リソース · 16

ソフトウェアサプライチェーン保証:リリースするコンポーネント

実際にデプロイされた各リリースに、コンポーネント、来歴、ビルド、脆弱性、更新を関連付けます。

更新済み · 12 min

架空の無人検証作業台。検査レンズの下に回路基板があり、金属製モジュールが琥珀色の光に照らされている。 AIで生成した編集用イラスト

このガイドが達成するのに役立つこと

  • 実際に出荷された依存関係を把握できます。
  • 成果物の出所を検証できます。
  • コンテキストに基づいて欠陥の優先順位付けができます。
  • 置換とロールバックをテストできます。

クイックチェック

  • 部品表はデプロイされたバージョンと一致していますか?
  • 推移的依存関係は含まれていますか?
  • リリースに署名できるのは誰ですか?
  • 使用環境において脆弱性に到達可能ですか?
  • 緊急対応なしで重要コンポーネントを削除できますか?

手順

  1. 1

    出荷済みリリースをマッピングできます。

    リポジトリ、直接および推移的依存関係、ビルドツール、イメージ、外部サービス、および所有者を特定します。 これらすべてを検証可能なリリースに接続します。

    成果物:製品、コンポーネント、バージョン、および所有者のマップ。

  2. 2

    使用可能な部品表を作成する

    リリースごとにSBOMを生成し、実際に出荷された成果物と比較する。 不正確な名称、欠落したバージョン、内部コンポーネントを解決する。

    成果物:日付と検証済みのSBOM。

  3. 3

    ビルドを保護する

    公開権限を制限し、機密性の高いステージを分離し、来歴、要約、署名を保持する。 デプロイ前にこれらの証拠を検証する。

    成果物:ビルド記録と検証ポリシー。

  4. 4

    アラートをトリアージする

    各脆弱性通知をコンポーネント、バージョン、露出度、実際の使用状況に関連付ける。 所有者、期限、決定、および解決の証拠を割り当てる。

    成果物:コンテキストに応じたトリアージキュー。

  5. 5

    変更をリハーサルする

    テスト環境で重要なコンポーネントを交換し、業務フローを確認し、ロールバックをリハーサルする。 変更を阻害する依存関係を測定する。

    成果物:代替およびフォールバック演習報告書

  6. 6

    証拠の保管

    主要リリース時およびインシデント発生後に、構成部品およびサプライヤーをレビューする。 調査および是正を支援する期間、記録を保管する。

    成果物:カレンダーおよびリリース履歴のレビュー

VEX:警告を除外する前に声明を読む

SBOMはソフトウェアの構成要素を列挙します。VEXは、識別した製品に対する脆弱性の影響を特定時点の声明として示します。状態を使う前に、対象製品、発行者、文脈を確認します。

OpenVEXの4つの状態
not_affected対象製品は影響なしとされています。OpenVEXはjustificationまたはimpact_statementを要求します。版と利用条件を確認します。
affected対象製品は影響ありとされています。対応のため、声明にはaction_statementが必要です。
fixed指定された版には修正が含まれます。その版が自分の環境に導入済みである証明ではありません。
under_investigation適用性はまだ不明です。影響なしとは判断できません。再確認を予定します。

