Recursos · 16
Aseguramiento de la cadena de suministro de software: componentes a liberar
Conecte componentes, procedencia, compilaciones, vulnerabilidades y actualizaciones a cada versión realmente implementada.
Actualizado · 7 min
Lo que esta guía ayuda a lograr
- Conoce las dependencias realmente enviadas
- Verificar origen de artefacto
- Priorizar fallas en contexto
- Reemplazo y reversión de pruebas
Comprobación rápida
- ¿La lista de materiales coincide con la versión implementada?
- ¿Se incluyen dependencias transitivas?
- ¿Quién puede firmar una autorización?
- ¿Hay alguna vulnerabilidad alcanzable en su uso?
- ¿Se puede eliminar un componente crítico sin improvisación?
Método paso a paso
- 1
Lanzamientos de mapas enviados
Identificar repositorios, dependencias directas y transitivas, construir herramientas, imágenes, servicios externos y propietarios. Conéctelos todos a una versión verificable.
Entregable: producto, componente, versión y mapa de propietarios.
- 2
Producir una lista de materiales utilizable
Generar un SBOM para cada lanzamiento y compararlo con los artefactos realmente enviados. Resuelva nombres inexactos, versiones faltantes y componentes internos.
Entregable: SBOM fechado y validado.
- 3
Proteger la compilación
Limitar los derechos de publicación, aislar etapas sensibles y conservar procedencia, resúmenes y firmas. Verifique esta evidencia antes del despliegue.
Entregable: registro de compilación y política de verificación.
- 4
Alertas de triaje
Conecta cada aviso de vulnerabilidad con el componente, versión, exposición y uso real. Asigne un propietario, fecha límite, decisión y evidencia de cierre.
Entregable: cola de triaje contextual.
- 5
Ensayar cambio
Reemplazar un componente crítico en un entorno de prueba, verificar los recorridos de negocios y ensayar la reversión. Mida las dependencias que bloquean el cambio.
Entregable: informe de ejercicio de reemplazo y respaldo.
- 6
Mantener evidencia
Revisar componentes y proveedores en lanzamientos importantes y después de incidentes. Conservar los registros durante un período que respalde la investigación y corrección.
Entregable: revisar calendario e historial de lanzamientos.
VEX: leer la declaración antes de descartar una alerta
Una SBOM enumera componentes. VEX declara el impacto de una vulnerabilidad en un producto identificado y en un momento concreto. Compruebe producto, emisor y contexto antes de usar el estado.
not_affected | El producto se declara no afectado. OpenVEX exige justification o impact_statement; compruebe versión y uso. |
|---|---|
affected | El producto se declara afectado. La declaración debe incluir un action_statement para orientar su tratamiento. |
fixed | Las versiones indicadas contienen una corrección. Esto no demuestra que estén instaladas en su entorno. |
under_investigation | Aún no se conoce la aplicabilidad. No demuestra ausencia de impacto; programe otra revisión. |
Seis casos de lectura
Casos ficticios de revisión documental; no analizan su software ni validan archivos VEX.
Ámbito coincidentenot_affected
Coinciden producto y versión; se aporta component_not_present y una explicación de la compilación.
Qué permite decidir la declaración
Revise las pruebas que vinculan explicación y artefacto entregado, identidad del emisor y revisiones. El estado aislado no demuestra la exactitud del análisis.
Otra versiónnot_affected
El proveedor declara no afectada una versión reciente; el inventario contiene una anterior.
Qué permite decidir la declaración
No extienda la conclusión a la versión instalada. Busque una declaración aplicable o pida aclaraciones; no cierre la alerta solo con esta pieza.
Falta el motivonot_affected
Consta not_affected, pero no hay justification ni impact_statement.
Qué permite decidir la declaración
No cumple este requisito OpenVEX. Solicite el motivo; su ausencia tampoco demuestra que el producto esté afectado.
Investigación abiertaunder_investigation
La última declaración indica under_investigation y no existe una conclusión posterior.
