Resources · 05

Digital due diligence: a trust checklist before commitment

Verify an organisation, its leadership, dependencies and risk signals without turning the investigation into indiscriminate data collection.

Updated 28 October 2026 · 15 min

Illustration · fictional scene

What this guide helps achieve

Verify identity beyond the sales narrative
Connect digital signals to decision risk
Separate facts, allegations and unknowns
Set measurable conditions before commitment

Quick check

Is the contracting entity unambiguous?
Are beneficial owners and leaders consistent across sources?
Do critical dependencies have a viable fallback?
Are incidents dated, sourced and contextualised?
What new fact would change the recommendation?

Step-by-step method

01
Frame the decision and proportionality
State the decision, value or impact at risk, jurisdictions, affected people and justified verification depth. Exclude data with no decision value.
Deliverable: verification mandate and stopping criteria.
02
Establish identity and control
Cross-check official registers, beneficial owners, directors, addresses, domains and institutional accounts. Document name collisions and inconsistencies instead of resolving them by intuition.
Deliverable: sourced identity file.
03
Map activity and dependencies
Connect products, sensitive customers, suppliers, hosting, subcontractors, licences and operating regions. Find concentrations and dependencies with no realistic alternative.
Deliverable: critical dependency map.
04
Qualify reputation and incidents
Build a timeline from primary sources: public decisions, official statements, incidents, corrections and organisational responses. Keep established fact separate from allegation.
Deliverable: qualified timeline.
05
Assess digital trust
Review external exposure, visible security practice, data governance, continuity, transparency and consistency between statements and supplied evidence.
Deliverable: trust grid and evidence requests.
06
Decide with conditions
Present scenarios, uncertainty, residual risk and compensating measures. Give every condition an owner, evidence criterion, due date and review trigger.
Deliverable: go, no-go or conditional-go note.

Worked example

Illustrative situation

Before signing with a critical provider, a team cross-checks legal identity, domain, subprocessors, disclosed incidents and technical dependencies. A name mismatch remains an open question.

Decision and expected evidence

The recommendation distinguishes conditions to clear before signature, controls during delivery and facts that remain unverifiable.

Management indicators

Indicator	What it measures	First action
Evidence coverage	Decision-critical points connected to primary sources or supplied evidence	Resolve unknowns most likely to reverse the decision first
Freshness	Evidence still valid at the subject’s pace of change	Set expiry dates for critical items
Concentration	Dependencies whose failure stops an essential function	Secure an alternative or compensating measure
Conditions cleared	Reservations closed with compliant evidence	Reject declaration-only closure

Common pitfalls

Confusing no signal with no risk
Collecting personal data without necessity
Treating media repetition as independent sourcing
Delivering a score without decision conditions

Frequently asked questions

Does digital due diligence replace legal and financial review?

No. It complements them by examining online identity, technical dependencies, exposure, public evidence and digital consistency.

Can any individual be investigated?

Collection must remain lawful, proportionate and tied to a legitimate purpose. Sensitive or decision-irrelevant data should be excluded.

How should contradictory information be handled?

Keep both versions, trace primary sources, date them, request clarification and state residual uncertainty in the recommendation.

Cyber incidents: recovery decisions and evidence

Assess recovery using supplier evidence

An availability promise does not explain who supplies records, accepts restoration or coordinates post-incident communication.

Identify crisis contacts, deputies, evidence-access rights and decision responsibilities.
Request a redacted test example covering candidate checks and restored-service validation.
Compare sharing and recovery communication rules with applicable agreements.

Explore NIST outcomes and the timeline →

References reviewed 2026-10-22 · NIST SP 800-61r3 · pp. 27–29, 34–35 · CSF 2.0 · Appendix A

Explore NIST CSF 2.0 outcomes

CSF 2.0 organises cybersecurity risk management outcomes. This Core view contains six functions, 22 categories and 106 active subcategories, extracted from the NIST tool and cross-checked against Appendix A of NIST CSWP 29. Official wording remains in English; the evidence questions below are Cyber Intelligence Embassy editorial proposals.

This reference supports a cyber due diligence discussion. It performs no audit, collects no visitor information and calculates no compliance score. Categories are not a universal control checklist: scope, priority outcomes and implementation methods depend on the organisation.

Framework version: 2.0, published on 26 February 2024. Export reviewed on 22 October 2026. The tool export is a generated view, distinct from the official publication; only active Core fields are included. Withdrawn CSF 1.1 entries, implementation examples and mappings to other frameworks are excluded.

Outcomes by function

Counts describe subcategories in this extraction. They measure neither risk, organisational coverage nor recommended spending. Work on all six functions concurrently; their display order is not a project schedule.

