リソース · 05

デジタルデューデリジェンス:コミットメント前の信頼性チェックリスト

組織、そのリーダーシップ、依存関係、リスクシグナルを、無差別なデータ収集に陥ることなく検証します。

更新済み · 38 min

現状と目標の資料を分け、六つの計画パネルを備えた架空の無人サイバーガバナンス室 AIで生成した編集用イラスト

このガイドが達成するのに役立つこと

  • 営業上の説明を超えてアイデンティティを検証します
  • デジタルシグナルを意思決定リスクに結び付けます
  • 事実、疑惑、未知の要素を区別します
  • コミットメント前に測定可能な条件を設定します

クイックチェック

  • 契約主体は明確ですか?
  • 情報源間で、実質的な所有者とリーダーは一貫していますか?
  • 重要な依存関係には実行可能な代替手段がありますか?
  • インシデントには日付、情報源、および状況が記録されていますか?
  • どのような新たな事実によって推奨事項が変更されますか?

手順

  1. 1

    意思決定と比例原則を明確にする

    意思決定、リスクにさらされる価値または影響、管轄区域、影響を受ける人々、および検証の妥当な深度を明記する。 意思決定に価値のないデータは除外する。

    成果物:検証の義務と停止基準。

  2. 2

    本人確認と管理を確立する

    公的登録簿、実質的所有者、取締役、住所、ドメイン、および機関アカウントを相互参照する。 名前の衝突や矛盾は、直感で解決するのではなく、文書化する。

    成果物:情報源付きの本人確認ファイル。

  3. 3

    活動と依存関係をマッピングする

    製品、機密性の高い顧客、サプライヤー、ホスティング、下請業者、ライセンス、および運用地域を関連付ける。 現実的な代替手段がない集中と依存関係を特定する。

    成果物:重要依存関係マップ

  4. 4

    評判とインシデントの評価

    一次情報源(公的決定、公式声明、インシデント、是正措置、組織の対応)からタイムラインを作成する。 確定した事実と疑惑は区別する。

    成果物:評価済みタイムライン

  5. 5

    デジタル信頼性の評価

    外部への露出、目に見えるセキュリティ対策、データガバナンス、継続性、透明性、声明と提出された証拠の一貫性をレビューする。

    成果物:信頼性グリッドと証拠要求

  6. 6

    条件付き決定

    シナリオ、不確実性、残存リスク、および補償措置を提示する。 各条件に担当者、証拠基準、期日、およびレビューのトリガーを設定する。

    成果物:実施可否、実施不可、または条件付き実施の通知

架空の事例

具体的な状況

重要なプロバイダーと契約する前に、チームは法的ID、ドメイン、サブプロセッサー、開示されたインシデント、技術的依存関係を相互チェックします。 名前の不一致は未解決の問題として残ります。

決定と期待される証拠

この勧告では、契約前に確認すべき条件、配信中の管理、検証不可能な事実を区別しています。

管理指標

指標測定対象最初のアクション
証拠の網羅性一次情報源または提供された証拠に関連する意思決定の重要ポイント意思決定を覆す可能性が最も高い未知の要素を最初に解決する
鮮度対象者の変化のペースに合わせて有効な証拠重要項目の有効期限を設定する
集中度障害が発生すると重要な機能が停止する依存関係代替措置または補償措置を確保する
条件がクリアされた要件を満たす証拠に基づいて留保事項を解消する拒否宣言のみによる解消

よくある間違い

  • シグナルがないことをリスクがないと混同する
  • 不必要な個人データの収集
  • メディアの繰り返しを独立した情報源として扱う
  • 意思決定条件なしにスコアを提供する

よくある質問

デジタルデューデリジェンスは法的および財務的レビューに取って代わるのか?

いいえ。オンラインID、技術的依存関係、情報漏洩リスク、公開証拠、デジタル整合性を検証することで、既存の手法を補完します。

個人は誰でも調査対象になり得るか?

データ収集は、合法かつ比例的であり、正当な目的に結び付けられていなければなりません。 機密性の高いデータや意思決定に関係のないデータは除外する必要があります。

矛盾する情報はどのように処理すべきか?

