Risorse · 16
Garanzia della catena di fornitura del software: dai componenti al rilascio
Collegare componenti, provenienza, build, vulnerabilità e aggiornamenti a ogni rilascio effettivamente distribuito.
Aggiornato · 7 min
Obiettivi di questa guida
- Conosci le dipendenze effettivamente distribuite.
- Verifica l'origine degli artefatti.
- Assegna priorità ai difetti nel contesto.
- Testa la sostituzione e il rollback.
Verifica rapida
- La distinta base corrisponde alla versione distribuita?
- Sono incluse le dipendenze transitive?
- Chi può firmare una release?
- Una vulnerabilità è raggiungibile nel tuo utilizzo?
- Un componente critico può essere rimosso senza improvvisazioni?
Metodo passo passo
- 1
Mappa le release distribuite.
Identifica repository, dipendenze dirette e transitive, strumenti di build, immagini, servizi esterni e proprietari. Collega tutti questi elementi a una release verificabile.
Risultato: mappa di prodotto, componente, versione e proprietario.
- 2
Generare una distinta base utilizzabile
Generare una distinta base per ogni release e confrontarla con gli artefatti effettivamente distribuiti. Risolvere nomi errati, versioni mancanti e componenti interni.
Risultato: distinta base datata e validata.
- 3
Proteggere la build
Limitare i diritti di pubblicazione, isolare le fasi sensibili e conservare la provenienza, i digest e le firme. Verificare queste prove prima del deployment.
Risultato: registro di build e policy di verifica.
- 4
Gestire gli avvisi
Collegare ogni avviso di vulnerabilità al componente, alla versione, all'esposizione e all'utilizzo effettivo. Assegnare un responsabile, una scadenza, una decisione e una prova di chiusura.
Risultato: coda di gestione contestuale.
- 5
Simulare la modifica
Sostituire un componente critico in un ambiente di test, verificare i percorsi aziendali e simulare il rollback. Misurare le dipendenze che bloccano la modifica.
Risultato atteso: rapporto sulle esercitazioni di sostituzione e di fallback.
- 6
Conservare la documentazione.
Esaminare i componenti e i fornitori in occasione di rilasci importanti e dopo gli incidenti. Conservare la documentazione per un periodo che supporti l'indagine e la correzione.
Risultato atteso: revisione del calendario e della cronologia dei rilasci.
VEX: leggere la dichiarazione prima di scartare un avviso
Una SBOM elenca componenti. VEX dichiara l’impatto di una vulnerabilità su un prodotto identificato in un dato momento. Verifichi prodotto, emittente e contesto prima di usare lo stato.
not_affected | Il prodotto è dichiarato non coinvolto. OpenVEX richiede justification o impact_statement: verifichi versione e uso. |
|---|---|
affected | Il prodotto è dichiarato coinvolto. La dichiarazione deve includere un action_statement per il trattamento. |
fixed | Le versioni indicate contengono una correzione. Non dimostra che quella versione sia installata nel suo ambiente. |
under_investigation | L’applicabilità non è ancora nota. Non dimostra assenza di impatto: programmi una nuova verifica. |
Sei casi di lettura
Casi fittizi di verifica documentale: non analizzano il suo software né convalidano file VEX.
Ambito coincidentenot_affected
Prodotto e versione coincidono; sono forniti component_not_present e una spiegazione del build.
Che cosa consente di decidere
Verifichi prove del legame con l’artefatto consegnato, identità dell’emittente e revisioni. Lo stato da solo non prova la correttezza dell’analisi.
Versione diversanot_affected
Il fornitore dichiara non coinvolta una versione recente; nell’inventario compare una precedente.
Che cosa consente di decidere
Non estenda la conclusione alla versione installata. Cerchi una dichiarazione pertinente o chiarimenti; questa prova da sola non chiude l’avviso.
Motivo assentenot_affected
È presente not_affected, senza justification né impact_statement.
Che cosa consente di decidere
Questo requisito OpenVEX non è soddisfatto. Richieda il motivo: la sua assenza non dimostra però che il prodotto sia coinvolto.
