Recursos · 16

Aseguramiento de la cadena de suministro de software: componentes a liberar

Conecte componentes, procedencia, compilaciones, vulnerabilidades y actualizaciones a cada versión realmente implementada.

Actualizado · 7 min

Banco de verificación ficticio sin personas, con placa electrónica bajo una lupa y módulo metálico iluminado en ámbar. Ilustración editorial generada con IA

Lo que esta guía ayuda a lograr

  • Conoce las dependencias realmente enviadas
  • Verificar origen de artefacto
  • Priorizar fallas en contexto
  • Reemplazo y reversión de pruebas

Comprobación rápida

  • ¿La lista de materiales coincide con la versión implementada?
  • ¿Se incluyen dependencias transitivas?
  • ¿Quién puede firmar una autorización?
  • ¿Hay alguna vulnerabilidad alcanzable en su uso?
  • ¿Se puede eliminar un componente crítico sin improvisación?

Método paso a paso

  1. 1

    Lanzamientos de mapas enviados

    Identificar repositorios, dependencias directas y transitivas, construir herramientas, imágenes, servicios externos y propietarios. Conéctelos todos a una versión verificable.

    Entregable: producto, componente, versión y mapa de propietarios.

  2. 2

    Producir una lista de materiales utilizable

    Generar un SBOM para cada lanzamiento y compararlo con los artefactos realmente enviados. Resuelva nombres inexactos, versiones faltantes y componentes internos.

    Entregable: SBOM fechado y validado.

  3. 3

    Proteger la compilación

    Limitar los derechos de publicación, aislar etapas sensibles y conservar procedencia, resúmenes y firmas. Verifique esta evidencia antes del despliegue.

    Entregable: registro de compilación y política de verificación.

  4. 4

    Alertas de triaje

    Conecta cada aviso de vulnerabilidad con el componente, versión, exposición y uso real. Asigne un propietario, fecha límite, decisión y evidencia de cierre.

    Entregable: cola de triaje contextual.

  5. 5

    Ensayar cambio

    Reemplazar un componente crítico en un entorno de prueba, verificar los recorridos de negocios y ensayar la reversión. Mida las dependencias que bloquean el cambio.

    Entregable: informe de ejercicio de reemplazo y respaldo.

  6. 6

    Mantener evidencia

    Revisar componentes y proveedores en lanzamientos importantes y después de incidentes. Conservar los registros durante un período que respalde la investigación y corrección.

    Entregable: revisar calendario e historial de lanzamientos.

VEX: leer la declaración antes de descartar una alerta

Una SBOM enumera componentes. VEX declara el impacto de una vulnerabilidad en un producto identificado y en un momento concreto. Compruebe producto, emisor y contexto antes de usar el estado.

Los cuatro estados OpenVEX
not_affectedEl producto se declara no afectado. OpenVEX exige justification o impact_statement; compruebe versión y uso.
affectedEl producto se declara afectado. La declaración debe incluir un action_statement para orientar su tratamiento.
fixedLas versiones indicadas contienen una corrección. Esto no demuestra que estén instaladas en su entorno.
under_investigationAún no se conoce la aplicabilidad. No demuestra ausencia de impacto; programe otra revisión.

Seis casos de lectura

Casos ficticios de revisión documental; no analizan su software ni validan archivos VEX.

Ámbito coincidentenot_affected

Coinciden producto y versión; se aporta component_not_present y una explicación de la compilación.

Qué permite decidir la declaración

Revise las pruebas que vinculan explicación y artefacto entregado, identidad del emisor y revisiones. El estado aislado no demuestra la exactitud del análisis.

Otra versiónnot_affected

El proveedor declara no afectada una versión reciente; el inventario contiene una anterior.

Qué permite decidir la declaración

No extienda la conclusión a la versión instalada. Busque una declaración aplicable o pida aclaraciones; no cierre la alerta solo con esta pieza.

Falta el motivonot_affected

Consta not_affected, pero no hay justification ni impact_statement.

