical check | Observable evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Enrol | Check who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path. | Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis. |
| Authenticate | Check the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access. | Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated. |
| Manage the session | Define overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation. | Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests. |
| Report loss | Identify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise. | Report timeline and observed access result after handling. |
| Recover | Follow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks. | Successful recovery case and refused bypass case. |
| Leave the service | Remove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too. | Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies. |
WebAuthn: verify the response at the service
The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →
Include people who use a different journey
WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →
Continue with identity governance →
Primary references and scope
Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication · Publication :
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels · Publication :
§2.1–2.3 - NIST · Authenticators and password requirements · Publication :
§3.1.1; §3.2.3; §3.2.5 - NIST · Authenticator Event Management · Publication :
§4.1; §4.2; §4.6 - NIST · Session Management · Publication :
§5 - NIST · Syncable Authenticators · Publication :
Appendix B - W3C · WebAuthn Level 3 · Publication : · W3C Recommendation
§6.1; §7.1–7.2 - W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum) · Publication :
WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 · AA
Extensiones: permisos y acceso
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
Robust authentication does not describe extension access
Phishing resistance does not remove the need to examine what runs in the browser after a session opens. A manifest provides clues about cookies, scripting, debugging and identity without establishing collection.
- Test approved extensions in a profile dedicated to sensitive operations.
- For identity, inspect OAuth scopes and recipients; this permission does not enumerate identity-provider rights.
- Distinguish session revocation, token revocation, extension disablement and native-component removal.
Read the permission directory and manifest examples →
Google Chrome · Stay secure · Documentation consulted 2026-10-23; browser behaviour remains version-dependent
Referencias oficiales
Las referencias respaldan el método. Adapte los controles a su contexto; no constituyen certificación. Los títulos de referencia originales y los documentos fuente pueden estar en otro idioma.
Referencias consultadas el .
- NIST — SP 800-63B, Authentication and Lifecycle Management
- NIST — Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels
- NIST · Authenticators and password requirements
- NIST · Authenticator Event Management
- NIST · Session Management
- NIST · Syncable Authenticators
- W3C · WebAuthn Level 3
- W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum)
- Google Chrome · Declare permissions
- Google Chrome · Stay secure