Qué permite decidir la declaración
Mantenga el asunto abierto, con responsable y fecha de revisión. La urgencia también depende de exposición local e información sobre amenazas.
Corrección sin desplegarfixed
El estado fixed corresponde a la versión corregida; el inventario conserva la anterior.
Qué permite decidir la declaración
Verifique despliegue y funcionamiento antes de cerrar la acción. Disponibilidad e instalación de una corrección son hechos distintos.
Faltan instruccionesaffected
Se declara affected, pero no se incluye action_statement.
Qué permite decidir la declaración
Solicite las instrucciones y consulte el aviso del proveedor. Un documento incompleto no justifica ignorar el impacto declarado.
Especificación de referencia : OpenVEX v0.2.0
Indicadores de gestión
| Indicador | Qué mide | Primera acción |
|---|---|---|
| Cobertura SBOM | Lanzamientos enviados con inventario de componentes comprobados | Resolver discrepancias antes de la publicación |
| Procedencia verificada | Artefactos comprobados antes del despliegue | A las liberaciones de bloque les falta la evidencia esperada |
| Tiempo de triaje | Tiempo desde la notificación relevante hasta la decisión documentada | Escalar componentes expuestos |
| Reversibilidad | Reemplazos críticos probados con rollback | Eliminar dependencias de bloqueo |
Errores comunes
- Inventario de repositorio confuso con componentes implementados
- Mantener un SBOM sin actualizarlo
- Ranking de un defecto sólo por puntuación
- Firmar un artefacto sin verificar la procedencia de la compilación
Preguntas frecuentes
¿Es suficiente un SBOM?
No. Ayuda a identificar componentes, pero también es necesario verificar la procedencia, integridad, exposición y capacidad de actualización.
¿Debería liberarse cada bloque de vulnerabilidad?
Decidir a partir del uso real, exposición, controles compensadores y criticidad del negocio, y registrar el razonamiento.
¿Qué marco de referencia ayuda?
El marco de desarrollo de software seguro del NIST ofrece prácticas seguras de desarrollo y protección de software durante todo el ciclo de vida.
Referencias: datos, usos y límites
Documentación consultada el .
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
| Fuente y finalidad | Dato o referencia verificada | Cómo utilizarla | Límite que debe conservarse |
|---|---|---|---|
| MITRE · Common Weakness Enumeration Name classes of software and hardware weakness. |
A CWE describes a weakness that can contribute to vulnerabilities. It does not represent a particular incident. | Connect the weakness to the observed mechanism: input, processing and missing control. Use it to fix the cause and plan regression tests. | A keyword in a report alone does not establish the correct CWE classification. |
| SPDX · Specifications Describe components and information in a software bill of materials. |
The official specifications page distinguishes SPDX 3.0 from earlier versions such as 2.3. Document version affects schema and tool compatibility. | Request format, version, build scope and component identifiers. Compare the bill of materials with the delivered artefact. | A bill of materials alone proves neither vulnerability absence, dependency completeness nor compliance with every licence. |
| OWASP · CycloneDX Exchange bills of materials and supply-chain information. |
The official overview dates specification 1.7 to 21 October 2025 and documents JSON, XML and Protobuf. | Check version, component references and dependency links. Retain the connection between the bill of materials, build and deployed product. | Changing format does not fix missing components. A descriptive inventory and a vulnerability impact assessment answer different questions. |
| NIST · Post-quantum cryptography Identify standards relevant to cryptographic transition. |
NIST distinguishes FIPS 203 for ML-KEM, FIPS 204 for ML-DSA and FIPS 205 for SLH-DSA. Key encapsulation and signatures are different functions. | Inventory protocols, libraries, keys and dependencies. Ask which versions are actually implemented and test interoperability, performance and rollback. Compare post-quantum parameters and estimate their volumes → |
Having a standardised algorithm does not establish security of the complete integration or a universal migration deadline. |
Criptografía poscuántica: comparar antes de migrar
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
ML-KEM establishes a shared secret; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sign data. These functions serve different needs. The 18 parameter sets below come from the three final FIPS standards published on 13 August 2024. Use them to prepare inventories and capacity tests without treating an algorithm name as proof of a secure system.