Qué permite decidir la declaración

No cumple este requisito OpenVEX. Solicite el motivo; su ausencia tampoco demuestra que el producto esté afectado.

Investigación abiertaunder_investigation

La última declaración indica under_investigation y no existe una conclusión posterior.

Qué permite decidir la declaración

Mantenga el asunto abierto, con responsable y fecha de revisión. La urgencia también depende de exposición local e información sobre amenazas.

Corrección sin desplegarfixed

El estado fixed corresponde a la versión corregida; el inventario conserva la anterior.

Qué permite decidir la declaración

Verifique despliegue y funcionamiento antes de cerrar la acción. Disponibilidad e instalación de una corrección son hechos distintos.

Faltan instruccionesaffected

Se declara affected, pero no se incluye action_statement.

Qué permite decidir la declaración

Solicite las instrucciones y consulte el aviso del proveedor. Un documento incompleto no justifica ignorar el impacto declarado.

Especificación de referencia : OpenVEX v0.2.0

Indicadores de gestión

IndicadorQué midePrimera acción
Cobertura SBOMLanzamientos enviados con inventario de componentes comprobadosResolver discrepancias antes de la publicación
Procedencia verificadaArtefactos comprobados antes del despliegueA las liberaciones de bloque les falta la evidencia esperada
Tiempo de triajeTiempo desde la notificación relevante hasta la decisión documentadaEscalar componentes expuestos
ReversibilidadReemplazos críticos probados con rollbackEliminar dependencias de bloqueo

Errores comunes

  • Inventario de repositorio confuso con componentes implementados
  • Mantener un SBOM sin actualizarlo
  • Ranking de un defecto sólo por puntuación
  • Firmar un artefacto sin verificar la procedencia de la compilación

Preguntas frecuentes

¿Es suficiente un SBOM?

No. Ayuda a identificar componentes, pero también es necesario verificar la procedencia, integridad, exposición y capacidad de actualización.

¿Debería liberarse cada bloque de vulnerabilidad?

Decidir a partir del uso real, exposición, controles compensadores y criticidad del negocio, y registrar el razonamiento.

¿Qué marco de referencia ayuda?

El marco de desarrollo de software seguro del NIST ofrece prácticas seguras de desarrollo y protección de software durante todo el ciclo de vida.

Referencias: datos, usos y límites

Documentación consultada el .

Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.

Software bill of materials: inventory to verificationActual delivered artefact. SPDX · Describe. CycloneDX · Describe. Applicability assessment. Link document and build. Components and information. Components and dependencies. Versions, advisories and settings. A bill of materials is not evidence of vulnerability absence.Software bill of materials: inventory to verificationActual delivered artefactLink document and buildSPDX · DescribeComponents and informationCycloneDX · DescribeComponents and dependenciesApplicability assessmentVersions, advisories and settingsA bill of materials is not evidence of vulnerability absence
Software bill of materials: inventory to verification
Referencias: datos, usos y límites
Fuente y finalidadDato o referencia verificadaCómo utilizarlaLímite que debe conservarse
MITRE · Common Weakness Enumeration

Name classes of software and hardware weakness.

A CWE describes a weakness that can contribute to vulnerabilities. It does not represent a particular incident. Connect the weakness to the observed mechanism: input, processing and missing control. Use it to fix the cause and plan regression tests.

Profundizar en el método →

A keyword in a report alone does not establish the correct CWE classification.
SPDX · Specifications

Describe components and information in a software bill of materials.

The official specifications page distinguishes SPDX 3.0 from earlier versions such as 2.3. Document version affects schema and tool compatibility. Request format, version, build scope and component identifiers. Compare the bill of materials with the delivered artefact.

Profundizar en el método →

A bill of materials alone proves neither vulnerability absence, dependency completeness nor compliance with every licence.
OWASP · CycloneDX

Exchange bills of materials and supply-chain information.

The official overview dates specification 1.7 to 21 October 2025 and documents JSON, XML and Protobuf. Check version, component references and dependency links. Retain the connection between the bill of materials, build and deployed product.

