资源 · 05
数字尽职调查:承诺前的信任核查清单
验证组织、其领导层、依赖关系和风险信号,避免将调查变成无差别的数据收集。
已更新 · 37 min
本指南有助于实现的目标
- 验证销售叙述之外的身份。
- 将数字信号与决策风险关联起来。
- 区分事实、指控和未知因素。
- 在承诺前设定可衡量的条件。
快速检查
- 合同主体是否明确无误?
- 不同来源的受益所有人和实际领导人是否一致?
- 关键依赖项是否有可行的备用方案?
- 事件是否已标注日期、来源和背景信息?
- 哪些新事实会改变建议?
分步指南
- 1
构建决策框架并考虑比例原则
说明决策、风险价值或影响、管辖范围、受影响人员以及合理的核查深度。 排除无决策价值的数据。
交付成果:核查授权和终止标准。
- 2
建立身份和控制
交叉核对官方登记册、受益所有人、董事、地址、域名和机构账户。 记录名称冲突和不一致之处,而不是凭直觉解决。
交付成果:来源身份文件。
- 3
绘制活动和依赖关系图
关联产品、敏感客户、供应商、托管服务商、分包商、许可证和运营区域。 找出没有切实可行的替代方案的集中点和依赖关系。
交付成果:关键依赖关系图。
- 4
评估声誉和事件。
根据主要来源(公开决策、官方声明、事件、纠正措施和组织应对措施)构建时间线。 将已确定的事实与指控区分开来。
交付成果:合格的时间线。
- 5
评估数字信任。
审查外部风险敞口、可见的安全实践、数据治理、连续性、透明度以及声明与所提供证据之间的一致性。
交付成果:信任网格和证据请求。
- 6
有条件地做出决策。
提出各种情景、不确定性、剩余风险和补偿措施。 为每个条件指定负责人、证据标准、截止日期和审查触发条件。
交付成果:批准、不批准或有条件批准的说明。
虚构示例
示例情境
在与关键供应商签约之前,团队应交叉核对法律身份、域名、子处理者、已披露的事件和技术依赖性。 名称不匹配仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。
决策及预期证据
该建议区分了签约前需要澄清的条件、交付期间的控制措施以及仍然无法核实的事实。
管理指标
| 指标 | 衡量内容 | 首要行动 |
|---|---|---|
| 证据覆盖范围 | 与主要来源或提供的证据相关的决策关键点 | 首先解决最有可能导致决策逆转的未知因素 |
| 新鲜度 | 证据在主体变化的速度下仍然有效 | 为关键项目设定有效期 |
| 集中性 | 依赖项的失效会导致关键功能停止 | 确保采取替代或补偿措施 |
| 条件已解除 | 以符合要求的证据关闭保留 | 拒绝仅以声明方式关闭 |
常见错误
- 将无信号与无风险混淆
- 不必要地收集个人数据
- 将媒体重复报道视为独立来源
- 在没有决策条件的情况下给出评分
常见问题解答
数字尽职调查是否取代了法律和财务审查?
否。它通过审查在线身份、技术依赖性、暴露情况、公开证据和数字一致性来补充现有建议。
是否可以对任何个人进行调查?
信息收集必须合法、适度,并与合法目的相关。 应排除敏感数据或与决策无关的数据。
应如何处理相互矛盾的信息?
保留两个版本,追踪原始来源,注明日期,请求澄清,并在建议中说明剩余的不确定性。
网络事件:恢复决策与证据
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
Assess recovery using supplier evidence
An availability promise does not explain who supplies records, accepts restoration or coordinates post-incident communication.
- Identify crisis contacts, deputies, evidence-access rights and decision responsibilities.
- Request a redacted test example covering candidate checks and restored-service validation.
- Compare sharing and recovery communication rules with applicable agreements.
Explore NIST outcomes and the timeline →
References reviewed · NIST SP 800-61r3 · pp. 27–29, 34–35 · CSF 2.0 · Appendix A
探索 NIST CSF 2.0 成果
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
CSF 2.0 organises cybersecurity risk management outcomes. This Core view contains six functions, 22 categories and 106 active subcategories, extracted from the NIST tool and cross-checked against Appendix A of NIST CSWP 29. Official wording remains in English; the evidence questions below are Cyber Intelligence Embassy editorial proposals.