Outcomes by function
CSF function	Categories	Subcategories
GV · GOVERN	6	31
ID · IDENTIFY	3	21
PR · PROTECT	5	22
DE · DETECT	2	11
RS · RESPOND	4	13
RC · RECOVER	2	8

Visible outcomes : 106 / 106

Questions and evidence to examine

For each category, the proposed question, document or test and limitation are editorial reading aids. They are not NIST requirements or translations of Implementation Examples. Protect sensitive information: an evidence reference and its scope will often suffice to prepare a discussion.

GV · GOVERN

The organization's cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy are established, communicated, and monitored

GV.OC · Organizational Context (5)

The circumstances - mission, stakeholder expectations, dependencies, and legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements - surrounding the organization's cybersecurity risk management decisions are understood

Review question: Which service must continue, and on whom does it depend?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Agreed scope, critical services, stakeholders and upstream/downstream dependencies.
Interpretation limit: A server list alone does not describe the mission or stakeholder expectations.

GV.OC · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
GV.OC-01	The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management
GV.OC-02	Internal and external stakeholders are understood, and their needs and expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management are understood and considered
GV.OC-03	Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity - including privacy and civil liberties obligations - are understood and managed
GV.OC-04	Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that external stakeholders depend on or expect from the organization are understood and communicated
GV.OC-05	Outcomes, capabilities, and services that the organization depends on are understood and communicated

GV.RM · Risk Management Strategy (7)

The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite statements, and assumptions are established, communicated, and used to support operational risk decisions

Review question: Who decides on risk, using which criteria?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Documented acceptance criteria, risk appetite and tolerance, decisions with an owner.
Interpretation limit: A coloured cell without criteria or decision authority remains ambiguous.

GV.RM · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
GV.RM-01	Risk management objectives are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
GV.RM-02	Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are established, communicated, and maintained
GV.RM-03	Cybersecurity risk management activities and outcomes are included in enterprise risk management processes
GV.RM-04	Strategic direction that describes appropriate risk response options is established and communicated
GV.RM-05	Lines of communication across the organization are established for cybersecurity risks, including risks from suppliers and other third parties
GV.RM-06	A standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing, and prioritizing cybersecurity risks is established and communicated
GV.RM-07	Strategic opportunities (i.e., positive risks) are characterized and are included in organizational cybersecurity risk discussions

GV.RR · Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (4)

Cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and authorities to foster accountability, performance assessment, and continuous improvement are established and communicated

Review question: Who can decide, fund and suspend an activity?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Approved responsibilities, delegated authority, resources and identified deputies.
Interpretation limit: An organisation chart does not prove responsibilities are understood or exercised.

GV.RR · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
GV.RR-01	Organizational leadership is responsible and accountable for cybersecurity risk and fosters a culture that is risk-aware, ethical, and continually improving
GV.RR-02	Roles, responsibilities, and authorities related to cybersecurity risk management are established, communicated, understood, and enforced
GV.RR-03	Adequate resources are allocated commensurate with the cybersecurity risk strategy, roles, responsibilities, and policies
GV.RR-04	Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices

GV.PO · Policy (2)

Organizational cybersecurity policy is established, communicated, and enforced

Review question: Does the policy cover the actual operating scope?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Dated policy, approval, communication, exceptions and review triggers.
Interpretation limit: An archived policy proves neither communication nor implementation.

GV.PO · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
GV.PO-01	Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is established based on organizational context, cybersecurity strategy, and priorities and is communicated and enforced
GV.PO-02	Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is reviewed, updated, communicated, and enforced to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology, and organizational mission

GV.OV · Oversight (3)

Results of organization-wide cybersecurity risk management activities and performance are used to inform, improve, and adjust the risk management strategy

Review question: Did previous decisions deliver the intended outcome?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Management reviews, defined indicators, explained gaps and corrective decisions.
Interpretation limit: An overall average can conceal an untreated critical dependency.

GV.OV · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
GV.OV-01	Cybersecurity risk management strategy outcomes are reviewed to inform and adjust strategy and direction
GV.OV-02	The cybersecurity risk management strategy is reviewed and adjusted to ensure coverage of organizational requirements and risks
GV.OV-03	Organizational cybersecurity risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed

GV.SC · Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (10)

Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified, established, managed, monitored, and improved by organizational stakeholders

Review question: Does the agreement cover the supplier, dependencies and exit?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Prioritised third parties, agreed requirements, monitoring, incident coordination and termination scenario.
Interpretation limit: A supplier certificate does not automatically cover your use or every subcontractor.