Profundizar en el método →

Changing format does not fix missing components. A descriptive inventory and a vulnerability impact assessment answer different questions.
NIST · Post-quantum cryptography

Identify standards relevant to cryptographic transition.

NIST distinguishes FIPS 203 for ML-KEM, FIPS 204 for ML-DSA and FIPS 205 for SLH-DSA. Key encapsulation and signatures are different functions. Inventory protocols, libraries, keys and dependencies. Ask which versions are actually implemented and test interoperability, performance and rollback.

Profundizar en el método →

Compare post-quantum parameters and estimate their volumes →

Having a standardised algorithm does not establish security of the complete integration or a universal migration deadline.

Criptografía poscuántica: comparar antes de migrar

Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.

ML-KEM establishes a shared secret; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sign data. These functions serve different needs. The 18 parameter sets below come from the three final FIPS standards published on 13 August 2024. Use them to prepare inventories and capacity tests without treating an algorithm name as proof of a secure system.

Data and publication status pages checked on .

Establishing a secret and signing: two separate paths

ML-KEM · Establish a secret

  1. The recipient publishes an encapsulation key.
  2. The sender creates a ciphertext and shared secret, then sends the ciphertext.
  3. The recipient recovers the secret using a decapsulation key.

Peer authentication and use of the secret depend on the complete protocol.

ML-DSA / SLH-DSA · Sign

  1. The signer protects a private key and distributes a public key.
  2. The signer signs data and sends the data with its signature.
  3. The verifier checks the signature using the trusted public key.

A signature alone does not encrypt the signed content.

For ML-KEM, the public and private keys are used for encapsulation and decapsulation respectively; column five is the ciphertext. For both DSA families, the keys are used for verification and signing; column five is the signature. A dash means not applicable. NIST categories are neither quality ratings nor key lengths in bits.

Raw sizes in bytes · FIPS 203, 204 and 205
Parameter set / sourceNIST categoryPublic keyPrivate keyKEM ciphertext / signatureShared secret
ML-KEM-512FIPS 203 18001,632 76832
ML-KEM-768FIPS 203 31,1842,400 1,08832
ML-KEM-1024FIPS 203 51,5683,168 1,56832
ML-DSA-44FIPS 204 21,3122,560 2,420—
ML-DSA-65FIPS 204 31,9524,032 3,309—
ML-DSA-87FIPS 204 52,5924,896 4,627—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128sFIPS 205 13264 7,856—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128fFIPS 205 13264 17,088—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192sFIPS 205 34896 16,224—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192fFIPS 205 34896 35,664—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256sFIPS 205 564128 29,792—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256fFIPS 205 564128 49,856—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128sFIPS 205 13264 7,856—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128fFIPS 205 13264 17,088—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192sFIPS 205 34896 16,224—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192fFIPS 205 34896 35,664—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256sFIPS 205 564128 29,792—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256fFIPS 205 564128 49,856—

Sizes refer to the raw encodings defined by the standards. A private key stored as a seed may occupy less space than the full encoding shown here. Certificates, containers, Base64, protocol headers and protected storage add their own bytes. In SLH-DSA, ‘s’ favours smaller signatures and ‘f’ faster signing; SHA2 and SHAKE variants share sizes for each variant, rather than the same hash instantiation.

Estimate a volume of cryptographic data

Choose a parameter set and object count. The calculation adds raw public sizes only: one KEM ciphertext or signature per object, with a public key sent once or repeated for every object. Private keys and shared secrets are excluded from the modelled transfer.

A numerical example for planning a test

For 1,000 ML-KEM-768 objects with a public key for every object: 1,000 × (1,184 + 1,088) = 2,272,000 raw bytes. With one public key for the whole batch: 1,184 + 1,000 × 1,088 = 1,089,184 bytes. This is an illustrative transport assumption, not a service or protocol measurement.

This volume model measures neither computation time, throughput, TLS latency nor security. The single-key mode assumes the same recipient or verifier can reuse that key under the chosen protocol. Check this assumption, key rotation and size limits in your environment. This tool sends no content, keys or entered data.