Indagine apertaunder_investigation
L’ultima dichiarazione indica under_investigation e manca una conclusione successiva.
Che cosa consente di decidere
Mantenga il punto aperto con responsabile e prossima verifica. L’urgenza dipende anche da esposizione locale e informazioni sulle minacce.
Correzione non distribuitafixed
fixed riguarda la versione corretta, ma l’inventario mostra ancora la precedente.
Che cosa consente di decidere
Verifichi distribuzione e funzionamento prima di chiudere l’azione. Disponibilità e installazione della correzione sono fatti distinti.
Istruzioni assentiaffected
Il prodotto è dichiarato affected, ma manca action_statement.
Che cosa consente di decidere
Richieda le istruzioni e consulti l’avviso del fornitore. Un documento incompleto non giustifica ignorare l’impatto dichiarato.
Specifica di riferimento : OpenVEX v0.2.0
Indicatori di gestione
| Indicatore | Cosa misura | Prima azione |
|---|---|---|
| Copertura SBOM | Release distribuite con inventario dei componenti verificato | Risoluzione delle discrepanze prima della pubblicazione |
| Provenienza verificata | Artefatti controllati prima del deployment | Blocco delle release prive delle prove previste |
| Tempo di triage | Tempo intercorso tra la notifica pertinente e la decisione documentata | Escalation dei componenti esposti |
| Reversibilità | Sostituzioni critiche testate con rollback | Rimozione delle dipendenze bloccanti |
Errori comuni
- Confusione tra l'inventario del repository e i componenti distribuiti
- Mantenimento di un SBOM senza aggiornarlo
- Classificazione di un difetto solo in base al punteggio
- Firma di un artefatto senza verificarne la provenienza della build
Domande frequenti
Un SBOM è sufficiente?
No. Aiuta a identificare i componenti, ma è necessario verificare anche la provenienza, l'integrità, l'esposizione e la capacità di aggiornamento.
Ogni vulnerabilità dovrebbe bloccare il rilascio?
Decidere in base all'utilizzo effettivo, all'esposizione, ai controlli compensativi e alla criticità aziendale, e documentare le motivazioni.
Quale framework di riferimento è utile?
Il framework NIST Secure Software Development offre pratiche di sviluppo sicuro e protezione del software lungo tutto il ciclo di vita.
Riferimenti: dati, usi e limiti
Documentazione consultata il .
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
| Fonte e finalità | Dato o riferimento verificato | Come utilizzarlo | Limite da conservare |
|---|---|---|---|
| MITRE · Common Weakness Enumeration Name classes of software and hardware weakness. |
A CWE describes a weakness that can contribute to vulnerabilities. It does not represent a particular incident. | Connect the weakness to the observed mechanism: input, processing and missing control. Use it to fix the cause and plan regression tests. | A keyword in a report alone does not establish the correct CWE classification. |
| SPDX · Specifications Describe components and information in a software bill of materials. |
The official specifications page distinguishes SPDX 3.0 from earlier versions such as 2.3. Document version affects schema and tool compatibility. | Request format, version, build scope and component identifiers. Compare the bill of materials with the delivered artefact. | A bill of materials alone proves neither vulnerability absence, dependency completeness nor compliance with every licence. |
| OWASP · CycloneDX Exchange bills of materials and supply-chain information. |
The official overview dates specification 1.7 to 21 October 2025 and documents JSON, XML and Protobuf. | Check version, component references and dependency links. Retain the connection between the bill of materials, build and deployed product. | Changing format does not fix missing components. A descriptive inventory and a vulnerability impact assessment answer different questions. |
| NIST · Post-quantum cryptography Identify standards relevant to cryptographic transition. |
NIST distinguishes FIPS 203 for ML-KEM, FIPS 204 for ML-DSA and FIPS 205 for SLH-DSA. Key encapsulation and signatures are different functions. | Inventory protocols, libraries, keys and dependencies. Ask which versions are actually implemented and test interoperability, performance and rollback. Compare post-quantum parameters and estimate their volumes → |
Having a standardised algorithm does not establish security of the complete integration or a universal migration deadline. |
Crittografia post-quantistica: confrontare prima di migrare
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
ML-KEM establishes a shared secret; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sign data. These functions serve different needs. The 18 parameter sets below come from the three final FIPS standards published on 13 August 2024. Use them to prepare inventories and capacity tests without treating an algorithm name as proof of a secure system.