GV.SC · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
GV.SC-01	A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
GV.SC-02	Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally
GV.SC-03	Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes
GV.SC-04	Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality
GV.SC-05	Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties
GV.SC-06	Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier or other third-party relationships
GV.SC-07	The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship
GV.SC-08	Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities
GV.SC-09	Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle
GV.SC-10	Cybersecurity supply chain risk management plans include provisions for activities that occur after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement

ID · IDENTIFY

The organization's current cybersecurity risks are understood

ID.AM · Asset Management (7)

Assets (e.g., data, hardware, software, systems, facilities, services, people) that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy

Review question: Which assets, data and services make up the scope?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Inventory reconciled with observations, flows, owners and lifecycle stages.
Interpretation limit: An unreconciled inventory can omit SaaS, abandoned assets or duplicated data.

ID.AM · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID.AM-01	Inventories of hardware managed by the organization are maintained
ID.AM-02	Inventories of software, services, and systems managed by the organization are maintained
ID.AM-03	Representations of the organization's authorized network communication and internal and external network data flows are maintained
ID.AM-04	Inventories of services provided by suppliers are maintained
ID.AM-05	Assets are prioritized based on classification, criticality, resources, and impact on the mission
ID.AM-07	Inventories of data and corresponding metadata for designated data types are maintained
ID.AM-08	Systems, hardware, software, services, and data are managed throughout their life cycles

ID.RA · Risk Assessment (10)

The cybersecurity risk to the organization, assets, and individuals is understood by the organization

Review question: Which scenario links a threat, vulnerability and business consequence?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Dated findings, threat sources, likelihood/impact analysis and a treatment decision.
Interpretation limit: A CVE or technical score alone does not demonstrate risk applicable to the service.

ID.RA · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID.RA-01	Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded
ID.RA-02	Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources
ID.RA-03	Internal and external threats to the organization are identified and recorded
ID.RA-04	Potential impacts and likelihoods of threats exploiting vulnerabilities are identified and recorded
ID.RA-05	Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to understand inherent risk and inform risk response prioritization
ID.RA-06	Risk responses are chosen, prioritized, planned, tracked, and communicated
ID.RA-07	Changes and exceptions are managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked
ID.RA-08	Processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established
ID.RA-09	The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use
ID.RA-10	Critical suppliers are assessed prior to acquisition

ID.IM · Improvement (4)

Improvements to organizational cybersecurity risk management processes, procedures and activities are identified across all CSF Functions

Review question: Which lesson changed preparedness?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Assessment and exercise results, tracked actions, revised plans and later verification.
Interpretation limit: Minutes without action or later checks do not demonstrate improvement.

ID.IM · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID.IM-01	Improvements are identified from evaluations
ID.IM-02	Improvements are identified from security tests and exercises, including those done in coordination with suppliers and relevant third parties
ID.IM-03	Improvements are identified from execution of operational processes, procedures, and activities
ID.IM-04	Incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans that affect operations are established, communicated, maintained, and improved

PR · PROTECT

Safeguards to manage the organization's cybersecurity risks are used

PR.AA · Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (6)

Access to physical and logical assets is limited to authorized users, services, and hardware and managed commensurate with the assessed risk of unauthorized access

Review question: Do actual permissions follow identity and business need?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Provisioning/removal, authentication, authorisation, reviews and relevant physical safeguards.
Interpretation limit: Enabling MFA proves neither least privilege nor removal of old access.

PR.AA · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
PR.AA-01	Identities and credentials for authorized users, services, and hardware are managed by the organization
PR.AA-02	Identities are proofed and bound to credentials based on the context of interactions
PR.AA-03	Users, services, and hardware are authenticated
PR.AA-04	Identity assertions are protected, conveyed, and verified
PR.AA-05	Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties
PR.AA-06	Physical access to assets is managed, monitored, and enforced commensurate with risk

PR.AT · Awareness and Training (2)

The organization's personnel are provided with cybersecurity awareness and training so that they can perform their cybersecurity-related tasks

Review question: Can each role recognise and handle its risk?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Role-specific material, exercises and observation of sensitive tasks.
Interpretation limit: Attendance does not demonstrate operational competence.

PR.AT · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
PR.AT-01	Personnel are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform general tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind
PR.AT-02	Individuals in specialized roles are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind

PR.DS · Data Security (4)

Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information

Review question: How are data protected and recoverable?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Safeguards for data at rest, in transit and in use, protected backups and tests.
Interpretation limit: Encryption alone proves neither access control nor recoverability.

