资源 · 16

软件供应链保障:组件发布

将组件、来源、构建、漏洞和更新与每个实际部署的版本关联起来。

已更新 · 11 min

虚构的无人验证工作台,检查镜下有电路板,金属模块被琥珀色灯光照亮。 由人工智能生成的编辑插图

本指南有助于实现的目标

  • 了解实际发布的依赖项
  • 验证工件来源
  • 根据上下文确定缺陷优先级
  • 测试替换和回滚

快速检查

  • 物料清单是否与已部署版本匹配?
  • 是否包含传递依赖项?
  • 谁可以签署版本?
  • 您的使用过程中是否存在漏洞?
  • 是否可以在不进行任何修改的情况下移除关键组件?

分步指南

  1. 1

    映射已发布的版本

    识别存储库、直接和传递依赖项、构建工具、镜像、外部服务及其所有者。 将所有这些关联到可验证的版本。

    交付物:产品、组件、版本和所有者映射。

  2. 2

    生成可用的物料清单 (SBOM)

    为每个版本生成 SBOM,并将其与实际交付的工件进行比较。 解决名称不准确、版本缺失和内部组件等问题。

    交付成果:带有日期且经过验证的 SBOM。

  3. 3

    保护构建

    限制发布权限,隔离敏感阶段,并保留来源、摘要和签名。 在部署前验证这些证据。

    交付成果:构建记录和验证策略。

  4. 4

    警报分类

    将每个漏洞通知与组件、版本、暴露情况和实际使用情况关联起来。 指定负责人、截止日期、决策和关闭证据。

    交付成果:上下文分类队列。

  5. 5

    演练变更

    在测试环境中替换关键组件,检查业务流程并演练回滚。 评估阻碍变更的依赖关系。

    交付成果:替换和备用方案演练报告。

  6. 6

    保存证据

    在重大版本发布和事故发生后审查组件和供应商。 保留记录以支持调查和纠正措施。

    交付成果:审查日历和发布历史记录。

VEX:排除警报前先读懂声明

SBOM列出软件组件。VEX表达特定时间点上,漏洞对已标识产品的声明性影响。使用状态进行研判前,应核实准确产品、发布者与上下文。

OpenVEX的四种状态
not_affected声明指定产品不受影响。OpenVEX要求justification或impact_statement,应核实版本与使用条件。
affected声明产品受影响。声明必须包含action_statement,以支持漏洞处置。
fixed指定版本包含修复,但这不能证明你的环境已经安装该版本。
under_investigation适用性尚不确定,不能据此断定没有影响,应安排复查。

六个阅读案例

以下是文档审阅的虚构案例,不分析你的软件,也不验证VEX文件。

范围一致not_affected

产品与版本一致,声明提供component_not_present及构建说明。

声明支持什么判断

检查说明与交付制品的关联证据、发布者身份和修订。状态本身不能证明分析正确。

版本不一致not_affected

供应商声明新版不受影响,但资产清单仍是旧版。

声明支持什么判断

不要把结论扩展到已安装的旧版。查找覆盖该版的声明或索取说明,不能仅凭此文档关闭警报。

缺少原因not_affected

状态为not_affected,却没有justification或impact_statement。

声明支持什么判断

这不满足该项OpenVEX要求,应索取缺失原因;缺少原因本身也不能证明产品受影响。

调查仍在进行under_investigation

最新声明为under_investigation,没有后续结论。

声明支持什么判断

保持事项开放,指定负责人并安排复查。紧急程度还取决于本地暴露与可用威胁信息。

修复尚未部署fixed

fixed指向修复版,但清单仍显示前一版本。

声明支持什么判断

关闭处置任务前,确认修复版已部署且运行正常。修复可用和修复已安装是不同事实。

缺少行动说明affected

产品被声明为affected,但缺少action_statement。

声明支持什么判断

索取行动指引并阅读供应商公告。文档不完整并不能成为忽略已声明影响的理由。

参考规范 : OpenVEX v0.2.0

管理指标

指标衡量内容首要行动
SBOM 覆盖率已发布版本,并已检查组件清单发布前解决差异
已验证来源部署前已检查工件阻止缺少预期证据的发布
分类时间从相关通知到记录决策的时间升级暴露组件
可逆性已测试关键替换组件的回滚功能移除阻塞依赖项

常见错误

  • 混淆存储库清单和已部署组件
  • 保留 SBOM 而不更新
  • 仅按分数对缺陷进行排名
  • 未验证构建来源就对工件进行签名

常见问题解答

SBOM 是否足够?

不够。它有助于识别组件,但来源、完整性、暴露情况和更新能力也需要验证。

每个漏洞都应该阻止发布吗?