6つの読み取り事例

文書確認を学ぶ架空の事例です。利用中のソフトウェアやVEXファイルを検証するものではありません。

対象範囲が一致not_affected

製品と版が一致し、component_not_presentとビルドの説明があります。

声明から判断できること

説明と納品物を結び付ける証拠、発行者、改訂を確認します。状態だけでは分析の正しさは証明されません。

異なるバージョンnot_affected

供給者は新しい版を影響なしとしていますが、台帳には古い版があります。

声明から判断できること

導入済みの版に結論を広げないでください。該当する声明か説明を求め、この文書だけで警告を終了しません。

理由がないnot_affected

not_affectedですが、justificationもimpact_statementもありません。

声明から判断できること

このOpenVEX要件を満たしません。理由を求めます。ただし理由の欠落だけで影響ありとは証明されません。

調査が継続中under_investigation

最新の声明はunder_investigationで、後続の結論はありません。

声明から判断できること

担当者と再確認日を決め、未解決として扱います。緊急性には自組織の露出や脅威情報も関係します。

修正が未導入fixed

fixedは修正版を対象としていますが、台帳は以前の版のままです。

声明から判断できること

対応を閉じる前に修正版の導入と動作を確認します。修正の提供と導入は別の事実です。

対応指示がないaffected

製品はaffectedですが、action_statementがありません。

声明から判断できること

指示を求め、供給者の勧告を確認します。不完全な文書は、表明された影響を無視する理由にはなりません。

参照仕様 : OpenVEX v0.2.0

管理指標

指標測定対象最初のアクション
SBOMの網羅性コンポーネントインベントリを確認した上でリリースを出荷する公開前に不一致を解決する
出所を検証するデプロイ前に成果物をチェックする必要な証拠がないためにリリースをブロックする
トリアージ時間関連する通知から文書化された決定までの時間脆弱性のあるコンポーネントをエスカレーションする
可逆性ロールバックでテストされた重要な置換ブロックする依存関係を削除する

よくある間違い

  • リポジトリインベントリとデプロイ済みコンポーネントを混同する
  • SBOMを更新せずに保持する
  • スコアのみで脆弱性をランク付けする
  • ビルドの出所を検証せずに成果物に署名する

よくある質問

SBOMは十分か?

いいえ。SBOMはコンポーネントの識別に役立ちますが、出所、整合性、脆弱性、および更新機能も検証する必要があります。

すべての脆弱性でリリースをブロックすべきか?

実際の使用状況、リスク、代替制御、およびビジネス上の重要度に基づいて判断し、その理由を記録する。

どの参照フレームワークが役立つか?

NISTセキュアソフトウェア開発フレームワークは、ライフサイクル全体にわたるセキュアな開発とソフトウェア保護の実践方法を提供する。

参照資料:データ・用途・限界

資料確認日 .

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

Software bill of materials: inventory to verificationActual delivered artefact. SPDX · Describe. CycloneDX · Describe. Applicability assessment. Link document and build. Components and information. Components and dependencies. Versions, advisories and settings. A bill of materials is not evidence of vulnerability absence.Software bill of materials: inventory to verificationActual delivered artefactLink document and buildSPDX · DescribeComponents and informationCycloneDX · DescribeComponents and dependenciesApplicability assessmentVersions, advisories and settingsA bill of materials is not evidence of vulnerability absence
Software bill of materials: inventory to verification
参照資料:データ・用途・限界
出典と目的確認済みのデータ・指標利用方法留意する限界
MITRE · Common Weakness Enumeration

Name classes of software and hardware weakness.

A CWE describes a weakness that can contribute to vulnerabilities. It does not represent a particular incident. Connect the weakness to the observed mechanism: input, processing and missing control. Use it to fix the cause and plan regression tests.

手法を詳しく読む →

A keyword in a report alone does not establish the correct CWE classification.
SPDX · Specifications

Describe components and information in a software bill of materials.

The official specifications page distinguishes SPDX 3.0 from earlier versions such as 2.3. Document version affects schema and tool compatibility. Request format, version, build scope and component identifiers. Compare the bill of materials with the delivered artefact.

手法を詳しく読む →

A bill of materials alone proves neither vulnerability absence, dependency completeness nor compliance with every licence.
OWASP · CycloneDX

Exchange bills of materials and supply-chain information.

The official overview dates specification 1.7 to 21 October 2025 and documents JSON, XML and Protobuf. Check version, component references and dependency links. Retain the connection between the bill of materials, build and deployed product.

手法を詳しく読む →

Changing format does not fix missing components. A descriptive inventory and a vulnerability impact assessment answer different questions.
NIST · Post-quantum cryptography

Identify standards relevant to cryptographic transition.

