Ressourcen · 05
Digitale Due Diligence: Eine Vertrauenscheckliste vor dem Engagement
Überprüfen Sie eine Organisation, ihre Führung, Abhängigkeiten und Risikosignale, ohne die Untersuchung in eine wahllose Datensammlung umzuwandeln.
Aktualisiert · 15 min
Wozu dieser Leitfaden beiträgt
- Überprüfen Sie die Identität über die Verkaufserzählung hinaus
- Verbinden Sie digitale Signale mit Entscheidungsrisiken
- Trennen Sie Fakten, Behauptungen und Unbekanntes
- Legen Sie messbare Bedingungen fest, bevor Sie sich verpflichten
Kurzcheck
- Ist der Auftraggeber eindeutig?
- Sind wirtschaftliche Eigentümer und Führungskräfte in allen Quellen konsistent?
- Gibt es für kritische Abhängigkeiten einen praktikablen Fallback?
- Sind Vorfälle datiert, mit Quellen versehen und kontextualisiert?
- Welche neue Tatsache würde die Empfehlung ändern?
Schritt-für-Schritt-Anleitung
- 1
Rahmen der Entscheidung und Verhältnismäßigkeit
Geben Sie die Entscheidung, den gefährdeten Wert oder die gefährdeten Auswirkungen, die Gerichtsbarkeit, die betroffenen Personen und die begründete Prüftiefe an. Daten ohne Entscheidungswert ausschließen.
Liefergegenstand: Verifizierungsauftrag und Stoppkriterien.
- 2
Identität und Kontrolle herstellen
Überprüfen Sie offizielle Register, wirtschaftliche Eigentümer, Direktoren, Adressen, Domains und institutionelle Konten. Dokumentieren Sie Namenskonflikte und Inkonsistenzen, anstatt sie durch Intuition zu lösen.
Liefergegenstand: Identitätsdatei mit Quellenangabe.
- 3
Kartenaktivität und Abhängigkeiten
Verbinden Sie Produkte, sensible Kunden, Lieferanten, Hosting, Subunternehmer, Lizenzen und Betriebsregionen. Finden Sie Konzentrationen und Abhängigkeiten ohne realistische Alternative.
Liefergegenstand: Critical Dependency Map.
- 4
Reputation und Vorfälle qualifizieren
Erstellen Sie eine Zeitleiste aus Primärquellen: öffentliche Entscheidungen, offizielle Stellungnahmen, Vorfälle, Korrekturen und organisatorische Reaktionen. Halten Sie festgestellte Tatsachen von Behauptungen getrennt.
Liefergegenstand: Qualifizierter Zeitplan.
- 5
Digitales Vertrauen bewerten
Überprüfen Sie die externe Exposition, sichtbare Sicherheitspraktiken, Datenverwaltung, Kontinuität, Transparenz und Konsistenz zwischen Aussagen und bereitgestellten Beweisen.
Lieferinhalt: Vertrauensraster und Beweisanfragen.
- 6
Entscheiden Sie mit Bedingungen
Aktuelle Szenarien, Unsicherheit, Restrisiko und kompensierende Maßnahmen. Geben Sie jeder Bedingung einen Eigentümer, ein Beweiskriterium, ein Fälligkeitsdatum und einen Überprüfungsauslöser.
Lieferbar: Go-, No-Go- oder Conditional-Go-Hinweis.
Fiktives Arbeitsbeispiel
Beispielhafte Situation
Vor der Unterzeichnung mit einem kritischen Anbieter prüft ein Team die rechtliche Identität, die Domäne, die Unterauftragsverarbeiter, offengelegte Vorfälle und technische Abhängigkeiten. Eine Namensinkongruenz bleibt eine offene Frage.
Entscheidung und erwartete Beweise
Die Empfehlung unterscheidet zwischen Bedingungen, die vor der Unterschrift geklärt werden müssen, Kontrollen während der Zustellung und Tatsachen, die nicht überprüfbar bleiben.