This reference supports a cyber due diligence discussion. It performs no audit, collects no visitor information and calculates no compliance score. Categories are not a universal control checklist: scope, priority outcomes and implementation methods depend on the organisation.
Framework version: 2.0, published on 26 February 2024. Export reviewed on 22 October 2026. The tool export is a generated view, distinct from the official publication; only active Core fields are included. Withdrawn CSF 1.1 entries, implementation examples and mappings to other frameworks are excluded.
按功能划分的成果
| CSF 功能 | 类别 | 子类别 |
|---|---|---|
| GV · GOVERN | 6 | 31 |
| ID · IDENTIFY | 3 | 21 |
| PR · PROTECT | 5 | 22 |
| DE · DETECT | 2 | 11 |
| RS · RESPOND | 4 | 13 |
| RC · RECOVER | 2 | 8 |
显示的成果 : 106 / 106
没有符合条件的成果。
需要核查的问题与证据
For each category, the proposed question, document or test and limitation are editorial reading aids. They are not NIST requirements or translations of Implementation Examples. Protect sensitive information: an evidence reference and its scope will often suffice to prepare a discussion.
GV · GOVERN
The organization's cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy are established, communicated, and monitored
GV.OC · Organizational Context (5)
The circumstances - mission, stakeholder expectations, dependencies, and legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements - surrounding the organization's cybersecurity risk management decisions are understood
- Review question
- Which service must continue, and on whom does it depend?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Agreed scope, critical services, stakeholders and upstream/downstream dependencies.
- Interpretation limit
- A server list alone does not describe the mission or stakeholder expectations.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| GV.OC-01 | The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management |
| GV.OC-02 | Internal and external stakeholders are understood, and their needs and expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management are understood and considered |
| GV.OC-03 | Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity - including privacy and civil liberties obligations - are understood and managed |
| GV.OC-04 | Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that external stakeholders depend on or expect from the organization are understood and communicated |
| GV.OC-05 | Outcomes, capabilities, and services that the organization depends on are understood and communicated |
GV.RM · Risk Management Strategy (7)
The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite statements, and assumptions are established, communicated, and used to support operational risk decisions
- Review question
- Who decides on risk, using which criteria?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Documented acceptance criteria, risk appetite and tolerance, decisions with an owner.
- Interpretation limit
- A coloured cell without criteria or decision authority remains ambiguous.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| GV.RM-01 | Risk management objectives are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders |
| GV.RM-02 | Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are established, communicated, and maintained |
| GV.RM-03 | Cybersecurity risk management activities and outcomes are included in enterprise risk management processes |
| GV.RM-04 | Strategic direction that describes appropriate risk response options is established and communicated |
| GV.RM-05 | Lines of communication across the organization are established for cybersecurity risks, including risks from suppliers and other third parties |
| GV.RM-06 | A standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing, and prioritizing cybersecurity risks is established and communicated |
| GV.RM-07 | Strategic opportunities (i.e., positive risks) are characterized and are included in organizational cybersecurity risk discussions |
GV.RR · Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (4)
Cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and authorities to foster accountability, performance assessment, and continuous improvement are established and communicated
- Review question
- Who can decide, fund and suspend an activity?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Approved responsibilities, delegated authority, resources and identified deputies.
- Interpretation limit
- An organisation chart does not prove responsibilities are understood or exercised.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| GV.RR-01 | Organizational leadership is responsible and accountable for cybersecurity risk and fosters a culture that is risk-aware, ethical, and continually improving |
| GV.RR-02 | Roles, responsibilities, and authorities related to cybersecurity risk management are established, communicated, understood, and enforced |
| GV.RR-03 | Adequate resources are allocated commensurate with the cybersecurity risk strategy, roles, responsibilities, and policies |
| GV.RR-04 | Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices |
GV.PO · Policy (2)
Organizational cybersecurity policy is established, communicated, and enforced
- Review question
- Does the policy cover the actual operating scope?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Dated policy, approval, communication, exceptions and review triggers.