根据实际使用情况、风险暴露程度、补偿控制措施和业务关键性做出决策,并记录决策理由。

哪些参考框架有所帮助?

NIST 安全软件开发框架提供贯穿整个生命周期的安全开发和软件保护实践。

参考资料:数据、用途与局限

文档核查日期 .

此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。

Software bill of materials: inventory to verificationActual delivered artefact. SPDX · Describe. CycloneDX · Describe. Applicability assessment. Link document and build. Components and information. Components and dependencies. Versions, advisories and settings. A bill of materials is not evidence of vulnerability absence.Software bill of materials: inventory to verificationActual delivered artefactLink document and buildSPDX · DescribeComponents and informationCycloneDX · DescribeComponents and dependenciesApplicability assessmentVersions, advisories and settingsA bill of materials is not evidence of vulnerability absence
Software bill of materials: inventory to verification
参考资料:数据、用途与局限
来源与目的已核实的数据或指标使用方法需要保留的局限
MITRE · Common Weakness Enumeration

Name classes of software and hardware weakness.

A CWE describes a weakness that can contribute to vulnerabilities. It does not represent a particular incident. Connect the weakness to the observed mechanism: input, processing and missing control. Use it to fix the cause and plan regression tests.

深入了解方法 →

A keyword in a report alone does not establish the correct CWE classification.
SPDX · Specifications

Describe components and information in a software bill of materials.

The official specifications page distinguishes SPDX 3.0 from earlier versions such as 2.3. Document version affects schema and tool compatibility. Request format, version, build scope and component identifiers. Compare the bill of materials with the delivered artefact.

深入了解方法 →

A bill of materials alone proves neither vulnerability absence, dependency completeness nor compliance with every licence.
OWASP · CycloneDX

Exchange bills of materials and supply-chain information.

The official overview dates specification 1.7 to 21 October 2025 and documents JSON, XML and Protobuf. Check version, component references and dependency links. Retain the connection between the bill of materials, build and deployed product.

深入了解方法 →

Changing format does not fix missing components. A descriptive inventory and a vulnerability impact assessment answer different questions.
NIST · Post-quantum cryptography

Identify standards relevant to cryptographic transition.

NIST distinguishes FIPS 203 for ML-KEM, FIPS 204 for ML-DSA and FIPS 205 for SLH-DSA. Key encapsulation and signatures are different functions. Inventory protocols, libraries, keys and dependencies. Ask which versions are actually implemented and test interoperability, performance and rollback.

深入了解方法 →

Compare post-quantum parameters and estimate their volumes →

Having a standardised algorithm does not establish security of the complete integration or a universal migration deadline.

后量子密码:迁移前先比较

此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。

ML-KEM establishes a shared secret; ML-DSA and SLH-DSA sign data. These functions serve different needs. The 18 parameter sets below come from the three final FIPS standards published on 13 August 2024. Use them to prepare inventories and capacity tests without treating an algorithm name as proof of a secure system.

Data and publication status pages checked on .

Establishing a secret and signing: two separate paths

ML-KEM · Establish a secret

  1. The recipient publishes an encapsulation key.
  2. The sender creates a ciphertext and shared secret, then sends the ciphertext.
  3. The recipient recovers the secret using a decapsulation key.

Peer authentication and use of the secret depend on the complete protocol.

ML-DSA / SLH-DSA · Sign

  1. The signer protects a private key and distributes a public key.
  2. The signer signs data and sends the data with its signature.
  3. The verifier checks the signature using the trusted public key.

A signature alone does not encrypt the signed content.

For ML-KEM, the public and private keys are used for encapsulation and decapsulation respectively; column five is the ciphertext. For both DSA families, the keys are used for verification and signing; column five is the signature. A dash means not applicable. NIST categories are neither quality ratings nor key lengths in bits.

Raw sizes in bytes · FIPS 203, 204 and 205
Parameter set / sourceNIST categoryPublic keyPrivate keyKEM ciphertext / signatureShared secret
ML-KEM-512FIPS 203 18001,632 76832
ML-KEM-768FIPS 203 31,1842,400 1,08832
ML-KEM-1024FIPS 203 51,5683,168 1,56832
ML-DSA-44FIPS 204 21,3122,560 2,420—
ML-DSA-65FIPS 204 31,9524,032 3,309—
ML-DSA-87FIPS 204 52,5924,896 4,627—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128sFIPS 205 13264 7,856—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128fFIPS 205 13264 17,088—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192sFIPS 205 34896 16,224—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-192fFIPS 205 34896 35,664—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256sFIPS 205 564128 29,792—
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256fFIPS 205 564128 49,856—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128sFIPS 205 13264 7,856—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128fFIPS 205 13264 17,088—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192sFIPS 205 34896 16,224—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-192fFIPS 205 34896 35,664—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256sFIPS 205 564128 29,792—
SLH-DSA-SHAKE-256fFIPS 205 564128 49,856—

Sizes refer to the raw encodings defined by the standards. A private key stored as a seed may occupy less space than the full encoding shown here. Certificates, containers, Base64, protocol headers and protected storage add their own bytes. In SLH-DSA, ‘s’ favours smaller signatures and ‘f’ faster signing; SHA2 and SHAKE variants share sizes for each variant, rather than the same hash instantiation.