Managementindikatoren
| Indikator | Was es misst | Erste Aktion |
|---|---|---|
| Beweissicherung | Entscheidungskritische Punkte im Zusammenhang mit Primärquellen oder bereitgestellten Beweisen | Lösen Sie Unbekannte auf, die die Entscheidung höchstwahrscheinlich zuerst umkehren |
| Aktualität | Beweise sind auch bei der Geschwindigkeit des Wandels des Subjekts immer noch gültig | Ablaufdaten für kritische Artikel festlegen |
| Konzentration | Abhängigkeiten, deren Ausfall eine wesentliche Funktion stoppt | Sichern Sie sich eine Ersatz- oder Ausgleichsmaßnahme |
| Bedingungen gelöscht | Reservierungen mit konformem Nachweis abgeschlossen | Deklarationsbasierte Schließung ablehnen |
Häufige Fallstricke
- Kein Signal verwechselt mit keinem Risiko
- Erhebung personenbezogener Daten ohne Notwendigkeit
- Medienwiederholung als eigenständiges Sourcing behandeln
- Abgabe einer Wertung ohne Entscheidungsbedingungen
Häufig gestellte Fragen
Ersetzt die digitale Due Diligence die rechtliche und finanzielle Prüfung?
Nein. Es ergänzt sie durch die Untersuchung von Online-Identität, technischen Abhängigkeiten, Gefährdung, öffentlichen Beweisen und digitaler Konsistenz.
Kann gegen jede Person ermittelt werden?
Die Erhebung muss rechtmäßig, verhältnismäßig und an einen legitimen Zweck gebunden bleiben. Sensible oder entscheidungsirrelevante Daten sollten ausgeschlossen werden.
Wie ist mit widersprüchlichen Angaben umzugehen?
Beide Fassungen aufbewahren, Primärquellen ausfindig machen, datieren, um Klärung bitten und Restunsicherheiten in der Empfehlung angeben.
Cybervorfälle: Entscheidungen und Nachweise
Ausführliche Hinweise stehen in dieser Ausgabe auf Englisch zur Verfügung.
Assess recovery using supplier evidence
An availability promise does not explain who supplies records, accepts restoration or coordinates post-incident communication.
- Identify crisis contacts, deputies, evidence-access rights and decision responsibilities.
- Request a redacted test example covering candidate checks and restored-service validation.
- Compare sharing and recovery communication rules with applicable agreements.
Explore NIST outcomes and the timeline →
References reviewed · NIST SP 800-61r3 · pp. 27–29, 34–35 · CSF 2.0 · Appendix A
Ergebnisse des NIST CSF 2.0 erkunden
Ausführliche Hinweise stehen in dieser Ausgabe auf Englisch zur Verfügung.
CSF 2.0 organises cybersecurity risk management outcomes. This Core view contains six functions, 22 categories and 106 active subcategories, extracted from the NIST tool and cross-checked against Appendix A of NIST CSWP 29. Official wording remains in English; the evidence questions below are Cyber Intelligence Embassy editorial proposals.
This reference supports a cyber due diligence discussion. It performs no audit, collects no visitor information and calculates no compliance score. Categories are not a universal control checklist: scope, priority outcomes and implementation methods depend on the organisation.
Framework version: 2.0, published on 26 February 2024. Export reviewed on 22 October 2026. The tool export is a generated view, distinct from the official publication; only active Core fields are included. Withdrawn CSF 1.1 entries, implementation examples and mappings to other frameworks are excluded.
Ergebnisse nach Funktion
| CSF-Funktion | Kategorien | Unterkategorien |
|---|---|---|
| GV · GOVERN | 6 | 31 |
| ID · IDENTIFY | 3 | 21 |
| PR · PROTECT | 5 | 22 |
| DE · DETECT | 2 | 11 |
| RS · RESPOND | 4 | 13 |
| RC · RECOVER | 2 | 8 |
Sichtbare Ergebnisse : 106 / 106
Kein Ergebnis entspricht diesen Kriterien.