Data and publication status pages checked on .
ML-KEM · Establish a secret
- The recipient publishes an encapsulation key.
- The sender creates a ciphertext and shared secret, then sends the ciphertext.
- The recipient recovers the secret using a decapsulation key.
Peer authentication and use of the secret depend on the complete protocol.
ML-DSA / SLH-DSA · Sign
- The signer protects a private key and distributes a public key.
- The signer signs data and sends the data with its signature.
- The verifier checks the signature using the trusted public key.
A signature alone does not encrypt the signed content.
For ML-KEM, the public and private keys are used for encapsulation and decapsulation respectively; column five is the ciphertext. For both DSA families, the keys are used for verification and signing; column five is the signature. A dash means not applicable. NIST categories are neither quality ratings nor key lengths in bits.
| Parameter set / source | NIST category | Public key | Private key | KEM ciphertext / signature | Shared secret |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ML-KEM-512FIPS 203 | 1 | 800 | 1,632 | 768 | 32 |
| ML-KEM-768FIPS 203 | 3 | 1,184 | 2,400 | 1,088 | 32 |
| ML-KEM-1024FIPS 203 | 5 | 1,568 | 3,168 | 1,568 | 32 |
| ML-DSA-44FIPS 204 | 2 | 1,312 | 2,560 | 2,420 | — |
| ML-DSA-65FIPS 204 | 3 | 1,952 | 4,032 | 3,309 | — |
| ML-DSA-87FIPS 204 | 5 | 2,592 | 4,896 | 4,627 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128sFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 7,856 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128fFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 17,088 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-192sFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 16,224 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-192fFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 35,664 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-256sFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 29,792 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-256fFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 49,856 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128sFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 7,856 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128fFIPS 205 | 1 | 32 | 64 | 17,088 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192sFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 16,224 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192fFIPS 205 | 3 | 48 | 96 | 35,664 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256sFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 29,792 | — |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256fFIPS 205 | 5 | 64 | 128 | 49,856 | — |
Sizes refer to the raw encodings defined by the standards. A private key stored as a seed may occupy less space than the full encoding shown here. Certificates, containers, Base64, protocol headers and protected storage add their own bytes. In SLH-DSA, ‘s’ favours smaller signatures and ‘f’ faster signing; SHA2 and SHAKE variants share sizes for each variant, rather than the same hash instantiation.
Estimate a volume of cryptographic data
Choose a parameter set and object count. The calculation adds raw public sizes only: one KEM ciphertext or signature per object, with a public key sent once or repeated for every object. Private keys and shared secrets are excluded from the modelled transfer.
A numerical example for planning a test
For 1,000 ML-KEM-768 objects with a public key for every object: 1,000 × (1,184 + 1,088) = 2,272,000 raw bytes. With one public key for the whole batch: 1,184 + 1,000 × 1,088 = 1,089,184 bytes. This is an illustrative transport assumption, not a service or protocol measurement.
This volume model measures neither computation time, throughput, TLS latency nor security. The single-key mode assumes the same recipient or verifier can reuse that key under the chosen protocol. Check this assumption, key rotation and size limits in your environment. This tool sends no content, keys or entered data.
What evidence should a pilot require?
| Use to inventory | Information to record | Useful test and decision condition |
|---|---|---|
| Exchanges and confidential data | Application, protocol, library and version; key establishment function; data sensitivity lifetime; intermediary equipment. | Replay connections on an authorised test platform, record errors and volumes, verify which peers actually interoperate and how to restore the approved configuration. |
| Software signing and updates | Build chain, signed format, keys and embedded verifiers; ability to renew the root of trust. | Verify a valid package and then a modified package. Measure the final manifest size and confirm that older devices have an update path. |
| Certificates and machine identities | Authorities, certificate profiles, signature algorithms, trust stores and external dependencies. | Check issuance, renewal and revocation in the products concerned. Library support for an algorithm does not by itself prove support for the full certificate. |
| Backups, archives and retention | Formats, keys needed for restoration, custody responsibilities and versions able to read historical objects. | Restore an old sample in the target environment and preserve the necessary verification material. Migrating connections does not automatically re-encrypt stored archives. |
Decision questions
Does ML-KEM replace a signature?