PR.DS · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
PR.DS-01	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected
PR.DS-02	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected
PR.DS-10	The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected
PR.DS-11	Backups of data are created, protected, maintained, and tested

PR.PS · Platform Security (6)

The hardware, software (e.g., firmware, operating systems, applications), and services of physical and virtual platforms are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect their confidentiality, integrity, and availability

Review question: Does the deployed configuration match the approved baseline?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Configuration baselines, maintenance, logging, authorised software and development practices.
Interpretation limit: A hardening baseline not compared with production does not show the actual state.

PR.PS · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
PR.PS-01	Configuration management practices are established and applied
PR.PS-02	Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk
PR.PS-03	Hardware is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk
PR.PS-04	Log records are generated and made available for continuous monitoring
PR.PS-05	Installation and execution of unauthorized software are prevented
PR.PS-06	Secure software development practices are integrated, and their performance is monitored throughout the software development life cycle

PR.IR · Technology Infrastructure Resilience (4)

Security architectures are managed with the organization's risk strategy to protect asset confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and organizational resilience

Review question: Can the service withstand loss of a dependency?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Architecture, segmentation, environmental safeguards, capacity and failure exercises.
Interpretation limit: Advertised redundancy can still share a single dependency.

PR.IR · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
PR.IR-01	Networks and environments are protected from unauthorized logical access and usage
PR.IR-02	The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats
PR.IR-03	Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations
PR.IR-04	Adequate resource capacity to ensure availability is maintained

DE · DETECT

Possible cybersecurity attacks and compromises are found and analyzed

DE.CM · Continuous Monitoring (5)

Assets are monitored to find anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events

Review question: Which relevant events are actually observed?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Monitoring sources, coverage, timestamps, anomaly handling and blind spots.
Interpretation limit: High log volume guarantees neither useful coverage nor actionable alerts.

DE.CM · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
DE.CM-01	Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-02	The physical environment is monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-03	Personnel activity and technology usage are monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-06	External service provider activities and services are monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-09	Computing hardware and software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored to find potentially adverse events

DE.AE · Adverse Event Analysis (6)

Anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events are analyzed to characterize the events and detect cybersecurity incidents

Review question: Who turns correlated events into an incident decision?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Event correlation, threat context, estimated impact and declaration criteria.
Interpretation limit: An isolated alert does not automatically establish a confirmed incident.

DE.AE · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
DE.AE-02	Potentially adverse events are analyzed to better understand associated activities
DE.AE-03	Information is correlated from multiple sources
DE.AE-04	The estimated impact and scope of adverse events are understood
DE.AE-06	Information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools
DE.AE-07	Cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis
DE.AE-08	Incidents are declared when adverse events meet the defined incident criteria

RS · RESPOND

Actions regarding a detected cybersecurity incident are taken

RS.MA · Incident Management (5)

Responses to detected cybersecurity incidents are managed

Review question: Does the incident have leadership and escalation criteria?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Activated plan, triage, priorities, third-party coordination and a recovery transition decision.
Interpretation limit: An on-call number without authority or criteria is insufficient to manage response.

RS.MA · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
RS.MA-01	The incident response plan is executed in coordination with relevant third parties once an incident is declared
RS.MA-02	Incident reports are triaged and validated
RS.MA-03	Incidents are categorized and prioritized
RS.MA-04	Incidents are escalated or elevated as needed
RS.MA-05	The criteria for initiating incident recovery are applied

RS.AN · Incident Analysis (4)

Investigations are conducted to ensure effective response and support forensics and recovery activities

Review question: Can scope and cause be explained without altering evidence?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Timeline, collected data, integrity, provenance and explicitly separated hypotheses.
Interpretation limit: An initial cause hypothesis does not prove the full scope is known.

RS.AN · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
RS.AN-03	Analysis is performed to establish what has taken place during an incident and the root cause of the incident
RS.AN-06	Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, and the records' integrity and provenance are preserved
RS.AN-07	Incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved
RS.AN-08	An incident's magnitude is estimated and validated

RS.CO · Incident Response Reporting and Communication (2)

Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders as required by laws, regulations, or policies

Review question: Which message can be shared, with whom and through which channel?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Recipients, approval, fallback channels and agreed sharing rules.
Interpretation limit: Legal reporting duties depend on context and require separate verification.

RS.CO · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
RS.CO-02	Internal and external stakeholders are notified of incidents
RS.CO-03	Information is shared with designated internal and external stakeholders

RS.MI · Incident Mitigation (2)

Activities are performed to prevent expansion of an event and mitigate its effects

Review question: How is the effect of containment and eradication checked?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Authorised actions, dependencies, execution records and observation after intervention.
Interpretation limit: The disappearance of an alert alone does not demonstrate eradication.