Fragen und zu prüfende Nachweise
For each category, the proposed question, document or test and limitation are editorial reading aids. They are not NIST requirements or translations of Implementation Examples. Protect sensitive information: an evidence reference and its scope will often suffice to prepare a discussion.
GV · GOVERN
The organization's cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy are established, communicated, and monitored
GV.OC · Organizational Context (5)
The circumstances - mission, stakeholder expectations, dependencies, and legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements - surrounding the organization's cybersecurity risk management decisions are understood
- Review question
- Which service must continue, and on whom does it depend?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Agreed scope, critical services, stakeholders and upstream/downstream dependencies.
- Interpretation limit
- A server list alone does not describe the mission or stakeholder expectations.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| GV.OC-01 | The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management |
| GV.OC-02 | Internal and external stakeholders are understood, and their needs and expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management are understood and considered |
| GV.OC-03 | Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity - including privacy and civil liberties obligations - are understood and managed |
| GV.OC-04 | Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that external stakeholders depend on or expect from the organization are understood and communicated |
| GV.OC-05 | Outcomes, capabilities, and services that the organization depends on are understood and communicated |
GV.RM · Risk Management Strategy (7)
The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite statements, and assumptions are established, communicated, and used to support operational risk decisions
- Review question
- Who decides on risk, using which criteria?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Documented acceptance criteria, risk appetite and tolerance, decisions with an owner.
- Interpretation limit
- A coloured cell without criteria or decision authority remains ambiguous.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| GV.RM-01 | Risk management objectives are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders |
| GV.RM-02 | Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are established, communicated, and maintained |
| GV.RM-03 | Cybersecurity risk management activities and outcomes are included in enterprise risk management processes |
| GV.RM-04 | Strategic direction that describes appropriate risk response options is established and communicated |
| GV.RM-05 | Lines of communication across the organization are established for cybersecurity risks, including risks from suppliers and other third parties |
| GV.RM-06 | A standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing, and prioritizing cybersecurity risks is established and communicated |
| GV.RM-07 | Strategic opportunities (i.e., positive risks) are characterized and are included in organizational cybersecurity risk discussions |
GV.RR · Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (4)
Cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and authorities to foster accountability, performance assessment, and continuous improvement are established and communicated
- Review question
- Who can decide, fund and suspend an activity?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Approved responsibilities, delegated authority, resources and identified deputies.
- Interpretation limit
- An organisation chart does not prove responsibilities are understood or exercised.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| GV.RR-01 | Organizational leadership is responsible and accountable for cybersecurity risk and fosters a culture that is risk-aware, ethical, and continually improving |
| GV.RR-02 | Roles, responsibilities, and authorities related to cybersecurity risk management are established, communicated, understood, and enforced |
| GV.RR-03 | Adequate resources are allocated commensurate with the cybersecurity risk strategy, roles, responsibilities, and policies |
| GV.RR-04 | Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices |
GV.PO · Policy (2)
Organizational cybersecurity policy is established, communicated, and enforced
- Review question
- Does the policy cover the actual operating scope?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Dated policy, approval, communication, exceptions and review triggers.
- Interpretation limit
- An archived policy proves neither communication nor implementation.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| GV.PO-01 | Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is established based on organizational context, cybersecurity strategy, and priorities and is communicated and enforced |
| GV.PO-02 | Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is reviewed, updated, communicated, and enforced to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology, and organizational mission |
GV.OV · Oversight (3)
Results of organization-wide cybersecurity risk management activities and performance are used to inform, improve, and adjust the risk management strategy
- Review question
- Did previous decisions deliver the intended outcome?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Management reviews, defined indicators, explained gaps and corrective decisions.