- Interpretation limit
- An archived policy proves neither communication nor implementation.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| GV.PO-01 | Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is established based on organizational context, cybersecurity strategy, and priorities and is communicated and enforced |
| GV.PO-02 | Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is reviewed, updated, communicated, and enforced to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology, and organizational mission |
GV.OV · Oversight (3)
Results of organization-wide cybersecurity risk management activities and performance are used to inform, improve, and adjust the risk management strategy
- Review question
- Did previous decisions deliver the intended outcome?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Management reviews, defined indicators, explained gaps and corrective decisions.
- Interpretation limit
- An overall average can conceal an untreated critical dependency.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| GV.OV-01 | Cybersecurity risk management strategy outcomes are reviewed to inform and adjust strategy and direction |
| GV.OV-02 | The cybersecurity risk management strategy is reviewed and adjusted to ensure coverage of organizational requirements and risks |
| GV.OV-03 | Organizational cybersecurity risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed |
GV.SC · Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (10)
Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified, established, managed, monitored, and improved by organizational stakeholders
- Review question
- Does the agreement cover the supplier, dependencies and exit?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Prioritised third parties, agreed requirements, monitoring, incident coordination and termination scenario.
- Interpretation limit
- A supplier certificate does not automatically cover your use or every subcontractor.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| GV.SC-01 | A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders |
| GV.SC-02 | Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally |
| GV.SC-03 | Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes |
| GV.SC-04 | Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality |
| GV.SC-05 | Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties |
| GV.SC-06 | Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier or other third-party relationships |
| GV.SC-07 | The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship |
| GV.SC-08 | Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities |
| GV.SC-09 | Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle |
| GV.SC-10 | Cybersecurity supply chain risk management plans include provisions for activities that occur after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement |
ID · IDENTIFY
The organization's current cybersecurity risks are understood
ID.AM · Asset Management (7)
Assets (e.g., data, hardware, software, systems, facilities, services, people) that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy
- Review question
- Which assets, data and services make up the scope?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Inventory reconciled with observations, flows, owners and lifecycle stages.
- Interpretation limit
- An unreconciled inventory can omit SaaS, abandoned assets or duplicated data.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| ID.AM-01 | Inventories of hardware managed by the organization are maintained |
| ID.AM-02 | Inventories of software, services, and systems managed by the organization are maintained |
| ID.AM-03 | Representations of the organization's authorized network communication and internal and external network data flows are maintained |
| ID.AM-04 | Inventories of services provided by suppliers are maintained |
| ID.AM-05 | Assets are prioritized based on classification, criticality, resources, and impact on the mission |
| ID.AM-07 | Inventories of data and corresponding metadata for designated data types are maintained |
| ID.AM-08 | Systems, hardware, software, services, and data are managed throughout their life cycles |
ID.RA · Risk Assessment (10)
The cybersecurity risk to the organization, assets, and individuals is understood by the organization
- Review question
- Which scenario links a threat, vulnerability and business consequence?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Dated findings, threat sources, likelihood/impact analysis and a treatment decision.
- Interpretation limit
- A CVE or technical score alone does not demonstrate risk applicable to the service.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| ID.RA-01 | Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded |
| ID.RA-02 | Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources |
| ID.RA-03 | Internal and external threats to the organization are identified and recorded |
| ID.RA-04 | Potential impacts and likelihoods of threats exploiting vulnerabilities are identified and recorded |
| ID.RA-05 | Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to understand inherent risk and inform risk response prioritization |
| ID.RA-06 | Risk responses are chosen, prioritized, planned, tracked, and communicated |
| ID.RA-07 | Changes and exceptions are managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked |
| ID.RA-08 | Processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established |
| ID.RA-09 | The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use |
| ID.RA-10 | Critical suppliers are assessed prior to acquisition |
ID.IM · Improvement (4)
Improvements to organizational cybersecurity risk management processes, procedures and activities are identified across all CSF Functions
- Review question
- Which lesson changed preparedness?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Assessment and exercise results, tracked actions, revised plans and later verification.