NIST distinguishes FIPS 203 for ML-KEM, FIPS 204 for ML-DSA and FIPS 205 for SLH-DSA. Key encapsulation and signatures are different functions. Inventory protocols, libraries, keys and dependencies. Ask which versions are actually implemented and test interoperability, performance and rollback.

手法を詳しく読む →

Compare post-quantum parameters and estimate their volumes →

Having a standardised algorithm does not establish security of the complete integration or a universal migration deadline.

耐量子暗号:移行前に比較する

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

ML-KEM establishes a shared secret; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sign data. These functions serve different needs. The 18 parameter sets below come from the three final FIPS standards published on 13 August 2024. Use them to prepare inventories and capacity tests without treating an algorithm name as proof of a secure system.

Data and publication status pages checked on .

Establishing a secret and signing: two separate paths

ML-KEM · Establish a secret

  1. The recipient publishes an encapsulation key.
  2. The sender creates a ciphertext and shared secret, then sends the ciphertext.
  3. The recipient recovers the secret using a decapsulation key.

Peer authentication and use of the secret depend on the complete protocol.

ML-DSA / SLH-DSA · Sign

  1. The signer protects a private key and distributes a public key.
  2. The signer signs data and sends the data with its signature.
  3. The verifier checks the signature using the trusted public key.

A signature alone does not encrypt the signed content.

For ML-KEM, the public and private keys are used for encapsulation and decapsulation respectively; column five is the ciphertext. For both DSA families, the keys are used for verification and signing; column five is the signature. A dash means not applicable. NIST categories are neither quality ratings nor key lengths in bits.

Raw sizes in bytes · FIPS 203, 204 and 205
Parameter set / sourceNIST categoryPublic keyPrivate keyKEM ciphertext / signatureShared secret
ML-KEM-512FIPS 203 18001,632 76832
ML-KEM-768FIPS 203 31,1842,400 1,08832
ML-KEM-1024FIPS 203 51,5683,168 1,56832
ML-DSA-44FIPS 204 21,3122,560 2,420—
ML-DSA-65FIPS 204 31,9524,032 3,309—
ML-DSA-87FIPS 204 52,5924,896 4,627—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128sFIPS 205 13264 7,856—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128fFIPS 205 13264 17,088—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192sFIPS 205 34896 16,224—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192fFIPS 205 34896 35,664—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256sFIPS 205 564128 29,792—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256fFIPS 205 564128 49,856—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128sFIPS 205 13264 7,856—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128fFIPS 205 13264 17,088—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192sFIPS 205 34896 16,224—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192fFIPS 205 34896 35,664—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256sFIPS 205 564128 29,792—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256fFIPS 205 564128 49,856—

Sizes refer to the raw encodings defined by the standards. A private key stored as a seed may occupy less space than the full encoding shown here. Certificates, containers, Base64, protocol headers and protected storage add their own bytes. In SLH-DSA, ‘s’ favours smaller signatures and ‘f’ faster signing; SHA2 and SHAKE variants share sizes for each variant, rather than the same hash instantiation.

Estimate a volume of cryptographic data

Choose a parameter set and object count. The calculation adds raw public sizes only: one KEM ciphertext or signature per object, with a public key sent once or repeated for every object. Private keys and shared secrets are excluded from the modelled transfer.

A numerical example for planning a test

For 1,000 ML-KEM-768 objects with a public key for every object: 1,000 × (1,184 + 1,088) = 2,272,000 raw bytes. With one public key for the whole batch: 1,184 + 1,000 × 1,088 = 1,089,184 bytes. This is an illustrative transport assumption, not a service or protocol measurement.

This volume model measures neither computation time, throughput, TLS latency nor security. The single-key mode assumes the same recipient or verifier can reuse that key under the chosen protocol. Check this assumption, key rotation and size limits in your environment. This tool sends no content, keys or entered data.

What evidence should a pilot require?