- Interpretation limit
- An overall average can conceal an untreated critical dependency.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| GV.OV-01 | Cybersecurity risk management strategy outcomes are reviewed to inform and adjust strategy and direction |
| GV.OV-02 | The cybersecurity risk management strategy is reviewed and adjusted to ensure coverage of organizational requirements and risks |
| GV.OV-03 | Organizational cybersecurity risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed |
GV.SC · Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (10)
Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified, established, managed, monitored, and improved by organizational stakeholders
- Review question
- Does the agreement cover the supplier, dependencies and exit?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Prioritised third parties, agreed requirements, monitoring, incident coordination and termination scenario.
- Interpretation limit
- A supplier certificate does not automatically cover your use or every subcontractor.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| GV.SC-01 | A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders |
| GV.SC-02 | Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally |
| GV.SC-03 | Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes |
| GV.SC-04 | Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality |
| GV.SC-05 | Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties |
| GV.SC-06 | Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier or other third-party relationships |
| GV.SC-07 | The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship |
| GV.SC-08 | Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities |
| GV.SC-09 | Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle |
| GV.SC-10 | Cybersecurity supply chain risk management plans include provisions for activities that occur after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement |
ID · IDENTIFY
The organization's current cybersecurity risks are understood
ID.AM · Asset Management (7)
Assets (e.g., data, hardware, software, systems, facilities, services, people) that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy
- Review question
- Which assets, data and services make up the scope?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Inventory reconciled with observations, flows, owners and lifecycle stages.
- Interpretation limit
- An unreconciled inventory can omit SaaS, abandoned assets or duplicated data.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| ID.AM-01 | Inventories of hardware managed by the organization are maintained |
| ID.AM-02 | Inventories of software, services, and systems managed by the organization are maintained |
| ID.AM-03 | Representations of the organization's authorized network communication and internal and external network data flows are maintained |
| ID.AM-04 | Inventories of services provided by suppliers are maintained |
| ID.AM-05 | Assets are prioritized based on classification, criticality, resources, and impact on the mission |
| ID.AM-07 | Inventories of data and corresponding metadata for designated data types are maintained |
| ID.AM-08 | Systems, hardware, software, services, and data are managed throughout their life cycles |
ID.RA · Risk Assessment (10)
The cybersecurity risk to the organization, assets, and individuals is understood by the organization
- Review question
- Which scenario links a threat, vulnerability and business consequence?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Dated findings, threat sources, likelihood/impact analysis and a treatment decision.
- Interpretation limit
- A CVE or technical score alone does not demonstrate risk applicable to the service.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| ID.RA-01 | Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded |
| ID.RA-02 | Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources |
| ID.RA-03 | Internal and external threats to the organization are identified and recorded |
| ID.RA-04 | Potential impacts and likelihoods of threats exploiting vulnerabilities are identified and recorded |
| ID.RA-05 | Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to understand inherent risk and inform risk response prioritization |
| ID.RA-06 | Risk responses are chosen, prioritized, planned, tracked, and communicated |
| ID.RA-07 | Changes and exceptions are managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked |
| ID.RA-08 | Processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established |
| ID.RA-09 | The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use |
| ID.RA-10 | Critical suppliers are assessed prior to acquisition |
ID.IM · Improvement (4)
Improvements to organizational cybersecurity risk management processes, procedures and activities are identified across all CSF Functions
- Review question
- Which lesson changed preparedness?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Assessment and exercise results, tracked actions, revised plans and later verification.
- Interpretation limit
- Minutes without action or later checks do not demonstrate improvement.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| ID.IM-01 | Improvements are identified from evaluations |
| ID.IM-02 | Improvements are identified from security tests and exercises, including those done in coordination with suppliers and relevant third parties |
| ID.IM-03 | Improvements are identified from execution of operational processes, procedures, and activities |
| ID.IM-04 | Incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans that affect operations are established, communicated, maintained, and improved |
PR · PROTECT
Safeguards to manage the organization's cybersecurity risks are used
PR.AA · Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (6)
Access to physical and logical assets is limited to authorized users, services, and hardware and managed commensurate with the assessed risk of unauthorized access
- Review question
- Do actual permissions follow identity and business need?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Provisioning/removal, authentication, authorisation, reviews and relevant physical safeguards.