両方のバージョンを保管し、一次情報源を追跡し、日付を明記し、説明を求め、勧告の中で残存する不確実性を記載します。

サイバーインシデント:復旧判断と証拠

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

Assess recovery using supplier evidence

An availability promise does not explain who supplies records, accepts restoration or coordinates post-incident communication.

  • Identify crisis contacts, deputies, evidence-access rights and decision responsibilities.
  • Request a redacted test example covering candidate checks and restored-service validation.
  • Compare sharing and recovery communication rules with applicable agreements.

Explore NIST outcomes and the timeline →

References reviewed · NIST SP 800-61r3 · pp. 27–29, 34–35 · CSF 2.0 · Appendix A

NIST CSF 2.0の成果を調べる

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

CSF 2.0 organises cybersecurity risk management outcomes. This Core view contains six functions, 22 categories and 106 active subcategories, extracted from the NIST tool and cross-checked against Appendix A of NIST CSWP 29. Official wording remains in English; the evidence questions below are Cyber Intelligence Embassy editorial proposals.

This reference supports a cyber due diligence discussion. It performs no audit, collects no visitor information and calculates no compliance score. Categories are not a universal control checklist: scope, priority outcomes and implementation methods depend on the organisation.

Framework version: 2.0, published on 26 February 2024. Export reviewed on 22 October 2026. The tool export is a generated view, distinct from the official publication; only active Core fields are included. Withdrawn CSF 1.1 entries, implementation examples and mappings to other frameworks are excluded.

機能別の成果

Counts describe subcategories in this extraction. They measure neither risk, organisational coverage nor recommended spending. Work on all six functions concurrently; their display order is not a project schedule.
機能別の成果
CSFの機能カテゴリーサブカテゴリー
GV · GOVERN631
ID · IDENTIFY321
PR · PROTECT522
DE · DETECT211
RS · RESPOND413
RC · RECOVER28

表示中の成果 : 106 / 106

確認する質問と証拠

For each category, the proposed question, document or test and limitation are editorial reading aids. They are not NIST requirements or translations of Implementation Examples. Protect sensitive information: an evidence reference and its scope will often suffice to prepare a discussion.

GV · GOVERN

The organization's cybersecurity risk management strategy, expectations, and policy are established, communicated, and monitored

GV.OC · Organizational Context (5)

The circumstances - mission, stakeholder expectations, dependencies, and legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements - surrounding the organization's cybersecurity risk management decisions are understood

Review question
Which service must continue, and on whom does it depend?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Agreed scope, critical services, stakeholders and upstream/downstream dependencies.
Interpretation limit
A server list alone does not describe the mission or stakeholder expectations.
GV.OC · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
GV.OC-01The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management
GV.OC-02Internal and external stakeholders are understood, and their needs and expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management are understood and considered
GV.OC-03Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity - including privacy and civil liberties obligations - are understood and managed
GV.OC-04Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that external stakeholders depend on or expect from the organization are understood and communicated
GV.OC-05Outcomes, capabilities, and services that the organization depends on are understood and communicated
GV.RM · Risk Management Strategy (7)

The organization's priorities, constraints, risk tolerance and appetite statements, and assumptions are established, communicated, and used to support operational risk decisions

Review question
Who decides on risk, using which criteria?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Documented acceptance criteria, risk appetite and tolerance, decisions with an owner.
Interpretation limit
A coloured cell without criteria or decision authority remains ambiguous.
GV.RM · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
GV.RM-01Risk management objectives are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
GV.RM-02Risk appetite and risk tolerance statements are established, communicated, and maintained
GV.RM-03Cybersecurity risk management activities and outcomes are included in enterprise risk management processes
GV.RM-04Strategic direction that describes appropriate risk response options is established and communicated
GV.RM-05Lines of communication across the organization are established for cybersecurity risks, including risks from suppliers and other third parties
GV.RM-06A standardized method for calculating, documenting, categorizing, and prioritizing cybersecurity risks is established and communicated
GV.RM-07Strategic opportunities (i.e., positive risks) are characterized and are included in organizational cybersecurity risk discussions
GV.RR · Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (4)

Cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and authorities to foster accountability, performance assessment, and continuous improvement are established and communicated