Estimate a volume of cryptographic data

Choose a parameter set and object count. The calculation adds raw public sizes only: one KEM ciphertext or signature per object, with a public key sent once or repeated for every object. Private keys and shared secrets are excluded from the modelled transfer.

A numerical example for planning a test

For 1,000 ML-KEM-768 objects with a public key for every object: 1,000 × (1,184 + 1,088) = 2,272,000 raw bytes. With one public key for the whole batch: 1,184 + 1,000 × 1,088 = 1,089,184 bytes. This is an illustrative transport assumption, not a service or protocol measurement.

This volume model measures neither computation time, throughput, TLS latency nor security. The single-key mode assumes the same recipient or verifier can reuse that key under the chosen protocol. Check this assumption, key rotation and size limits in your environment. This tool sends no content, keys or entered data.

What evidence should a pilot require?

What evidence should a pilot require?
Use to inventoryInformation to recordUseful test and decision condition
Exchanges and confidential dataApplication, protocol, library and version; key establishment function; data sensitivity lifetime; intermediary equipment.Replay connections on an authorised test platform, record errors and volumes, verify which peers actually interoperate and how to restore the approved configuration.
Software signing and updatesBuild chain, signed format, keys and embedded verifiers; ability to renew the root of trust.Verify a valid package and then a modified package. Measure the final manifest size and confirm that older devices have an update path.
Certificates and machine identitiesAuthorities, certificate profiles, signature algorithms, trust stores and external dependencies.Check issuance, renewal and revocation in the products concerned. Library support for an algorithm does not by itself prove support for the full certificate.
Backups, archives and retentionFormats, keys needed for restoration, custody responsibilities and versions able to read historical objects.Restore an old sample in the target environment and preserve the necessary verification material. Migrating connections does not automatically re-encrypt stored archives.

Decision questions

Does ML-KEM replace a signature?

No. Encapsulation establishes a shared secret. Signatures support checks of data integrity and origin under the chosen trust mechanism. A project may need to migrate these two functions separately.

Is the smallest object the best choice?

Size addresses one capacity constraint. Selection must also consider security requirements, maintained implementations, compatibility and test results. The comparison does not rank algorithms.

Is a product described as ‘FIPS 203’ automatically certified?

A standard reference identifies an algorithm specification. Request separate evidence of any claimed conformity or validation, its exact scope, the module version and the configuration assessed.

Why check publication status pages as well as the standard?

NIST status pages identify potential updates: notes dated 17 November 2025 for FIPS 203 and 31 July 2026 for FIPS 204 at this review. Ask suppliers which corrections their release incorporates.

Value provenance and freshness limits

Links lead to official publication notices and histories. Sizes come from the tables identified below; SLH-DSA private key sizes are calculated using the 4n rule in §3.1. Scope is limited to parameter sets in FIPS 203–205: this is not a catalogue of all post-quantum research, proposals or protocol profiles.

NIST selected FALCON for digital signatures and is developing FIPS 206. NIST also selected HQC for key encapsulation. The table and calculator cover parameter sets in the published FIPS 203, 204 and 205 standards. NIST · Post-quantum cryptography standardization status ·

  • NIST FIPS 203 · ML-KEM · §8, tables 2–3; §8 security categories
    Standard publication : · Potential update note :
  • NIST FIPS 204 · ML-DSA · §4, tables 1–2
    Standard publication : · Potential update note :
  • NIST FIPS 205 · SLH-DSA · §11, table 2; §3.1: private key = 4n bytes
    Standard publication :

VEX 与产品适用性

此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。

VEX and SBOM: check the supplier assertion’s scope

An SBOM describes components; VEX expresses an impact status for a vulnerability and identified products. This reference uses OpenVEX v0.2.0 labels. It offers no automatic conversion to CSAF or CycloneDX, whose structures need reading in their own versions.

Issuer, product identity and time are essential to interpretation. Product or time information can be inherited under OpenVEX rules; an absent statement field does not necessarily mean missing information in the complete document. Check resolved values before concluding.

Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope

Four OpenVEX statuses and their scope
Exact statusAssertion meaningConsumer check
not_affectedThe specified product is declared not affected by this vulnerability.Require a justification or impact_statement under the OpenVEX structure; verify exact product identity and assessment conditions.
affectedActions are recommended to address the vulnerability.Read the action_statement required for this status and connect actions to installed versions.
fixedThe specified product versions contain a fix.Check that those versions are deployed and the service still works after the change.
under_investigationApplicability to the specified versions is not yet established.Preserve uncertainty and request an update; do not treat this as not_affected.

For not_affected, the OpenVEX structure requires a justification or impact_statement; the format recommends a machine-readable justification, optionally enriched by text. For affected, an action_statement is required. These fields document an assertion rather than automatically establishing issuer trust.

Five justifications requiring different evidence

Five justifications requiring different evidence
OpenVEX labelWhat the justification assertsProposed local evidence
component_not_presentThe component is not included in the product.Inventory of the exact build, dependencies and shipped contents, rather than a development dependency list alone.
vulnerable_code_not_presentThe component is included but the vulnerable code is absent.Build options, supplier patch and correspondence to the deployed artefact.
vulnerable_code_not_in_execute_pathThe vulnerable code cannot execute as used by the product.Execution-path analysis and assessed configurations; date assumptions needing review after change.
vulnerable_code_cannot_be_controlled_by_adversaryAn adversary cannot control the vulnerable code to exploit the flaw.Description of controllable inputs and demonstration limits. This assertion may be difficult to prove conclusively.
inline_mitigations_already_existBuilt-in product protections prevent exploitation under OpenVEX conditions.Check that attackers cannot subvert them and users cannot configure or disable them. Do not equate an external firewall rule with this justification.

Fictional JSON example: an assertion for build 2.4.0

A training example written for this reference, with identifier TRAINING-VULN-01 and an .example domain. It describes no real product or vulnerability, is unsigned and has not been validated by an OpenVEX compliance engine. Its single statement inherits the document timestamp.

{
    "@context": "https://openvex.dev/ns/v0.2.0",
    "@id": "https://vendor.example/vex/training-01",
    "author": "Fictional training publisher",
    "timestamp": "2026-10-22T10:00:00Z",
    "version": 1,
    "statements": [
        {
            "vulnerability": {
                "name": "TRAINING-VULN-01"
            },
            "products": [
                {
                    "@id": "https://vendor.example/products/gateway/2.4.0"
                }
            ],
            "status": "not_affected",
            "justification": "vulnerable_code_not_present",
            "impact_statement": "Fictional training statement: the affected code was excluded from this exact product build."
        }
    ]
}

This assertion concerns only the product identified as version 2.4.0. It does not automatically cover 2.3.0, another distribution or a different configuration. The code-exclusion assertion still needs comparison with evidence and the trust placed in the issuer.

Six checks before using VEX to reduce alerts

  • Identify the issuer and how the document was obtained; separate provenance, any signature and trust.
  • Resolve product, subcomponents and identifiers to the deployed build.
  • Check vulnerability identity and aliases rather than matching flaws by similar titles.
  • Read status, required justifications or actions and product-specific conditions.
  • Resolve inherited times and preserve document version; product changes may invalidate an older assumption.
  • Record the acceptance decision, owner and conditions triggering review.

Return to prioritisation signals and remediation evidence →

Primary sources and scope

  • OpenVEX · Specification v0.2.0 · OpenVEX v0.2.0 · reviewed 2026-10-22
    Statement Data Structure · Status Labels · Status Justifications · Data Inheritance

Sources checked on

构建签名与来源

此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。

Connect delivery records to deployed bytes

An SBOM, VEX and provenance can accompany one release while carrying different information. Preserve their binding to the exact package and the expectations used to accept its origin.

  • Match artefact digest to attested subject; preserve the reference from receipt through promotion to deployment.
  • Check authorised identity, builder, repository and parameters rather than concluding from signature presence alone.
  • Retain behaviour and recovery checks: an authentic package can still regress.

Read the pre-deployment provenance reference →

Sources checked on · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics · in-toto · Statement v1 · Sigstore · Verifying Signatures

浏览 CISA KEV 目录

此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。

One identifier can span several technical layers

An entry may concern a library, server or component embedded in an appliance. Search the exact name, known dependencies and the distributed product’s advisory. Catalogue aliases are not a complete list of affected versions.

  • Connect the CVE, component supplier and final-product supplier.
  • Check version, configuration and execution path in the authorised environment.
  • Do not infer remediation from an empty search result.

查看目录及方法 →

CISA KEV · 2026.11.06 · Documentary review : 2026-11-07

官方参考文献

参考文献支持该方法。 请根据您的实际情况调整检查;它们并非认证。 原始参考文献标题和源文档可能使用其他语言。

参考资料查阅日期 .