- Interpretation limit
- Minutes without action or later checks do not demonstrate improvement.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| ID.IM-01 | Improvements are identified from evaluations |
| ID.IM-02 | Improvements are identified from security tests and exercises, including those done in coordination with suppliers and relevant third parties |
| ID.IM-03 | Improvements are identified from execution of operational processes, procedures, and activities |
| ID.IM-04 | Incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans that affect operations are established, communicated, maintained, and improved |
PR · PROTECT
Safeguards to manage the organization's cybersecurity risks are used
PR.AA · Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (6)
Access to physical and logical assets is limited to authorized users, services, and hardware and managed commensurate with the assessed risk of unauthorized access
- Review question
- Do actual permissions follow identity and business need?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Provisioning/removal, authentication, authorisation, reviews and relevant physical safeguards.
- Interpretation limit
- Enabling MFA proves neither least privilege nor removal of old access.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| PR.AA-01 | Identities and credentials for authorized users, services, and hardware are managed by the organization |
| PR.AA-02 | Identities are proofed and bound to credentials based on the context of interactions |
| PR.AA-03 | Users, services, and hardware are authenticated |
| PR.AA-04 | Identity assertions are protected, conveyed, and verified |
| PR.AA-05 | Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties |
| PR.AA-06 | Physical access to assets is managed, monitored, and enforced commensurate with risk |
PR.AT · Awareness and Training (2)
The organization's personnel are provided with cybersecurity awareness and training so that they can perform their cybersecurity-related tasks
- Review question
- Can each role recognise and handle its risk?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Role-specific material, exercises and observation of sensitive tasks.
- Interpretation limit
- Attendance does not demonstrate operational competence.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| PR.AT-01 | Personnel are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform general tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind |
| PR.AT-02 | Individuals in specialized roles are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind |
PR.DS · Data Security (4)
Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information
- Review question
- How are data protected and recoverable?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Safeguards for data at rest, in transit and in use, protected backups and tests.
- Interpretation limit
- Encryption alone proves neither access control nor recoverability.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| PR.DS-01 | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected |
| PR.DS-02 | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected |
| PR.DS-10 | The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected |
| PR.DS-11 | Backups of data are created, protected, maintained, and tested |
PR.PS · Platform Security (6)
The hardware, software (e.g., firmware, operating systems, applications), and services of physical and virtual platforms are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect their confidentiality, integrity, and availability
- Review question
- Does the deployed configuration match the approved baseline?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Configuration baselines, maintenance, logging, authorised software and development practices.
- Interpretation limit
- A hardening baseline not compared with production does not show the actual state.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| PR.PS-01 | Configuration management practices are established and applied |
| PR.PS-02 | Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk |
| PR.PS-03 | Hardware is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk |
| PR.PS-04 | Log records are generated and made available for continuous monitoring |
| PR.PS-05 | Installation and execution of unauthorized software are prevented |
| PR.PS-06 | Secure software development practices are integrated, and their performance is monitored throughout the software development life cycle |
PR.IR · Technology Infrastructure Resilience (4)
Security architectures are managed with the organization's risk strategy to protect asset confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and organizational resilience
- Review question
- Can the service withstand loss of a dependency?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Architecture, segmentation, environmental safeguards, capacity and failure exercises.
- Interpretation limit
- Advertised redundancy can still share a single dependency.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| PR.IR-01 | Networks and environments are protected from unauthorized logical access and usage |
| PR.IR-02 | The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats |
| PR.IR-03 | Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations |
| PR.IR-04 | Adequate resource capacity to ensure availability is maintained |
DE · DETECT
Possible cybersecurity attacks and compromises are found and analyzed
DE.CM · Continuous Monitoring (5)
Assets are monitored to find anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events
- Review question
- Which relevant events are actually observed?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Monitoring sources, coverage, timestamps, anomaly handling and blind spots.