Data and publication status pages checked on .
ML-KEM · Establish a secret
- The recipient publishes an encapsulation key.
- The sender creates a ciphertext and shared secret, then sends the ciphertext.
- The recipient recovers the secret using a decapsulation key.
Peer authentication and use of the secret depend on the complete protocol.
ML-DSA / SLH-DSA · Sign
- The signer protects a private key and distributes a public key.
- The signer signs data and sends the data with its signature.
- The verifier checks the signature using the trusted public key.
A signature alone does not encrypt the signed content.
For ML-KEM, the public and private keys are used for encapsulation and decapsulation respectively; column five is the ciphertext. For both DSA families, the keys are used for verification and signing; column five is the signature. A dash means not applicable. NIST categories are neither quality ratings nor key lengths in bits.
| Parameter set / source | NIST category | Public key | Private key | KEM ciphertext / signature | Shared secret |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ML-KEM-512FIPS 203 | 1 | 800 | 1,632 | 768 | 32 |
| ML-KEM-768FIPS 203 | 3 | 1,184 | 2,400 | 1,088 | 32 |
| ML-KEM-1024FIPS 203 | 5 | 1,568 | 3,168 | 1,568 | 32 |
| ML-DSA-44FIPS 204 | 2 | 1,312 | 2,560 | 2,420 | — |
| ML-DSA-65FIPS 204 | 3 | 1,952 | 4,032 | 3,309 | — |
| ML-DSA-87FIPS 204 | 5 | 2,592 | 4,896 | 4,627 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128sFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 7,856 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128fFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 17,088 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-192sFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 16,224 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-192fFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 35,664 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-256sFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 29,792 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-256fFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 49,856 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128sFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 7,856 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128fFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 17,088 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192sFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 16,224 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192fFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 35,664 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256sFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 29,792 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256fFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 49,856 | — |
Sizes refer to the raw encodings defined by the standards. A private key stored as a seed may occupy less space than the full encoding shown here. Certificates, containers, Base64, protocol headers and protected storage add their own bytes. In SLH-DSA, ‘s’ favours smaller signatures and ‘f’ faster signing; SHA2 and SHAKE variants share sizes for each variant, rather than the same hash instantiation.
Estimate a volume of cryptographic data
Choose a parameter set and object count. The calculation adds raw public sizes only: one KEM ciphertext or signature per object, with a public key sent once or repeated for every object. Private keys and shared secrets are excluded from the modelled transfer.
A numerical example for planning a test
For 1,000 ML-KEM-768 objects with a public key for every object: 1,000 × (1,184 + 1,088) = 2,272,000 raw bytes. With one public key for the whole batch: 1,184 + 1,000 × 1,088 = 1,089,184 bytes. This is an illustrative transport assumption, not a service or protocol measurement.
This volume model measures neither computation time, throughput, TLS latency nor security. The single-key mode assumes the same recipient or verifier can reuse that key under the chosen protocol. Check this assumption, key rotation and size limits in your environment. This tool sends no content, keys or entered data.
What evidence should a pilot require?
| Use to inventory | Information to record | Useful test and decision condition |
|---|---|---|
| Exchanges and confidential data | Application, protocol, library and version; key establishment function; data sensitivity lifetime; intermediary equipment. | Replay connections on an authorised test platform, record errors and volumes, verify which peers actually interoperate and how to restore the approved configuration. |
| Software signing and updates | Build chain, signed format, keys and embedded verifiers; ability to renew the root of trust. | Verify a valid package and then a modified package. Measure the final manifest size and confirm that older devices have an update path. |
| Certificates and machine identities | Authorities, certificate profiles, signature algorithms, trust stores and external dependencies. | Check issuance, renewal and revocation in the products concerned. Library support for an algorithm does not by itself prove support for the full certificate. |
| Backups, archives and retention | Formats, keys needed for restoration, custody responsibilities and versions able to read historical objects. | Restore an old sample in the target environment and preserve the necessary verification material. Migrating connections does not automatically re-encrypt stored archives. |
Decision questions
Does ML-KEM replace a signature?