Review question
Who can decide, fund and suspend an activity?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Approved responsibilities, delegated authority, resources and identified deputies.
Interpretation limit
An organisation chart does not prove responsibilities are understood or exercised.
GV.RR · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
GV.RR-01Organizational leadership is responsible and accountable for cybersecurity risk and fosters a culture that is risk-aware, ethical, and continually improving
GV.RR-02Roles, responsibilities, and authorities related to cybersecurity risk management are established, communicated, understood, and enforced
GV.RR-03Adequate resources are allocated commensurate with the cybersecurity risk strategy, roles, responsibilities, and policies
GV.RR-04Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices
GV.PO · Policy (2)

Organizational cybersecurity policy is established, communicated, and enforced

Review question
Does the policy cover the actual operating scope?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Dated policy, approval, communication, exceptions and review triggers.
Interpretation limit
An archived policy proves neither communication nor implementation.
GV.PO · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
GV.PO-01Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is established based on organizational context, cybersecurity strategy, and priorities and is communicated and enforced
GV.PO-02Policy for managing cybersecurity risks is reviewed, updated, communicated, and enforced to reflect changes in requirements, threats, technology, and organizational mission
GV.OV · Oversight (3)

Results of organization-wide cybersecurity risk management activities and performance are used to inform, improve, and adjust the risk management strategy

Review question
Did previous decisions deliver the intended outcome?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Management reviews, defined indicators, explained gaps and corrective decisions.
Interpretation limit
An overall average can conceal an untreated critical dependency.
GV.OV · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
GV.OV-01Cybersecurity risk management strategy outcomes are reviewed to inform and adjust strategy and direction
GV.OV-02The cybersecurity risk management strategy is reviewed and adjusted to ensure coverage of organizational requirements and risks
GV.OV-03Organizational cybersecurity risk management performance is evaluated and reviewed for adjustments needed
GV.SC · Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (10)

Cyber supply chain risk management processes are identified, established, managed, monitored, and improved by organizational stakeholders

Review question
Does the agreement cover the supplier, dependencies and exit?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Prioritised third parties, agreed requirements, monitoring, incident coordination and termination scenario.
Interpretation limit
A supplier certificate does not automatically cover your use or every subcontractor.
GV.SC · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
GV.SC-01A cybersecurity supply chain risk management program, strategy, objectives, policies, and processes are established and agreed to by organizational stakeholders
GV.SC-02Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for suppliers, customers, and partners are established, communicated, and coordinated internally and externally
GV.SC-03Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management, risk assessment, and improvement processes
GV.SC-04Suppliers are known and prioritized by criticality
GV.SC-05Requirements to address cybersecurity risks in supply chains are established, prioritized, and integrated into contracts and other types of agreements with suppliers and other relevant third parties
GV.SC-06Planning and due diligence are performed to reduce risks before entering into formal supplier or other third-party relationships
GV.SC-07The risks posed by a supplier, their products and services, and other third parties are understood, recorded, prioritized, assessed, responded to, and monitored over the course of the relationship
GV.SC-08Relevant suppliers and other third parties are included in incident planning, response, and recovery activities
GV.SC-09Supply chain security practices are integrated into cybersecurity and enterprise risk management programs, and their performance is monitored throughout the technology product and service life cycle
GV.SC-10Cybersecurity supply chain risk management plans include provisions for activities that occur after the conclusion of a partnership or service agreement

ID · IDENTIFY

The organization's current cybersecurity risks are understood

ID.AM · Asset Management (7)

Assets (e.g., data, hardware, software, systems, facilities, services, people) that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to organizational objectives and the organization's risk strategy

Review question
Which assets, data and services make up the scope?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Inventory reconciled with observations, flows, owners and lifecycle stages.
Interpretation limit
An unreconciled inventory can omit SaaS, abandoned assets or duplicated data.
ID.AM · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
ID.AM-01Inventories of hardware managed by the organization are maintained
ID.AM-02Inventories of software, services, and systems managed by the organization are maintained
ID.AM-03Representations of the organization's authorized network communication and internal and external network data flows are maintained
ID.AM-04Inventories of services provided by suppliers are maintained
ID.AM-05Assets are prioritized based on classification, criticality, resources, and impact on the mission
ID.AM-07Inventories of data and corresponding metadata for designated data types are maintained
ID.AM-08Systems, hardware, software, services, and data are managed throughout their life cycles
ID.RA · Risk Assessment (10)