RS.MI · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
RS.MI-01	Incidents are contained
RS.MI-02	Incidents are eradicated

RC · RECOVER

Assets and operations affected by a cybersecurity incident are restored

RC.RP · Incident Recovery Plan Execution (6)

Restoration activities are performed to ensure operational availability of systems and services affected by cybersecurity incidents

Review question: Does the restored service work with intact data?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Recovery asset integrity, functional tests, restored-state checks and documented closure.
Interpretation limit: A successful backup job does not prove restoration integrity.

RC.RP · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
RC.RP-01	The recovery portion of the incident response plan is executed once initiated from the incident response process
RC.RP-02	Recovery actions are selected, scoped, prioritized, and performed
RC.RP-03	The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration
RC.RP-04	Critical mission functions and cybersecurity risk management are considered to establish post-incident operational norms
RC.RP-05	The integrity of restored assets is verified, systems and services are restored, and normal operating status is confirmed
RC.RP-06	The end of incident recovery is declared based on criteria, and incident-related documentation is completed

RC.CO · Incident Recovery Communication (2)

Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties

Review question: How is progress communicated without declaring normal operation too early?
Evidence or observation to reconcile: Approved updates, internal/external recipients and consistency between statements and observations.
Interpretation limit: A public recovery announcement does not replace service verification.

RC.CO · Official NIST outcomes, in English
ID	Official NIST outcomes, in English
RC.CO-03	Recovery activities and progress in restoring operational capabilities are communicated to designated internal and external stakeholders
RC.CO-04	Public updates on incident recovery are shared using approved methods and messaging

Turn a desired outcome into an actionable gap

An organisational profile describes current and/or target posture using Core outcomes. Keep the same scope for observations and targets: a subsidiary, product or service can warrant its own profile. NIST SP 1301 covers scoping, gathering information, creating the profile, analysing gaps and creating an action plan, then following it up.

Turn a desired outcome into an actionable gap
Concept	What it describes	Useful discussion evidence
Current Profile	Outcomes currently achieved or attempted, and how or to what extent they are achieved.	Dated observations, scope, evidence references and uncertainties.
Target Profile	Desired outcomes selected and prioritised for risk management objectives.	Agreed expectations, priorities and business rationale.
Gap and action plan	Difference between compared states, then actions supporting progress.	Owner, dependencies, resources, agreed deadline and expected verification.
CSF Tiers	Rigor of risk governance and management practices: Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable, Adaptive.	Context and observed practices; no improvised average across subcategories.

Reasoning example: recovery at a critical supplier

Fictional learning case: a supplier presents a recovery procedure but no recent observation of restoration for the service in scope. RC.RP-03 concerns verifying the integrity of backups and other restoration assets before use. RC.RP-05 concerns verifying restored asset integrity, restoration and normal operating status. A procedure describes intent; it does not replace those checks. Record the gap, request an exercise suited to the scope and identify who accepts residual risk. No client result is represented here.

Read the framework without overinterpreting identifiers

Why are some numbers missing?

NIST retains numbering gaps where CSF 1.1 subcategories were relocated. An incomplete sequence does not indicate missing data in this explorer.

Does a category demonstrate compliance?

An identifier establishes shared meaning for an expected outcome. It proves neither achievement nor compliance with a contract, regulation or another framework.

Can a NIST CSF certification be claimed?

NIST states that it offers no certification or endorsement of CSF-related products, services or implementations. Describe the specific method or alignment examined without turning that work into NIST approval.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29. Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. CIE adaptation dated 22 October 2026: extraction of active Core elements, category grouping, consultation filter, and separately labelled editorial questions and examples. No NIST endorsement is implied. Reuse conditions and warranty disclaimer: NIST source below.

Source export SHA-256: 0438875f185cb3260caa464dad5644cd82927329d3e73d40f4aa811ffe48dd4e

NIST (2024) · The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 · NIST CSWP 29 · 2024-02-26 · §2–3, Appendix A–C
NIST (2024) · Creating and Using Organizational Profiles · NIST SP 1301 · 2024-02 · scope, current/target, gap analysis
NIST · CSF 2.0 Reference Tool · Export retrieved 2026-10-22 · Core fields only
NIST · Cybersecurity Framework FAQ · Reviewed 2026-10-22 · outcomes, numbering, certification
NIST · Copyright and licensing statements · Technical Series Publications / non-SRD data · reviewed 2026-10-22

Official references

References consulted: 22/10/2026. The method and worksheet propose checks to adapt to your context; they do not constitute certification.