No. Encapsulation establishes a shared secret. Signatures support checks of data integrity and origin under the chosen trust mechanism. A project may need to migrate these two functions separately.
Is the smallest object the best choice?
Size addresses one capacity constraint. Selection must also consider security requirements, maintained implementations, compatibility and test results. The comparison does not rank algorithms.
Is a product described as ‘FIPS 203’ automatically certified?
A standard reference identifies an algorithm specification. Request separate evidence of any claimed conformity or validation, its exact scope, the module version and the configuration assessed.
Why check publication status pages as well as the standard?
NIST status pages identify potential updates: notes dated 17 November 2025 for FIPS 203 and 31 July 2026 for FIPS 204 at this review. Ask suppliers which corrections their release incorporates.
Value provenance and freshness limits
Links lead to official publication notices and histories. Sizes come from the tables identified below; SLH-DSA private key sizes are calculated using the 4n rule in §3.1. Scope is limited to parameter sets in FIPS 203–205: this is not a catalogue of all post-quantum research, proposals or protocol profiles.
NIST selected FALCON for digital signatures and is developing FIPS 206. NIST also selected HQC for key encapsulation. The table and calculator cover parameter sets in the published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 standards. NIST · Post-quantum cryptography standardization status ·
- NIST FIPS 203 · ML-KEM · §8, tables 2–3; §8 security categories
Standard publication : · Potential update note : - NIST FIPS 204 · ML-DSA · §4, tables 1–2
Standard publication : · Potential update note : - NIST FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA · §11, table 2; §3.1: private key = 4n bytes
Standard publication :
VEX e applicabilità al prodotto
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
VEX and SBOM: check the supplier assertion’s scope
An SBOM describes components; VEX expresses an impact status for a vulnerability and identified products. This reference uses OpenVEX v0.2.0 labels. It offers no automatic conversion to CSAF or CycloneDX, whose structures need reading in their own versions.
Issuer, product identity and time are essential to interpretation. Product or time information can be inherited under OpenVEX rules; an absent statement field does not necessarily mean missing information in the complete document. Check resolved values before concluding.
Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope
| Exact status | Assertion meaning | Consumer check |
|---|---|---|
| not_affected | The specified product is declared not affected by this vulnerability. | Require a justification or impact_statement under the OpenVEX structure; verify exact product identity and assessment conditions. |
| affected | Actions are recommended to address the vulnerability. | Read the action_statement required for this status and connect actions to installed versions. |
| fixed | The specified product versions contain a fix. | Check that those versions are deployed and the service still works after the change. |
| under_investigation | Applicability to the specified versions is not yet established. | Preserve uncertainty and request an update; do not treat this as not_affected. |
For not_affected, the OpenVEX structure requires a justification or impact_statement; the format recommends a machine-readable justification, optionally enriched by text. For affected, an action_statement is required. These fields document an assertion rather than automatically establishing issuer trust.
Five justifications requiring different evidence
| OpenVEX label | What the justification asserts | Proposed local evidence |
|---|---|---|
| component_not_present | The component is not included in the product. | Inventory of the exact build, dependencies and shipped contents, rather than a development dependency list alone. |
| vulnerable_code_not_present | The component is included but the vulnerable code is absent. | Build options, supplier patch and correspondence to the deployed artefact. |
| vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path | The vulnerable code cannot execute as used by the product. | Execution-path analysis and assessed configurations; date assumptions needing review after change. |
| vulnerable_code_cannot_be_controlled_by_adversary | An adversary cannot control the vulnerable code to exploit the flaw. | Description of controllable inputs and demonstration limits. This assertion may be difficult to prove conclusively. |
| inline_mitigations_already_exist | Built-in product protections prevent exploitation under OpenVEX conditions. | Check that attackers cannot subvert them and users cannot configure or disable them. Do not equate an external firewall rule with this justification. |
Fictional JSON example: an assertion for build 2.4.0
A training example written for this reference, with identifier TRAINING-VULN-01 and an .example domain. It describes no real product or vulnerability, is unsigned and has not been validated by an OpenVEX compliance engine. Its single statement inherits the document timestamp.