The cybersecurity risk to the organization, assets, and individuals is understood by the organization

Review question
Which scenario links a threat, vulnerability and business consequence?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Dated findings, threat sources, likelihood/impact analysis and a treatment decision.
Interpretation limit
A CVE or technical score alone does not demonstrate risk applicable to the service.
ID.RA · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
ID.RA-01Vulnerabilities in assets are identified, validated, and recorded
ID.RA-02Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources
ID.RA-03Internal and external threats to the organization are identified and recorded
ID.RA-04Potential impacts and likelihoods of threats exploiting vulnerabilities are identified and recorded
ID.RA-05Threats, vulnerabilities, likelihoods, and impacts are used to understand inherent risk and inform risk response prioritization
ID.RA-06Risk responses are chosen, prioritized, planned, tracked, and communicated
ID.RA-07Changes and exceptions are managed, assessed for risk impact, recorded, and tracked
ID.RA-08Processes for receiving, analyzing, and responding to vulnerability disclosures are established
ID.RA-09The authenticity and integrity of hardware and software are assessed prior to acquisition and use
ID.RA-10Critical suppliers are assessed prior to acquisition
ID.IM · Improvement (4)

Improvements to organizational cybersecurity risk management processes, procedures and activities are identified across all CSF Functions

Review question
Which lesson changed preparedness?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Assessment and exercise results, tracked actions, revised plans and later verification.
Interpretation limit
Minutes without action or later checks do not demonstrate improvement.
ID.IM · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
ID.IM-01Improvements are identified from evaluations
ID.IM-02Improvements are identified from security tests and exercises, including those done in coordination with suppliers and relevant third parties
ID.IM-03Improvements are identified from execution of operational processes, procedures, and activities
ID.IM-04Incident response plans and other cybersecurity plans that affect operations are established, communicated, maintained, and improved

PR · PROTECT

Safeguards to manage the organization's cybersecurity risks are used

PR.AA · Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (6)

Access to physical and logical assets is limited to authorized users, services, and hardware and managed commensurate with the assessed risk of unauthorized access

Review question
Do actual permissions follow identity and business need?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Provisioning/removal, authentication, authorisation, reviews and relevant physical safeguards.
Interpretation limit
Enabling MFA proves neither least privilege nor removal of old access.
PR.AA · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
PR.AA-01Identities and credentials for authorized users, services, and hardware are managed by the organization
PR.AA-02Identities are proofed and bound to credentials based on the context of interactions
PR.AA-03Users, services, and hardware are authenticated
PR.AA-04Identity assertions are protected, conveyed, and verified
PR.AA-05Access permissions, entitlements, and authorizations are defined in a policy, managed, enforced, and reviewed, and incorporate the principles of least privilege and separation of duties
PR.AA-06Physical access to assets is managed, monitored, and enforced commensurate with risk
PR.AT · Awareness and Training (2)

The organization's personnel are provided with cybersecurity awareness and training so that they can perform their cybersecurity-related tasks

Review question
Can each role recognise and handle its risk?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Role-specific material, exercises and observation of sensitive tasks.
Interpretation limit
Attendance does not demonstrate operational competence.
PR.AT · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
PR.AT-01Personnel are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform general tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind
PR.AT-02Individuals in specialized roles are provided with awareness and training so that they possess the knowledge and skills to perform relevant tasks with cybersecurity risks in mind
PR.DS · Data Security (4)

Data are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information

Review question
How are data protected and recoverable?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Safeguards for data at rest, in transit and in use, protected backups and tests.
Interpretation limit
Encryption alone proves neither access control nor recoverability.
PR.DS · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
PR.DS-01The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-at-rest are protected
PR.DS-02The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-transit are protected
PR.DS-10The confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data-in-use are protected
PR.DS-11Backups of data are created, protected, maintained, and tested
PR.PS · Platform Security (6)

The hardware, software (e.g., firmware, operating systems, applications), and services of physical and virtual platforms are managed consistent with the organization's risk strategy to protect their confidentiality, integrity, and availability