What evidence should a pilot require?

What evidence should a pilot require?
Use to inventoryInformation to recordUseful test and decision condition
Exchanges and confidential dataApplication, protocol, library and version; key establishment function; data sensitivity lifetime; intermediary equipment.Replay connections on an authorised test platform, record errors and volumes, verify which peers actually interoperate and how to restore the approved configuration.
Software signing and updatesBuild chain, signed format, keys and embedded verifiers; ability to renew the root of trust.Verify a valid package and then a modified package. Measure the final manifest size and confirm that older devices have an update path.
Certificates and machine identitiesAuthorities, certificate profiles, signature algorithms, trust stores and external dependencies.Check issuance, renewal and revocation in the products concerned. Library support for an algorithm does not by itself prove support for the full certificate.
Backups, archives and retentionFormats, keys needed for restoration, custody responsibilities and versions able to read historical objects.Restore an old sample in the target environment and preserve the necessary verification material. Migrating connections does not automatically re-encrypt stored archives.

Decision questions

Does ML-KEM replace a signature?

No. Encapsulation establishes a shared secret. Signatures support checks of data integrity and origin under the chosen trust mechanism. A project may need to migrate these two functions separately.

Is the smallest object the best choice?

Size addresses one capacity constraint. Selection must also consider security requirements, maintained implementations, compatibility and test results. The comparison does not rank algorithms.

Is a product described as ‘FIPS 203’ automatically certified?

A standard reference identifies an algorithm specification. Request separate evidence of any claimed conformity or validation, its exact scope, the module version and the configuration assessed.

Why check publication status pages as well as the standard?

NIST status pages identify potential updates: notes dated 17 November 2025 for FIPS 203 and 31 July 2026 for FIPS 204 at this review. Ask suppliers which corrections their release incorporates.

Value provenance and freshness limits

Links lead to official publication notices and histories. Sizes come from the tables identified below; SLH-DSA private key sizes are calculated using the 4n rule in §3.1. Scope is limited to parameter sets in FIPS 203–205: this is not a catalogue of all post-quantum research, proposals or protocol profiles.

NIST selected FALCON for digital signatures and is developing FIPS 206. NIST also selected HQC for key encapsulation. The table and calculator cover parameter sets in the published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 standards. NIST · Post-quantum cryptography standardization status ·

  • NIST FIPS 203 · ML-KEM · §8, tables 2–3; §8 security categories
    Standard publication : · Potential update note :
  • NIST FIPS 204 · ML-DSA · §4, tables 1–2
    Standard publication : · Potential update note :
  • NIST FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA · §11, table 2; §3.1: private key = 4n bytes
    Standard publication :

VEX y aplicabilidad al producto

Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.

VEX and SBOM: check the supplier assertion’s scope

An SBOM describes components; VEX expresses an impact status for a vulnerability and identified products. This reference uses OpenVEX v0.2.0 labels. It offers no automatic conversion to CSAF or CycloneDX, whose structures need reading in their own versions.

Issuer, product identity and time are essential to interpretation. Product or time information can be inherited under OpenVEX rules; an absent statement field does not necessarily mean missing information in the complete document. Check resolved values before concluding.

Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope

Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope
Exact statusAssertion meaningConsumer check
not_affectedThe specified product is declared not affected by this vulnerability.Require a justification or impact_statement under the OpenVEX structure; verify exact product identity and assessment conditions.
affectedActions are recommended to address the vulnerability.Read the action_statement required for this status and connect actions to installed versions.
fixedThe specified product versions contain a fix.Check that those versions are deployed and the service still works after the change.
under_investigationApplicability to the specified versions is not yet established.Preserve uncertainty and request an update; do not treat this as not_affected.

For not_affected, the OpenVEX structure requires a justification or impact_statement; the format recommends a machine-readable justification, optionally enriched by text. For affected, an action_statement is required. These fields document an assertion rather than automatically establishing issuer trust.