{
"@context": "https://openvex.dev/ns/v0.2.0",
"@id": "https://vendor.example/vex/training-01",
"author": "Fictional training publisher",
"timestamp": "2026-10-22T10:00:00Z",
"version": 1,
"statements": [
{
"vulnerability": {
"name": "TRAINING-VULN-01"
},
"products": [
{
"@id": "https://vendor.example/products/gateway/2.4.0"
}
],
"status": "not_affected",
"justification": "vulnerable_code_not_present",
"impact_statement": "Fictional training statement: the affected code was excluded from this exact product build."
}
]
}This assertion concerns only the product identified as version 2.4.0. It does not automatically cover 2.3.0, another distribution or a different configuration. The code-exclusion assertion still needs comparison with evidence and the trust placed in the issuer.
Six checks before using VEX to reduce alerts
- Identify the issuer and how the document was obtained; separate provenance, any signature and trust.
- Resolve product, subcomponents and identifiers to the deployed build.
- Check vulnerability identity and aliases rather than matching flaws by similar titles.
- Read status, required justifications or actions and product-specific conditions.
- Resolve inherited times and preserve document version; product changes may invalidate an older assumption.
- Record the acceptance decision, owner and conditions triggering review.
Return to prioritisation signals and remediation evidence →
Primary sources and scope
- OpenVEX · Specification v0.2.0 · OpenVEX v0.2.0 · reviewed 2026-10-22
Statement Data Structure · Status Labels · Status Justifications · Data Inheritance
Sources checked on
Firma e provenienza del build
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
Connect delivery records to deployed bytes
An SBOM, VEX and provenance can accompany one release while carrying different information. Preserve their binding to the exact package and the expectations used to accept its origin.
- Match artefact digest to attested subject; preserve the reference from receipt through promotion to deployment.
- Check authorised identity, builder, repository and parameters rather than concluding from signature presence alone.
- Retain behaviour and recovery checks: an authentic package can still regress.
Read the pre-deployment provenance reference →
Sources checked on · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics · in-toto · Statement v1 · Sigstore · Verifying Signatures
Esplora il catalogo KEV di CISA
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
One identifier can span several technical layers
An entry may concern a library, server or component embedded in an appliance. Search the exact name, known dependencies and the distributed product’s advisory. Catalogue aliases are not a complete list of affected versions.
- Connect the CVE, component supplier and final-product supplier.
- Check version, configuration and execution path in the authorised environment.
- Do not infer remediation from an empty search result.
Esplora il catalogo e il metodo →
CISA KEV · 2026.11.06 · Documentary review : 2026-11-07
Riferimenti ufficiali
I riferimenti supportano il metodo. Adattare i controlli al proprio contesto; non costituiscono una certificazione. I titoli dei riferimenti originali e i documenti di origine potrebbero essere in un'altra lingua.
Riferimenti consultati il .
- NIST — Secure Software Development Framework
- NIST — software supply chain security guidance
- OpenVEX v0.2.0
- MITRE · Common Weakness Enumeration
- SPDX · Specifications
- OWASP · CycloneDX
- NIST · Post-quantum cryptography
- NIST FIPS 203 · ML-KEM
- NIST FIPS 204 · ML-DSA
- NIST FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA
- SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts
- SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance
- SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics
- in-toto · Statement v1
- Sigstore · Verifying Signatures
- CISA · KEV official snapshot
- CISA · Current KEV JSON in the official repository
- CISA · KEV data schema
- CISA · Official mirror and reuse terms
- CISA · KEV licence
- FedRAMP · Response to CISA BOD 26-04
- FIRST · CVSS
- FIRST · EPSS
