참고 자료 · 11

ID 및 계정 복구: 전체 수명 주기를 관리합니다.

계정 생성, 변경, 권한, 복구 및 폐쇄를 검증 가능한 증거 및 사전 연습된 결정과 연결합니다.

업데이트됨 · 17 min

보안 키 두 개, 빈 카드와 버건디 서류철이 있는 가상의 무인 신원 확인실 AI로 생성한 편집용 일러스트

이 가이드가 달성하는 목표

  • 모든 계정을 담당자 또는 서비스에 연결
  • 상시 권한 축소
  • 복구 요청 보호
  • 연속성 유지를 위한 신속한 권한 취소

빠른 확인

  • 계정 생성 및 역할 변경 승인 권한자
  • 기존 인증 기관에서 단독으로 계정 재설정 가능 여부
  • 공유 계정 활동 내역 추적 가능 여부
  • 권한 만료 여부
  • 휴대폰 분실 인증 활용 여부

단계별 방법

  1. 1

    ID 및 종속성 목록 작성

    담당자, 서비스, 공유, 연합 및 비상 계정 목록 작성. 해당 계정을 애플리케이션, 소유자, 인증 방법 및 접근 가능한 데이터에 연결

    결과물: ID, 계정, 시스템 및 소유자 등록부

  2. 2

    라이프사이클을 이벤트와 연결

    온보딩, 이동, 부재, 역할 변경, 퇴사 및 삭제에 대한 트리거 정의. 이벤트 발생과 실제 접근 권한 변경 사이의 지연 시간 측정

    산출물: 이벤트 및 조치 매트릭스

  3. 3

    권한 축소

    일상적인 사용과 관리 업무를 분리하고, 높은 수준의 접근 권한 유지 기간을 제한하며, 서비스 위험도에 따라 권한을 검토합니다.

    산출물: 역할 목록 및 날짜별 예외 목록

  4. 4

    복구 강화

    비정상적인 요청에 대해서는 독립적인 증거, 안전한 채널, 적절한 지연 시간 및 담당자 에스컬레이션을 활용합니다.

    산출물: 복구 의사결정 트리

  5. 5

    손실 및 침해 대비

    세션, 요소 및 장치 해지, 서비스 데스크 통신, 대체 접근 권한 및 비례적인 추적 보존 계획을 수립합니다.

    산출물: 잠금 및 복구 실행 매뉴얼

  6. 6

    훈련 및 개선

    긴급 퇴근, 분실된 휴대폰 및 사칭 시도 상황을 테스트합니다. 의사 결정, 시점, 증거 및 운영상의 영향을 관찰합니다.

    산출물: 훈련 보고서 및 개선 계획

가상 예시

예시 상황

관리자가 당직 근무 중 인증 장치를 분실했습니다. 지원팀은 사전에 합의된 증거를 확인하고, 복구를 위한 두 번째 승인을 받은 후, 영향을 받는 세션을 무효화합니다.

결정 및 예상 증거

이 실행은 서비스 연속성을 확인하고 요청, 승인, 대체 인증 요소 및 사고 후 검토 기록을 보관합니다.

관리 지표

지표측정 대상첫 번째 조치
속성이 지정된 계정활성 소유자에게 연결된 계정소유자가 없는 계정 우선 처리
권한 취소 지연이벤트 발생부터 액세스 제거까지의 시간신뢰할 수 있는 단계 자동화
임시 권한기간 및 근거를 명시한 권한 상승기본적으로 권한 만료
검증된 복구모든 예상되는 증거에 따른 요청각 우회 시도 검토

일반적인 실수

  • 개인 정보를 강력한 증거로 간주
  • 이중 제어 없이 지원팀이 MFA를 우회하도록 허용
  • 서비스 계정 삭제
  • 할당 후 권한 유지

자주 묻는 질문

MFA만으로 충분한가?

아니요. 일부 위험을 줄여주지만 수명 주기, 복구, 세션 및 권한은 여전히 ​​취약할 수 있습니다.

모든 공유 계정을 금지해야 하는가?

개별 ID를 우선적으로 사용하십시오. 공유 계정이 필요한 경우, 그 이유를 문서화하고, 사용 범위를 제한하며, 각 사용 내역을 추적할 수 있도록 하십시오.

무엇을 먼저 실행해야 할까요?

주요 인증 요소 분실 및 고위 권한자의 긴급 퇴사는 실제 의존성을 신속하게 드러냅니다.

신원: 인증 요소, 세션 및 복구

이 언어판의 상세 참고 설명은 영어로 제공됩니다.

An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.

References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.

Sources consulted on .

빈 사이버 연구실에 놓인 상표 없는 보안 키 두 개 AI로 생성한 편집용 일러스트
Two unbranded keys in an empty lab. Appearance proves neither key non-exportability nor assurance level.

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
Method and referenceProperty and conditionsRecovery and dependenciesEvidence to request
Entered password

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret.Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path.Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey.
Manually entered TOTP

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session.Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups.Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant.
SMS or voice code

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant.The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies.Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure.
Simple push approval

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance.Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling.Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient.
Syncable WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Syncable Authenticators

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology.The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary.Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export.
Device-bound WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection.Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery.Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients.
WebAuthn key without UV

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV).Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation.UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA.
Biometrics considered alone

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms.Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately.Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof.

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
Level and factorsResistance and key exportOverall reauthentication timeoutInactivity
AAL1

One factor can suffice at this level.

Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted.At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation.No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy.
AAL2

Two distinct factors.

A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions.At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory.At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation.
AAL3

Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor.

Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required.At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement.At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation.

These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →

Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points

Single factor
Minimum 15 characters required.
Within MFA
Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
Accepted length
Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
Composition
No imposed mixture of character types.
Replacement
No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
Secrets to reject
Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
Entry assistance
Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.

NIST §3.1.1.2 →

Recovery: four classes and their conditions

Previously saved code
At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
Code issued on demand
Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
Recovery contact
Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
Repeated identity proofing
An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.

Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
StageProposed practical checkObservable evidence
EnrolCheck who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path.Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis.
AuthenticateCheck the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access.Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated.
Manage the sessionDefine overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation.Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests.
Report lossIdentify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise.Report timeline and observed access result after handling.
RecoverFollow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks.Successful recovery case and refused bypass case.
Leave the serviceRemove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too.Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies.

WebAuthn: verify the response at the service

The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →

Include people who use a different journey

WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →

Continue with identity governance →

Primary references and scope

Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.

확장 프로그램: 권한과 접근

이 언어판의 상세 참고 설명은 영어로 제공됩니다.

Robust authentication does not describe extension access

Phishing resistance does not remove the need to examine what runs in the browser after a session opens. A manifest provides clues about cookies, scripting, debugging and identity without establishing collection.

  • Test approved extensions in a profile dedicated to sensitive operations.
  • For identity, inspect OAuth scopes and recipients; this permission does not enumerate identity-provider rights.
  • Distinguish session revocation, token revocation, extension disablement and native-component removal.

Read the permission directory and manifest examples →

Google Chrome · Stay secure · Documentation consulted 2026-10-23; browser behaviour remains version-dependent

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