- Interpretation limit
- Enabling MFA proves neither least privilege nor removal of old access.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| PR.AA-01 | Identities and credentials for authorized users, services, and hardware are managed by the organization |
| PR.AA-02 | Identities are proofed and bound to credentials based on the context of interactions |
| PR.AA-03 | Users, services, and hardware are authenticated |
| PR.AA-04 | Identity assertions are protected, conveyed, and verified |
| PR.AA-05 | Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties |
| PR.AA-06 | Physical access to assets is managed, monitored, and enforced commensurate with risk |
PR.AT · Awareness and Training (2)
The organization's personnel are provided with cybersecurity awareness and training so that they can perform their cybersecurity-related tasks
- Review question
- Can each role recognise and handle its risk?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Role-specific material, exercises and observation of sensitive tasks.
- Interpretation limit
- Attendance does not demonstrate operational competence.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| PR.AT-01 | Personnel are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform general tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind |
| PR.AT-02 | Individuals in specialized roles are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind |
PR.DS · Data Security (4)
Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information
- Review question
- How are data protected and recoverable?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Safeguards for data at rest, in transit and in use, protected backups and tests.
- Interpretation limit
- Encryption alone proves neither access control nor recoverability.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| PR.DS-01 | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected |
| PR.DS-02 | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected |
| PR.DS-10 | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected |
| PR.DS-11 | Backups of data are created, protected, maintained, and tested |
PR.PS · Platform Security (6)
The hardware, software (e.g., firmware, operating systems, applications), and services of physical and virtual platforms are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect their confidentiality, integrity, and availability
- Review question
- Does the deployed configuration match the approved baseline?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Configuration baselines, maintenance, logging, authorised software and development practices.
- Interpretation limit
- A hardening baseline not compared with production does not show the actual state.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| PR.PS-01 | Configuration management practices are established and applied |
| PR.PS-02 | Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk |
| PR.PS-03 | Hardware is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk |
| PR.PS-04 | Log records are generated and made available for continuous monitoring |
| PR.PS-05 | Installation and execution of unauthorized software are prevented |
| PR.PS-06 | Secure software development practices are integrated, and their performance is monitored throughout the software development life cycle |
PR.IR · Technology Infrastructure Resilience (4)
Security architectures are managed with the organization's risk strategy to protect asset confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and organizational resilience
- Review question
- Can the service withstand loss of a dependency?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Architecture, segmentation, environmental safeguards, capacity and failure exercises.
- Interpretation limit
- Advertised redundancy can still share a single dependency.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| PR.IR-01 | Networks and environments are protected from unauthorized logical access and usage |
| PR.IR-02 | The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats |
| PR.IR-03 | Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations |
| PR.IR-04 | Adequate resource capacity to ensure availability is maintained |
DE · DETECT
Possible cybersecurity attacks and compromises are found and analyzed
DE.CM · Continuous Monitoring (5)
Assets are monitored to find anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events
- Review question
- Which relevant events are actually observed?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Monitoring sources, coverage, timestamps, anomaly handling and blind spots.
- Interpretation limit
- High log volume guarantees neither useful coverage nor actionable alerts.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| DE.CM-01 | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-02 | The physical environment is monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-03 | Personnel activity and technology usage are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-06 | External service provider activities and services are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-09 | Computing hardware and software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
DE.AE · Adverse Event Analysis (6)
Anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events are analyzed to characterize the events and detect cybersecurity incidents
- Review question
- Who turns correlated events into an incident decision?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Event correlation, threat context, estimated impact and declaration criteria.