No. Encapsulation establishes a shared secret. Signatures support checks of data integrity and origin under the chosen trust mechanism. A project may need to migrate these two functions separately.
Is the smallest object the best choice?
Size addresses one capacity constraint. Selection must also consider security requirements, maintained implementations, compatibility and test results. The comparison does not rank algorithms.
Is a product described as ‘FIPS 203’ automatically certified?
A standard reference identifies an algorithm specification. Request separate evidence of any claimed conformity or validation, its exact scope, the module version and the configuration assessed.
Why check publication status pages as well as the standard?
NIST status pages identify potential updates: notes dated 17 November 2025 for FIPS 203 and 31 July 2026 for FIPS 204 at this review. Ask suppliers which corrections their release incorporates.
Value provenance and freshness limits
Links lead to official publication notices and histories. Sizes come from the tables identified below; SLH-DSA private key sizes are calculated using the 4n rule in §3.1. Scope is limited to parameter sets in FIPS 203–205: this is not a catalogue of all post-quantum research, proposals or protocol profiles.
NIST selected FALCON for digital signatures and is developing FIPS 206. NIST also selected HQC for key encapsulation. The table and calculator cover parameter sets in the published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 standards. NIST · Post-quantum cryptography standardization status ·
- NIST FIPS 203 · ML-KEM · §8, tables 2–3; §8 security categories
Standard publication : · Potential update note : - NIST FIPS 204 · ML-DSA · §4, tables 1–2
Standard publication : · Potential update note : - NIST FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA · §11, table 2; §3.1: private key = 4n bytes
Standard publication :
VEX y aplicabilidad al producto
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
VEX and SBOM: check the supplier assertion’s scope
An SBOM describes components; VEX expresses an impact status for a vulnerability and identified products. This reference uses OpenVEX v0.2.0 labels. It offers no automatic conversion to CSAF or CycloneDX, whose structures need reading in their own versions.
Issuer, product identity and time are essential to interpretation. Product or time information can be inherited under OpenVEX rules; an absent statement field does not necessarily mean missing information in the complete document. Check resolved values before concluding.
Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope
| Exact status | Assertion meaning | Consumer check |
|---|---|---|
| not_affected | The specified product is declared not affected by this vulnerability. | Require a justification or impact_statement under the OpenVEX structure; verify exact product identity and assessment conditions. |
| affected | Actions are recommended to address the vulnerability. | Read the action_statement required for this status and connect actions to installed versions. |
| fixed | The specified product versions contain a fix. | Check that those versions are deployed and the service still works after the change. |
| under_investigation | Applicability to the specified versions is not yet established. | Preserve uncertainty and request an update; do not treat this as not_affected. |
For not_affected, the OpenVEX structure requires a justification or impact_statement; the format recommends a machine-readable justification, optionally enriched by text. For affected, an action_statement is required. These fields document an assertion rather than automatically establishing issuer trust.
Five justifications requiring different evidence
| OpenVEX label | What the justification asserts | Proposed local evidence |
|---|---|---|
| component_not_present | The component is not included in the product. | Inventory of the exact build, dependencies and shipped contents, rather than a development dependency list alone. |
| vulnerable_code_not_present | The component is included but the vulnerable code is absent. | Build options, supplier patch and correspondence to the deployed artefact. |
| vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_path | The vulnerable code cannot execute as used by the product. | Execution-path analysis and assessed configurations; date assumptions needing review after change. |
| vulnerable_code_cannot_be_controlled_by_adversary | An adversary cannot control the vulnerable code to exploit the flaw. | Description of controllable inputs and demonstration limits. This assertion may be difficult to prove conclusively. |
| inline_mitigations_already_exist | Built-in product protections prevent exploitation under OpenVEX conditions. | Check that attackers cannot subvert them and users cannot configure or disable them. Do not equate an external firewall rule with this justification. |
Fictional JSON example: an assertion for build 2.4.0
A training example written for this reference, with identifier TRAINING-VULN-01 and an .example domain. It describes no real product or vulnerability, is unsigned and has not been validated by an OpenVEX compliance engine. Its single statement inherits the document timestamp.