What evidence should a pilot require?
Use to inventoryInformation to recordUseful test and decision condition
Exchanges and confidential dataApplication, protocol, library and version; key establishment function; data sensitivity lifetime; intermediary equipment.Replay connections on an authorised test platform, record errors and volumes, verify which peers actually interoperate and how to restore the approved configuration.
Software signing and updatesBuild chain, signed format, keys and embedded verifiers; ability to renew the root of trust.Verify a valid package and then a modified package. Measure the final manifest size and confirm that older devices have an update path.
Certificates and machine identitiesAuthorities, certificate profiles, signature algorithms, trust stores and external dependencies.Check issuance, renewal and revocation in the products concerned. Library support for an algorithm does not by itself prove support for the full certificate.
Backups, archives and retentionFormats, keys needed for restoration, custody responsibilities and versions able to read historical objects.Restore an old sample in the target environment and preserve the necessary verification material. Migrating connections does not automatically re-encrypt stored archives.

Decision questions

Does ML-KEM replace a signature?

No. Encapsulation establishes a shared secret. Signatures support checks of data integrity and origin under the chosen trust mechanism. A project may need to migrate these two functions separately.

Is the smallest object the best choice?

Size addresses one capacity constraint. Selection must also consider security requirements, maintained implementations, compatibility and test results. The comparison does not rank algorithms.

Is a product described as ‘FIPS 203’ automatically certified?

A standard reference identifies an algorithm specification. Request separate evidence of any claimed conformity or validation, its exact scope, the module version and the configuration assessed.

Why check publication status pages as well as the standard?

NIST status pages identify potential updates: notes dated 17 November 2025 for FIPS 203 and 31 July 2026 for FIPS 204 at this review. Ask suppliers which corrections their release incorporates.

Value provenance and freshness limits

Links lead to official publication notices and histories. Sizes come from the tables identified below; SLH-DSA private key sizes are calculated using the 4n rule in §3.1. Scope is limited to parameter sets in FIPS 203–205: this is not a catalogue of all post-quantum research, proposals or protocol profiles.

NIST selected FALCON for digital signatures and is developing FIPS 206. NIST also selected HQC for key encapsulation. The table and calculator cover parameter sets in the published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 standards. NIST · Post-quantum cryptography standardization status ·

  • NIST FIPS 203 · ML-KEM · §8, tables 2–3; §8 security categories
    Standard publication : · Potential update note :
  • NIST FIPS 204 · ML-DSA · §4, tables 1–2
    Standard publication : · Potential update note :
  • NIST FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA · §11, table 2; §3.1: private key = 4n bytes
    Standard publication :

VEXと製品への該当性

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

VEX and SBOM: check the supplier assertion’s scope

An SBOM describes components; VEX expresses an impact status for a vulnerability and identified products. This reference uses OpenVEX v0.2.0 labels. It offers no automatic conversion to CSAF or CycloneDX, whose structures need reading in their own versions.

Issuer, product identity and time are essential to interpretation. Product or time information can be inherited under OpenVEX rules; an absent statement field does not necessarily mean missing information in the complete document. Check resolved values before concluding.

Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope

Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope
Exact statusAssertion meaningConsumer check
not_affectedThe specified product is declared not affected by this vulnerability.Require a justification or impact_statement under the OpenVEX structure; verify exact product identity and assessment conditions.
affectedActions are recommended to address the vulnerability.Read the action_statement required for this status and connect actions to installed versions.
fixedThe specified product versions contain a fix.Check that those versions are deployed and the service still works after the change.
under_investigationApplicability to the specified versions is not yet established.Preserve uncertainty and request an update; do not treat this as not_affected.

For not_affected, the OpenVEX structure requires a justification or impact_statement; the format recommends a machine-readable justification, optionally enriched by text. For affected, an action_statement is required. These fields document an assertion rather than automatically establishing issuer trust.