- Interpretation limit
- An isolated alert does not automatically establish a confirmed incident.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| DE.AE-02 | Potentially adverse events are analyzed to better understand associated activities |
| DE.AE-03 | Information is correlated from multiple sources |
| DE.AE-04 | The estimated impact and scope of adverse events are understood |
| DE.AE-06 | Information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools |
| DE.AE-07 | Cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis |
| DE.AE-08 | Incidents are declared when adverse events meet the defined incident criteria |
RS · RESPOND
Actions regarding a detected cybersecurity incident are taken
RS.MA · Incident Management (5)
Responses to detected cybersecurity incidents are managed
- Review question
- Does the incident have leadership and escalation criteria?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Activated plan, triage, priorities, third-party coordination and a recovery transition decision.
- Interpretation limit
- An on-call number without authority or criteria is insufficient to manage response.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| RS.MA-01 | The incident response plan is executed in coordination with relevant third parties once an incident is declared |
| RS.MA-02 | Incident reports are triaged and validated |
| RS.MA-03 | Incidents are categorized and prioritized |
| RS.MA-04 | Incidents are escalated or elevated as needed |
| RS.MA-05 | The criteria for initiating incident recovery are applied |
RS.AN · Incident Analysis (4)
Investigations are conducted to ensure effective response and support forensics and recovery activities
- Review question
- Can scope and cause be explained without altering evidence?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Timeline, collected data, integrity, provenance and explicitly separated hypotheses.
- Interpretation limit
- An initial cause hypothesis does not prove the full scope is known.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| RS.AN-03 | Analysis is performed to establish what has taken place during an incident and the root cause of the incident |
| RS.AN-06 | Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, and the records' integrity and provenance are preserved |
| RS.AN-07 | Incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved |
| RS.AN-08 | An incident's magnitude is estimated and validated |
RS.CO · Incident Response Reporting and Communication (2)
Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders as required by laws, regulations, or policies
- Review question
- Which message can be shared, with whom and through which channel?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Recipients, approval, fallback channels and agreed sharing rules.
- Interpretation limit
- Legal reporting duties depend on context and require separate verification.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| RS.CO-02 | Internal and external stakeholders are notified of incidents |
| RS.CO-03 | Information is shared with designated internal and external stakeholders |
RS.MI · Incident Mitigation (2)
Activities are performed to prevent expansion of an event and mitigate its effects
- Review question
- How is the effect of containment and eradication checked?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Authorised actions, dependencies, execution records and observation after intervention.
- Interpretation limit
- The disappearance of an alert alone does not demonstrate eradication.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| RS.MI-01 | Incidents are contained |
| RS.MI-02 | Incidents are eradicated |
RC · RECOVER
Assets and operations affected by a cybersecurity incident are restored
RC.RP · Incident Recovery Plan Execution (6)
Restoration activities are performed to ensure operational availability of systems and services affected by cybersecurity incidents
- Review question
- Does the restored service work with intact data?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Recovery asset integrity, functional tests, restored-state checks and documented closure.
- Interpretation limit
- A successful backup job does not prove restoration integrity.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| RC.RP-01 | The recovery portion of the incident response plan is executed once initiated from the incident response process |
| RC.RP-02 | Recovery actions are selected, scoped, prioritized, and performed |
| RC.RP-03 | The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration |
| RC.RP-04 | Critical mission functions and cybersecurity risk management are considered to establish post-incident operational norms |
| RC.RP-05 | The integrity of restored assets is verified, systems and services are restored, and normal operating status is confirmed |
| RC.RP-06 | The end of incident recovery is declared based on criteria, and incident-related documentation is completed |
RC.CO · Incident Recovery Communication (2)
Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties
- Review question
- How is progress communicated without declaring normal operation too early?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Approved updates, internal/external recipients and consistency between statements and observations.