{
"@context": "https://openvex.dev/ns/v0.2.0",
"@id": "https://vendor.example/vex/training-01",
"author": "Fictional training publisher",
"timestamp": "2026-10-22T10:00:00Z",
"version": 1,
"statements": [
{
"vulnerability": {
"name": "TRAINING-VULN-01"
},
"products": [
{
"@id": "https://vendor.example/products/gateway/2.4.0"
}
],
"status": "not_affected",
"justification": "vulnerable_code_not_present",
"impact_statement": "Fictional training statement: the affected code was excluded from this exact product build."
}
]
}This assertion concerns only the product identified as version 2.4.0. It does not automatically cover 2.3.0, another distribution or a different configuration. The code-exclusion assertion still needs comparison with evidence and the trust placed in the issuer.
Six checks before using VEX to reduce alerts
- Identify the issuer and how the document was obtained; separate provenance, any signature and trust.
- Resolve product, subcomponents and identifiers to the deployed build.
- Check vulnerability identity and aliases rather than matching flaws by similar titles.
- Read status, required justifications or actions and product-specific conditions.
- Resolve inherited times and preserve document version; product changes may invalidate an older assumption.
- Record the acceptance decision, owner and conditions triggering review.
Return to prioritisation signals and remediation evidence →
Primary sources and scope
- OpenVEX · Specification v0.2.0 · OpenVEX v0.2.0 · reviewed 2026-10-22
Statement Data Structure · Status Labels · Status Justifications · Data Inheritance
Sources checked on
Firma y procedencia del build
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
Connect delivery records to deployed bytes
An SBOM, VEX and provenance can accompany one release while carrying different information. Preserve their binding to the exact package and the expectations used to accept its origin.
- Match artefact digest to attested subject; preserve the reference from receipt through promotion to deployment.
- Check authorised identity, builder, repository and parameters rather than concluding from signature presence alone.
- Retain behaviour and recovery checks: an authentic package can still regress.
Read the pre-deployment provenance reference →
Sources checked on · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics · in-toto · Statement v1 · Sigstore · Verifying Signatures
Explorar el catálogo KEV de CISA
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
One identifier can span several technical layers
An entry may concern a library, server or component embedded in an appliance. Search the exact name, known dependencies and the distributed product’s advisory. Catalogue aliases are not a complete list of affected versions.
- Connect the CVE, component supplier and final-product supplier.
- Check version, configuration and execution path in the authorised environment.
- Do not infer remediation from an empty search result.
Explorar el catálogo y el método →
CISA KEV · 2026.11.06 · Documentary review : 2026-11-07
Referencias oficiales
Las referencias respaldan el método. Adapte los controles a su contexto; no constituyen certificación. Los títulos de referencia originales y los documentos fuente pueden estar en otro idioma.
Referencias consultadas el .
- NIST — Secure Software Development Framework
- NIST — software supply chain security guidance
- OpenVEX v0.2.0
- MITRE · Common Weakness Enumeration
- SPDX · Specifications
- OWASP · CycloneDX
- NIST · Post-quantum cryptography
- NIST FIPS 203 · ML-KEM
- NIST FIPS 204 · ML-DSA
- NIST FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA
- SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts
- SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance
- SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics
- in-toto · Statement v1
- Sigstore · Verifying Signatures
- CISA · KEV official snapshot
- CISA · Current KEV JSON in the official repository
- CISA · KEV data schema
- CISA · Official mirror and reuse terms
- CISA · KEV licence
- FedRAMP · Response to CISA BOD 26-04
- FIRST · CVSS
- FIRST · EPSS