- Interpretation limit
- High log volume guarantees neither useful coverage nor actionable alerts.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| DE.CM-01 | Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-02 | The physical environment is monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-03 | Personnel activity and technology usage are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-06 | External service provider activities and services are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
| DE.CM-09 | Computing hardware and software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored to find potentially adverse events |
DE.AE · Adverse Event Analysis (6)
Anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events are analyzed to characterize the events and detect cybersecurity incidents
- Review question
- Who turns correlated events into an incident decision?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Event correlation, threat context, estimated impact and declaration criteria.
- Interpretation limit
- An isolated alert does not automatically establish a confirmed incident.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| DE.AE-02 | Potentially adverse events are analyzed to better understand associated activities |
| DE.AE-03 | Information is correlated from multiple sources |
| DE.AE-04 | The estimated impact and scope of adverse events are understood |
| DE.AE-06 | Information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools |
| DE.AE-07 | Cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis |
| DE.AE-08 | Incidents are declared when adverse events meet the defined incident criteria |
RS · RESPOND
Actions regarding a detected cybersecurity incident are taken
RS.MA · Incident Management (5)
Responses to detected cybersecurity incidents are managed
- Review question
- Does the incident have leadership and escalation criteria?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Activated plan, triage, priorities, third-party coordination and a recovery transition decision.
- Interpretation limit
- An on-call number without authority or criteria is insufficient to manage response.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| RS.MA-01 | The incident response plan is executed in coordination with relevant third parties once an incident is declared |
| RS.MA-02 | Incident reports are triaged and validated |
| RS.MA-03 | Incidents are categorized and prioritized |
| RS.MA-04 | Incidents are escalated or elevated as needed |
| RS.MA-05 | The criteria for initiating incident recovery are applied |
RS.AN · Incident Analysis (4)
Investigations are conducted to ensure effective response and support forensics and recovery activities
- Review question
- Can scope and cause be explained without altering evidence?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Timeline, collected data, integrity, provenance and explicitly separated hypotheses.
- Interpretation limit
- An initial cause hypothesis does not prove the full scope is known.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| RS.AN-03 | Analysis is performed to establish what has taken place during an incident and the root cause of the incident |
| RS.AN-06 | Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, and the records' integrity and provenance are preserved |
| RS.AN-07 | Incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved |
| RS.AN-08 | An incident's magnitude is estimated and validated |
RS.CO · Incident Response Reporting and Communication (2)
Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders as required by laws, regulations, or policies
- Review question
- Which message can be shared, with whom and through which channel?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Recipients, approval, fallback channels and agreed sharing rules.
- Interpretation limit
- Legal reporting duties depend on context and require separate verification.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| RS.CO-02 | Internal and external stakeholders are notified of incidents |
| RS.CO-03 | Information is shared with designated internal and external stakeholders |
RS.MI · Incident Mitigation (2)
Activities are performed to prevent expansion of an event and mitigate its effects
- Review question
- How is the effect of containment and eradication checked?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Authorised actions, dependencies, execution records and observation after intervention.
- Interpretation limit
- The disappearance of an alert alone does not demonstrate eradication.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| RS.MI-01 | Incidents are contained |
| RS.MI-02 | Incidents are eradicated |
RC · RECOVER
Assets and operations affected by a cybersecurity incident are restored
RC.RP · Incident Recovery Plan Execution (6)
Restoration activities are performed to ensure operational availability of systems and services affected by cybersecurity incidents
- Review question
- Does the restored service work with intact data?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Recovery asset integrity, functional tests, restored-state checks and documented closure.
- Interpretation limit
- A successful backup job does not prove restoration integrity.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| RC.RP-01 | The recovery portion of the incident response plan is executed once initiated from the incident response process |
| RC.RP-02 | Recovery actions are selected, scoped, prioritized, and performed |
| RC.RP-03 | The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration |
| RC.RP-04 | Critical mission functions and cybersecurity risk management are considered to establish post-incident operational norms |
| RC.RP-05 | The integrity of restored assets is verified, systems and services are restored, and normal operating status is confirmed |
| RC.RP-06 | The end of incident recovery is declared based on criteria, and incident-related documentation is completed |
RC.CO · Incident Recovery Communication (2)
Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties
- Review question
- How is progress communicated without declaring normal operation too early?