Five justifications requiring different evidence

Five justifications requiring different evidence
OpenVEX labelWhat the justification assertsProposed local evidence
component_not_presentThe component is not included in the product.Inventory of the exact build, dependencies and shipped contents, rather than a development dependency list alone.
vulnerable_code_not_presentThe component is included but the vulnerable code is absent.Build options, supplier patch and correspondence to the deployed artefact.
vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_pathThe vulnerable code cannot execute as used by the product.Execution-path analysis and assessed configurations; date assumptions needing review after change.
vulnerable_code_cannot_be_controlled_by_adversaryAn adversary cannot control the vulnerable code to exploit the flaw.Description of controllable inputs and demonstration limits. This assertion may be difficult to prove conclusively.
inline_mitigations_already_existBuilt-in product protections prevent exploitation under OpenVEX conditions.Check that attackers cannot subvert them and users cannot configure or disable them. Do not equate an external firewall rule with this justification.

Fictional JSON example: an assertion for build 2.4.0

A training example written for this reference, with identifier TRAINING-VULN-01 and an .example domain. It describes no real product or vulnerability, is unsigned and has not been validated by an OpenVEX compliance engine. Its single statement inherits the document timestamp.

{
    "@context": "https://openvex.dev/ns/v0.2.0",
    "@id": "https://vendor.example/vex/training-01",
    "author": "Fictional training publisher",
    "timestamp": "2026-10-22T10:00:00Z",
    "version": 1,
    "statements": [
        {
            "vulnerability": {
                "name": "TRAINING-VULN-01"
            },
            "products": [
                {
                    "@id": "https://vendor.example/products/gateway/2.4.0"
                }
            ],
            "status": "not_affected",
            "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_present",
            "impact_statement": "Fictional training statement: the affected code was excluded from this exact product build."
        }
    ]
}

This assertion concerns only the product identified as version 2.4.0. It does not automatically cover 2.3.0, another distribution or a different configuration. The code-exclusion assertion still needs comparison with evidence and the trust placed in the issuer.

Six checks before using VEX to reduce alerts

  • Identify the issuer and how the document was obtained; separate provenance, any signature and trust.
  • Resolve product, subcomponents and identifiers to the deployed build.
  • Check vulnerability identity and aliases rather than matching flaws by similar titles.
  • Read status, required justifications or actions and product-specific conditions.
  • Resolve inherited times and preserve document version; product changes may invalidate an older assumption.
  • Record the acceptance decision, owner and conditions triggering review.

Return to prioritisation signals and remediation evidence →

Primary sources and scope

  • OpenVEX · Specification v0.2.0 · OpenVEX v0.2.0 · reviewed 2026-10-22
    Statement Data Structure · Status Labels · Status Justifications · Data Inheritance

Sources checked on

Firma y procedencia del build

Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.

Connect delivery records to deployed bytes

An SBOM, VEX and provenance can accompany one release while carrying different information. Preserve their binding to the exact package and the expectations used to accept its origin.

  • Match artefact digest to attested subject; preserve the reference from receipt through promotion to deployment.
  • Check authorised identity, builder, repository and parameters rather than concluding from signature presence alone.
  • Retain behaviour and recovery checks: an authentic package can still regress.

Read the pre-deployment provenance reference →

Sources checked on · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics · in-toto · Statement v1 · Sigstore · Verifying Signatures

Explorar el catálogo KEV de CISA

Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.

One identifier can span several technical layers

An entry may concern a library, server or component embedded in an appliance. Search the exact name, known dependencies and the distributed product’s advisory. Catalogue aliases are not a complete list of affected versions.

  • Connect the CVE, component supplier and final-product supplier.
  • Check version, configuration and execution path in the authorised environment.
  • Do not infer remediation from an empty search result.

Explorar el catálogo y el método →

CISA KEV · 2026.11.06 · Documentary review : 2026-11-07

Referencias oficiales

Las referencias respaldan el método. Adapte los controles a su contexto; no constituyen certificación. Los títulos de referencia originales y los documentos fuente pueden estar en otro idioma.

Referencias consultadas el .