- Interpretation limit
- A public recovery announcement does not replace service verification.
| ID | Offizielle NIST-Ergebnisse auf Englisch |
|---|---|
| RC.CO-03 | Recovery activities and progress in restoring operational capabilities are communicated to designated internal and external stakeholders |
| RC.CO-04 | Public updates on incident recovery are shared using approved methods and messaging |
Turn a desired outcome into an actionable gap
An organisational profile describes current and/or target posture using Core outcomes. Keep the same scope for observations and targets: a subsidiary, product or service can warrant its own profile. NIST SP 1301 covers scoping, gathering information, creating the profile, analysing gaps and creating an action plan, then following it up.
| Concept | What it describes | Useful discussion evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Current Profile | Outcomes currently achieved or attempted, and how or to what extent they are achieved. | Dated observations, scope, evidence references and uncertainties. |
| Target Profile | Desired outcomes selected and prioritised for risk management objectives. | Agreed expectations, priorities and business rationale. |
| Gap and action plan | Difference between compared states, then actions supporting progress. | Owner, dependencies, resources, agreed deadline and expected verification. |
| CSF Tiers | Rigor of risk governance and management practices: Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable, Adaptive. | Context and observed practices; no improvised average across subcategories. |
Reasoning example: recovery at a critical supplier
Fictional learning case: a supplier presents a recovery procedure but no recent observation of restoration for the service in scope. RC.RP-03 concerns verifying the integrity of backups and other restoration assets before use. RC.RP-05 concerns verifying restored asset integrity, restoration and normal operating status. A procedure describes intent; it does not replace those checks. Record the gap, request an exercise suited to the scope and identify who accepts residual risk. No client result is represented here.
Read the framework without overinterpreting identifiers
Why are some numbers missing?
NIST retains numbering gaps where CSF 1.1 subcategories were relocated. An incomplete sequence does not indicate missing data in this explorer.
Does a category demonstrate compliance?
An identifier establishes shared meaning for an expected outcome. It proves neither achievement nor compliance with a contract, regulation or another framework.
Can a NIST CSF certification be claimed?
NIST states that it offers no certification or endorsement of CSF-related products, services or implementations. Describe the specific method or alignment examined without turning that work into NIST approval.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29. Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. CIE adaptation dated 22 October 2026: extraction of active Core elements, category grouping, consultation filter, and separately labelled editorial questions and examples. No NIST endorsement is implied. Reuse conditions and warranty disclaimer: NIST source below.
Source export SHA-256: 0438875f185cb3260caa464dad5644cd82927329d3e73d40f4aa811ffe48dd4e
- NIST (2024) · The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 · NIST CSWP 29 · 2024-02-26 · §2–3, Appendix A–C
- NIST (2024) · Creating and Using Organizational Profiles · NIST SP 1301 · 2024-02 · scope, current/target, gap analysis
- NIST · CSF 2.0 Reference Tool · Export retrieved 2026-10-22 · Core fields only
- NIST · Cybersecurity Framework FAQ · Reviewed 2026-10-22 · outcomes, numbering, certification
- NIST · Copyright and licensing statements · Technical Series Publications / non-SRD data · reviewed 2026-10-22
Offizielle Referenzen
Die Referenzen unterstützen die Methode. Passen Sie die Prüfungen an Ihren Kontext an; sie stellen keine Zertifizierung dar. Originalreferenztitel und Quelldokumente können in einer anderen Sprache verfasst sein.
Referenzen geprüft am .
- OECD — Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
- NIST — SP 800-161, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
- NIST (2024) · The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0
- NIST (2024) · Creating and Using Organizational Profiles
- NIST · CSF 2.0 Reference Tool
- NIST · Cybersecurity Framework FAQ
- NIST · Copyright and licensing statements
- NIST · SP 800-61 Rev. 3
- NIST · SP 800-61r3 — recommandations détaillées / detailed recommendations
- NIST · Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- NIST · SP 800-184 — Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery
