Risorse · 24
Implementare un'autenticazione resistente al phishing con ripristino sicuro.
Utilizzare fattori associati al servizio autentico e proteggere la registrazione, la perdita e la revoca.
Aggiornato · 8 min
Obiettivi di questa guida
- Mappare i percorsi di accesso
- Selezionare un protocollo resistente
- Proteggere la registrazione
- Esercitazione di ripristino.
Verifica rapida
- Quali account accedono a dati o funzioni critiche?
- Il fattore è crittograficamente associato al servizio autentico?
- Chi autorizza un nuovo autenticatore?
- Come viene revocato un dispositivo smarrito?
- Le eccezioni hanno un responsabile e una data di fine?
Metodo passo passo
- 1
Inventariare i percorsi di accesso
Elencare applicazioni, federazione, amministratori, account di emergenza e metodi attuali. Identificare gli accessi che accettano ancora codici inseriti manualmente.
Risultato: matrice account, applicazione e fattore.
- 2
Selezionare la resistenza richiesta
Valutare i protocolli crittografici associati a un canale o a un nome di verificatore, come WebAuthn/FIDO2, laddove l'applicazione lo supporti. Il NIST non considera gli OTP inseriti manualmente resistenti al phishing perché un sito falso può inoltrarli.
Risultato atteso: scelta del metodo e limitazioni note.
- 3
Testare gli account sensibili.
Testare browser, dispositivi, delega, possibile utilizzo offline e accessibilità con un gruppo rappresentativo. Fornire più di un percorso autorizzato senza accumulare accessi inattivi.
Risultato: scenari pilota e criteri di successo.
- 4
Proteggere la registrazione
Verificare l'identità e la sessione prima di aggiungere una chiave, notificare l'utente e registrare l'evento. Testare il rifiuto di una richiesta di registrazione da un contesto sospetto.
Risultato: procedura di registrazione e registro degli eventi.
- 5
Pianificare la gestione della perdita e della revoca.
Documentare la segnalazione, la disabilitazione, il ripristino e i controlli di identità per un autenticatore smarrito. Testare il percorso senza aggirare la protezione tramite un canale più debole.
Risultato: esercitazione di ripristino e revoca.
- 6
Espandere e monitorare.
Implementare per gruppi, misurare la copertura, monitorare guasti ed eccezioni, quindi dismettere i metodi legacy una volta che il processo di ripristino testato lo consente.
Risultato: dashboard di migrazione e registro delle eccezioni.
Indicatori di gestione
| Indicatore | Cosa misura | Prima azione |
|---|---|---|
| Copertura | Account sensibili con metodi resistenti | Estensione del rollout |
| Registrazione | Aggiunte con controlli e notifiche | Correzione dei punti deboli |
| Ripristino | Perdite simulate risolte senza bypass | Ripetizione dell'esercizio |
| Eccezioni | Accesso residuo con proprietario e scadenza | Dismissione dei fattori legacy |
Errori comuni
- Definire ogni metodo MFA resistente al phishing
- Protezione dell'accesso ma registrazione debole
- Mancanza di amministratori e account di emergenza
- Dismissione di un metodo legacy prima che il ripristino funzioni
Domande frequenti
È sufficiente un codice monouso?
Il NIST spiega che un codice inserito manualmente può essere trasmesso da un servizio di impostore e non è resistente al phishing.
È necessaria una chiave hardware per tutti?
La scelta dipende dalla sicurezza e dal contesto; alcuni autenticatori WebAuthn sincronizzabili possono essere adatti ad alcuni utilizzi con opzioni di ripristino appropriate.
Cosa succede in caso di smarrimento del dispositivo?
Revoca l'autenticatore interessato, segui la procedura di ripristino verificata e notifica l'utente in base alle policy di servizio.
Identità: fattori, sessioni e recupero
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.
References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.
Sources consulted on .
Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
| Method and reference | Property and conditions | Recovery and dependencies | Evidence to request |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entered password | Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret. | Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path. | Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey. |
| Manually entered TOTP | Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session. | Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups. | Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant. |
| SMS or voice code | PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant. | The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies. | Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure. |
| Simple push approval | Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance. | Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling. | Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient. |
| Syncable WebAuthn with UV | Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology. | The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary. | Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export. |
| Device-bound WebAuthn with UV | Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection. | Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery. | Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients. |
| WebAuthn key without UV | Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV). | Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation. | UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA. |
| Biometrics considered alone | In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms. | Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately. | Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof. |
No method matches the filters.
Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
| Level and factors | Resistance and key export | Overall reauthentication timeout | Inactivity |
|---|---|---|---|
| AAL1 One factor can suffice at this level. | Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted. | At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation. | No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy. |
| AAL2 Two distinct factors. | A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions. | At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory. | At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation. |
| AAL3 Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor. | Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required. | At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement. | At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation. |
These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →
Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points
- Single factor
- Minimum 15 characters required.
- Within MFA
- Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
- Accepted length
- Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
- Composition
- No imposed mixture of character types.
- Replacement
- No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
- Secrets to reject
- Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
- Entry assistance
- Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.
Recovery: four classes and their conditions
- Previously saved code
- At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
- Code issued on demand
- Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
- Recovery contact
- Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
- Repeated identity proofing
- An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.
Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →
Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
| Stage | Proposed practical check | Observable evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Enrol | Check who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path. | Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis. |
| Authenticate | Check the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access. | Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated. |
| Manage the session | Define overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation. | Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests. |
| Report loss | Identify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise. | Report timeline and observed access result after handling. |
| Recover | Follow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks. | Successful recovery case and refused bypass case. |
| Leave the service | Remove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too. | Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies. |
WebAuthn: verify the response at the service
The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →
Include people who use a different journey
WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →
Continue with identity governance →
Primary references and scope
Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication · Publication :
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels · Publication :
§2.1–2.3 - NIST · Authenticators and password requirements · Publication :
§3.1.1; §3.2.3; §3.2.5 - NIST · Authenticator Event Management · Publication :
§4.1; §4.2; §4.6 - NIST · Session Management · Publication :
§5 - NIST · Syncable Authenticators · Publication :
Appendix B - W3C · WebAuthn Level 3 · Publication : · W3C Recommendation
§6.1; §7.1–7.2 - W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum) · Publication :
WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 · AA
Moduli: criteri, errori e contrasto
Le note dettagliate di questa edizione sono disponibili in inglese.
Authenticate without avoidable cognitive effort
SC 3.3.8 addresses cognitive tests at each authentication step, with specific alternatives, assistance mechanisms and exceptions. Verify security and usability together.
- Try password managers and paste where relevant.
- Examine recovery mechanisms in the actual journey.
- Do not infer screen accessibility from the chosen authentication technology alone.
Open the WCAG review grid and contrast calculator →
W3C WAI · Understanding SC 3.3.8 · Accessible Authentication (Minimum) · Informative explanation · consulted 2026-10-23
Riferimenti ufficiali
I riferimenti supportano il metodo. Adattare i controlli al proprio contesto; non costituiscono una certificazione. I titoli dei riferimenti originali e i documenti di origine potrebbero essere in un'altra lingua.
Riferimenti consultati il .
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 — phishing resistance and authenticator lifecycle
- CISA — Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels
- NIST · Authenticators and password requirements
- NIST · Authenticator Event Management
- NIST · Session Management
- NIST · Syncable Authenticators
- W3C · WebAuthn Level 3
- W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum)
- W3C · Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.2
- W3C WAI · Understanding SC 3.3.8 · Accessible Authentication (Minimum)