Five justifications requiring different evidence

Five justifications requiring different evidence
OpenVEX labelWhat the justification assertsProposed local evidence
component_not_presentThe component is not included in the product.Inventory of the exact build, dependencies and shipped contents, rather than a development dependency list alone.
vulnerable_code_not_presentThe component is included but the vulnerable code is absent.Build options, supplier patch and correspondence to the deployed artefact.
vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_pathThe vulnerable code cannot execute as used by the product.Execution-path analysis and assessed configurations; date assumptions needing review after change.
vulnerable_code_cannot_be_controlled_by_adversaryAn adversary cannot control the vulnerable code to exploit the flaw.Description of controllable inputs and demonstration limits. This assertion may be difficult to prove conclusively.
inline_mitigations_already_existBuilt-in product protections prevent exploitation under OpenVEX conditions.Check that attackers cannot subvert them and users cannot configure or disable them. Do not equate an external firewall rule with this justification.

Fictional JSON example: an assertion for build 2.4.0

A training example written for this reference, with identifier TRAINING-VULN-01 and an .example domain. It describes no real product or vulnerability, is unsigned and has not been validated by an OpenVEX compliance engine. Its single statement inherits the document timestamp.

{
    "@context": "https://openvex.dev/ns/v0.2.0",
    "@id": "https://vendor.example/vex/training-01",
    "author": "Fictional training publisher",
    "timestamp": "2026-10-22T10:00:00Z",
    "version": 1,
    "statements": [
        {
            "vulnerability": {
                "name": "TRAINING-VULN-01"
            },
            "products": [
                {
                    "@id": "https://vendor.example/products/gateway/2.4.0"
                }
            ],
            "status": "not_affected",
            "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_present",
            "impact_statement": "Fictional training statement: the affected code was excluded from this exact product build."
        }
    ]
}

This assertion concerns only the product identified as version 2.4.0. It does not automatically cover 2.3.0, another distribution or a different configuration. The code-exclusion assertion still needs comparison with evidence and the trust placed in the issuer.

Six checks before using VEX to reduce alerts

  • Identify the issuer and how the document was obtained; separate provenance, any signature and trust.
  • Resolve product, subcomponents and identifiers to the deployed build.
  • Check vulnerability identity and aliases rather than matching flaws by similar titles.
  • Read status, required justifications or actions and product-specific conditions.
  • Resolve inherited times and preserve document version; product changes may invalidate an older assumption.
  • Record the acceptance decision, owner and conditions triggering review.

Return to prioritisation signals and remediation evidence →

Primary sources and scope

  • OpenVEX · Specification v0.2.0 · OpenVEX v0.2.0 · reviewed 2026-10-22
    Statement Data Structure · Status Labels · Status Justifications · Data Inheritance

Sources checked on

ビルドの署名と来歴

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

Connect delivery records to deployed bytes

An SBOM, VEX and provenance can accompany one release while carrying different information. Preserve their binding to the exact package and the expectations used to accept its origin.

  • Match artefact digest to attested subject; preserve the reference from receipt through promotion to deployment.
  • Check authorised identity, builder, repository and parameters rather than concluding from signature presence alone.
  • Retain behaviour and recovery checks: an authentic package can still regress.

Read the pre-deployment provenance reference →

Sources checked on · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics · in-toto · Statement v1 · Sigstore · Verifying Signatures

CISA KEVカタログを調べる

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

One identifier can span several technical layers

An entry may concern a library, server or component embedded in an appliance. Search the exact name, known dependencies and the distributed product’s advisory. Catalogue aliases are not a complete list of affected versions.

  • Connect the CVE, component supplier and final-product supplier.
  • Check version, configuration and execution path in the authorised environment.
  • Do not infer remediation from an empty search result.

カタログと方法を見る →

CISA KEV · 2026.11.06 · Documentary review : 2026-11-07

公式参照文献

参照文献はメソッドを裏付けるものです。 チェックは状況に合わせて調整してください。 これらは認証ではありません。 元の参照文献のタイトルやソース文書は別の言語で書かれている場合があります。

参照資料の確認日 .