- Evidence or observation to reconcile
- Approved updates, internal/external recipients and consistency between statements and observations.
- Interpretation limit
- A public recovery announcement does not replace service verification.
| ID | NIST 官方成果,英文原文 |
|---|---|
| RC.CO-03 | Recovery activities and progress in restoring operational capabilities are communicated to designated internal and external stakeholders |
| RC.CO-04 | Public updates on incident recovery are shared using approved methods and messaging |
Turn a desired outcome into an actionable gap
An organisational profile describes current and/or target posture using Core outcomes. Keep the same scope for observations and targets: a subsidiary, product or service can warrant its own profile. NIST SP 1301 covers scoping, gathering information, creating the profile, analysing gaps and creating an action plan, then following it up.
| Concept | What it describes | Useful discussion evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Current Profile | Outcomes currently achieved or attempted, and how or to what extent they are achieved. | Dated observations, scope, evidence references and uncertainties. |
| Target Profile | Desired outcomes selected and prioritised for risk management objectives. | Agreed expectations, priorities and business rationale. |
| Gap and action plan | Difference between compared states, then actions supporting progress. | Owner, dependencies, resources, agreed deadline and expected verification. |
| CSF Tiers | Rigor of risk governance and management practices: Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable, Adaptive. | Context and observed practices; no improvised average across subcategories. |
Reasoning example: recovery at a critical supplier
Fictional learning case: a supplier presents a recovery procedure but no recent observation of restoration for the service in scope. RC.RP-03 concerns verifying the integrity of backups and other restoration assets before use. RC.RP-05 concerns verifying restored asset integrity, restoration and normal operating status. A procedure describes intent; it does not replace those checks. Record the gap, request an exercise suited to the scope and identify who accepts residual risk. No client result is represented here.
Read the framework without overinterpreting identifiers
Why are some numbers missing?
NIST retains numbering gaps where CSF 1.1 subcategories were relocated. An incomplete sequence does not indicate missing data in this explorer.
Does a category demonstrate compliance?
An identifier establishes shared meaning for an expected outcome. It proves neither achievement nor compliance with a contract, regulation or another framework.
Can a NIST CSF certification be claimed?
NIST states that it offers no certification or endorsement of CSF-related products, services or implementations. Describe the specific method or alignment examined without turning that work into NIST approval.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29. Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. CIE adaptation dated 22 October 2026: extraction of active Core elements, category grouping, consultation filter, and separately labelled editorial questions and examples. No NIST endorsement is implied. Reuse conditions and warranty disclaimer: NIST source below.
Source export SHA-256: 0438875f185cb3260caa464dad5644cd82927329d3e73d40f4aa811ffe48dd4e
- NIST (2024) · The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 · NIST CSWP 29 · 2024-02-26 · §2–3, Appendix A–C
- NIST (2024) · Creating and Using Organizational Profiles · NIST SP 1301 · 2024-02 · scope, current/target, gap analysis
- NIST · CSF 2.0 Reference Tool · Export retrieved 2026-10-22 · Core fields only
- NIST · Cybersecurity Framework FAQ · Reviewed 2026-10-22 · outcomes, numbering, certification
- NIST · Copyright and licensing statements · Technical Series Publications / non-SRD data · reviewed 2026-10-22
官方参考文献
参考文献支持该方法。 请根据您的实际情况调整检查;它们并非认证。 原始参考文献标题和源文档可能使用其他语言。
参考资料查阅日期 .
- OECD — Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
- NIST — SP 800-161, Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
- NIST (2024) · The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0
- NIST (2024) · Creating and Using Organizational Profiles
- NIST · CSF 2.0 Reference Tool
- NIST · Cybersecurity Framework FAQ
- NIST · Copyright and licensing statements
- NIST · SP 800-61 Rev. 3
- NIST · SP 800-61r3 — recommandations détaillées / detailed recommendations
- NIST · Cybersecurity Framework 2.0
- NIST · SP 800-184 — Guide for Cybersecurity Event Recovery