Review question
Does the deployed configuration match the approved baseline?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Configuration baselines, maintenance, logging, authorised software and development practices.
Interpretation limit
A hardening baseline not compared with production does not show the actual state.
PR.PS · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
PR.PS-01Configuration management practices are established and applied
PR.PS-02Software is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk
PR.PS-03Hardware is maintained, replaced, and removed commensurate with risk
PR.PS-04Log records are generated and made available for continuous monitoring
PR.PS-05Installation and execution of unauthorized software are prevented
PR.PS-06Secure software development practices are integrated, and their performance is monitored throughout the software development life cycle
PR.IR · Technology Infrastructure Resilience (4)

Security architectures are managed with the organization's risk strategy to protect asset confidentiality, integrity, and availability, and organizational resilience

Review question
Can the service withstand loss of a dependency?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Architecture, segmentation, environmental safeguards, capacity and failure exercises.
Interpretation limit
Advertised redundancy can still share a single dependency.
PR.IR · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
PR.IR-01Networks and environments are protected from unauthorized logical access and usage
PR.IR-02The organization's technology assets are protected from environmental threats
PR.IR-03Mechanisms are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations
PR.IR-04Adequate resource capacity to ensure availability is maintained

DE · DETECT

Possible cybersecurity attacks and compromises are found and analyzed

DE.CM · Continuous Monitoring (5)

Assets are monitored to find anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events

Review question
Which relevant events are actually observed?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Monitoring sources, coverage, timestamps, anomaly handling and blind spots.
Interpretation limit
High log volume guarantees neither useful coverage nor actionable alerts.
DE.CM · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
DE.CM-01Networks and network services are monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-02The physical environment is monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-03Personnel activity and technology usage are monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-06External service provider activities and services are monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.CM-09Computing hardware and software, runtime environments, and their data are monitored to find potentially adverse events
DE.AE · Adverse Event Analysis (6)

Anomalies, indicators of compromise, and other potentially adverse events are analyzed to characterize the events and detect cybersecurity incidents

Review question
Who turns correlated events into an incident decision?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Event correlation, threat context, estimated impact and declaration criteria.
Interpretation limit
An isolated alert does not automatically establish a confirmed incident.
DE.AE · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
DE.AE-02Potentially adverse events are analyzed to better understand associated activities
DE.AE-03Information is correlated from multiple sources
DE.AE-04The estimated impact and scope of adverse events are understood
DE.AE-06Information on adverse events is provided to authorized staff and tools
DE.AE-07Cyber threat intelligence and other contextual information are integrated into the analysis
DE.AE-08Incidents are declared when adverse events meet the defined incident criteria

RS · RESPOND

Actions regarding a detected cybersecurity incident are taken

RS.MA · Incident Management (5)

Responses to detected cybersecurity incidents are managed

Review question
Does the incident have leadership and escalation criteria?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Activated plan, triage, priorities, third-party coordination and a recovery transition decision.
Interpretation limit
An on-call number without authority or criteria is insufficient to manage response.
RS.MA · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
RS.MA-01The incident response plan is executed in coordination with relevant third parties once an incident is declared
RS.MA-02Incident reports are triaged and validated
RS.MA-03Incidents are categorized and prioritized
RS.MA-04Incidents are escalated or elevated as needed
RS.MA-05The criteria for initiating incident recovery are applied
RS.AN · Incident Analysis (4)

Investigations are conducted to ensure effective response and support forensics and recovery activities

Review question
Can scope and cause be explained without altering evidence?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Timeline, collected data, integrity, provenance and explicitly separated hypotheses.
Interpretation limit
An initial cause hypothesis does not prove the full scope is known.
RS.AN · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
RS.AN-03Analysis is performed to establish what has taken place during an incident and the root cause of the incident
RS.AN-06Actions performed during an investigation are recorded, and the records' integrity and provenance are preserved
RS.AN-07Incident data and metadata are collected, and their integrity and provenance are preserved
RS.AN-08An incident's magnitude is estimated and validated
RS.CO · Incident Response Reporting and Communication (2)

Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders as required by laws, regulations, or policies

Review question
Which message can be shared, with whom and through which channel?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Recipients, approval, fallback channels and agreed sharing rules.
Interpretation limit
Legal reporting duties depend on context and require separate verification.
RS.CO · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
RS.CO-02Internal and external stakeholders are notified of incidents
RS.CO-03Information is shared with designated internal and external stakeholders
RS.MI · Incident Mitigation (2)

Activities are performed to prevent expansion of an event and mitigate its effects

Review question
How is the effect of containment and eradication checked?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Authorised actions, dependencies, execution records and observation after intervention.
Interpretation limit
The disappearance of an alert alone does not demonstrate eradication.
RS.MI · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
RS.MI-01Incidents are contained
RS.MI-02Incidents are eradicated

RC · RECOVER

Assets and operations affected by a cybersecurity incident are restored

RC.RP · Incident Recovery Plan Execution (6)

Restoration activities are performed to ensure operational availability of systems and services affected by cybersecurity incidents

Review question
Does the restored service work with intact data?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Recovery asset integrity, functional tests, restored-state checks and documented closure.
Interpretation limit
A successful backup job does not prove restoration integrity.
RC.RP · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
RC.RP-01The recovery portion of the incident response plan is executed once initiated from the incident response process
RC.RP-02Recovery actions are selected, scoped, prioritized, and performed
RC.RP-03The integrity of backups and other restoration assets is verified before using them for restoration
RC.RP-04Critical mission functions and cybersecurity risk management are considered to establish post-incident operational norms
RC.RP-05The integrity of restored assets is verified, systems and services are restored, and normal operating status is confirmed
RC.RP-06The end of incident recovery is declared based on criteria, and incident-related documentation is completed
RC.CO · Incident Recovery Communication (2)

Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties

Review question
How is progress communicated without declaring normal operation too early?
Evidence or observation to reconcile
Approved updates, internal/external recipients and consistency between statements and observations.
Interpretation limit
A public recovery announcement does not replace service verification.
RC.CO · NISTの公式成果、英語原文
IDNISTの公式成果、英語原文
RC.CO-03Recovery activities and progress in restoring operational capabilities are communicated to designated internal and external stakeholders
RC.CO-04Public updates on incident recovery are shared using approved methods and messaging

Turn a desired outcome into an actionable gap

An organisational profile describes current and/or target posture using Core outcomes. Keep the same scope for observations and targets: a subsidiary, product or service can warrant its own profile. NIST SP 1301 covers scoping, gathering information, creating the profile, analysing gaps and creating an action plan, then following it up.

Turn a desired outcome into an actionable gap
ConceptWhat it describesUseful discussion evidence
Current ProfileOutcomes currently achieved or attempted, and how or to what extent they are achieved.Dated observations, scope, evidence references and uncertainties.
Target ProfileDesired outcomes selected and prioritised for risk management objectives.Agreed expectations, priorities and business rationale.
Gap and action planDifference between compared states, then actions supporting progress.Owner, dependencies, resources, agreed deadline and expected verification.
CSF TiersRigor of risk governance and management practices: Partial, Risk Informed, Repeatable, Adaptive.Context and observed practices; no improvised average across subcategories.

Reasoning example: recovery at a critical supplier

Fictional learning case: a supplier presents a recovery procedure but no recent observation of restoration for the service in scope. RC.RP-03 concerns verifying the integrity of backups and other restoration assets before use. RC.RP-05 concerns verifying restored asset integrity, restoration and normal operating status. A procedure describes intent; it does not replace those checks. Record the gap, request an exercise suited to the scope and identify who accepts residual risk. No client result is represented here.

Read the framework without overinterpreting identifiers

Why are some numbers missing?

NIST retains numbering gaps where CSF 1.1 subcategories were relocated. An incomplete sequence does not indicate missing data in this explorer.

Does a category demonstrate compliance?

An identifier establishes shared meaning for an expected outcome. It proves neither achievement nor compliance with a contract, regulation or another framework.

Can a NIST CSF certification be claimed?

NIST states that it offers no certification or endorsement of CSF-related products, services or implementations. Describe the specific method or alignment examined without turning that work into NIST approval.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (2024), The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0, NIST CSWP 29. Republished courtesy of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. CIE adaptation dated 22 October 2026: extraction of active Core elements, category grouping, consultation filter, and separately labelled editorial questions and examples. No NIST endorsement is implied. Reuse conditions and warranty disclaimer: NIST source below.

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