참고 자료 · 24

안전한 복구 기능을 갖춘 피싱 방지 인증을 배포합니다.

정품 서비스와 관련된 인증 요소를 사용하고 등록, 분실 및 해지를 보호합니다.

업데이트됨 · 17 min

보안 키 두 개, 빈 카드와 버건디 서류철이 있는 가상의 무인 신원 확인실 AI로 생성한 편집용 일러스트

이 가이드가 달성하는 목표

  • 접근 경로 매핑
  • 내성 프로토콜 선택
  • 등록 보호
  • 복구 연습

빠른 확인

  • 어떤 계정이 중요 데이터 또는 기능에 접근합니까?
  • 인증 요소가 실제 서비스와 암호화 방식으로 연결되어 있습니까?
  • 누가 새로운 인증자를 승인합니까?
  • 분실된 기기는 어떻게 취소됩니까?
  • 예외 사항에 담당자와 종료일이 있습니까?

단계별 방법

  1. 1

    접근 경로 목록 작성

    애플리케이션, 페더레이션, 관리자, 비상 계정 및 현재 사용 중인 방법을 나열합니다. 수동으로 입력한 코드를 여전히 허용하는 로그인 방식을 식별합니다.

    결과물: 계정, 애플리케이션 및 인증 요소 매트릭스

  2. 2

    필요한 내성 수준 선택

    애플리케이션에서 지원하는 경우 WebAuthn/FIDO2와 같이 채널 또는 검증자 이름에 연결된 암호화 프로토콜을 평가합니다. NIST는 가짜 사이트에서 수동으로 입력한 OTP를 전달할 수 있으므로 피싱 방지 기능으로 간주하지 않습니다.

    결과물: 방법 선택 및 알려진 제한 사항.

  3. 3

    민감 계정 시범 운영

    대표 그룹을 대상으로 브라우저, 장치, 위임, 오프라인 사용 가능성 및 접근성 테스트. 비활성 액세스 누적 없이 여러 개의 승인된 경로를 제공합니다.

    산출물: 파일럿 시나리오 및 성공 기준.

  4. 4

    등록 보호

    키 추가 전 신원 및 세션을 확인하고, 사용자에게 알림을 보내고 이벤트를 기록합니다. 의심스러운 상황에서 등록 요청이 거부되는 것을 테스트합니다.

    산출물: 등록 절차 및 이벤트 기록.

  5. 5

    분실 및 해지 계획.

    분실된 인증 장치에 대한 보고, 비활성화, 복구 및 신원 확인 절차를 문서화합니다. 취약한 채널을 통해 보호 기능을 우회하지 않고 전체 과정을 테스트합니다.

    산출물: 복구 및 해지 연습.

  6. 6

    확장 및 모니터링.

    그룹별로 배포하고, 적용 범위를 측정하고, 장애 및 예외 사항을 추적한 후, 테스트된 복구 프로세스가 허용되면 기존 방식을 폐기합니다.

    산출물: 마이그레이션 대시보드 및 예외 등록부.

관리 지표

지표측정 대상첫 번째 조치
범위민감한 계정 보호 및 보안 강화배포 확장
등록확인 및 알림을 통한 추가 기능취약한 경로 수정
복구우회 없이 해결된 모의 손실반복 연습
예외소유자 및 만료일을 포함한 잔여 액세스 권한기존 인증 요소 폐기

일반적인 실수

  • 모든 MFA 방식이 피싱 방지 기능을 갖추고 있다고 주장
  • 로그인 보안은 강화했지만 등록은 취약한 상태
  • 관리자 및 비상 계정 누락
  • 복구가 작동하기 전에 기존 방식을 폐기

자주 묻는 질문

일회용 코드로 충분한가?

NIST는 수동으로 입력한 코드는 사칭 서비스를 통해 전달될 수 있으며 피싱 방지 기능이 없다고 설명합니다.

모든 사용자에게 하드웨어 키가 필요한가?

선택은 보증 및 컨텍스트에 따라 달라집니다. 일부 동기화 가능한 WebAuthn 인증기는 적절한 복구 옵션을 통해 특정 용도에 적합할 수 있습니다.

기기 분실 시 어떻게 해야 할까요?

해당 인증기를 취소하고, 검증된 복구 프로세스를 따르고, 서비스 정책에 따라 사용자에게 알립니다.

신원: 인증 요소, 세션 및 복구

이 언어판의 상세 참고 설명은 영어로 제공됩니다.

An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.

References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.

Sources consulted on .

빈 사이버 연구실에 놓인 상표 없는 보안 키 두 개 AI로 생성한 편집용 일러스트
Two unbranded keys in an empty lab. Appearance proves neither key non-exportability nor assurance level.

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees

Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
Method and referenceProperty and conditionsRecovery and dependenciesEvidence to request
Entered password

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret.Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path.Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey.
Manually entered TOTP

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session.Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups.Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant.
SMS or voice code

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant.The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies.Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure.
Simple push approval

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance.Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling.Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient.
Syncable WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Syncable Authenticators

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology.The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary.Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export.
Device-bound WebAuthn with UV

NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection.Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery.Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients.
WebAuthn key without UV

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

W3C · WebAuthn Level 3

Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV).Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation.UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA.
Biometrics considered alone

NIST · Authenticators and password requirements

In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms.Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately.Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof.

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations

Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
Level and factorsResistance and key exportOverall reauthentication timeoutInactivity
AAL1

One factor can suffice at this level.

Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted.At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation.No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy.
AAL2

Two distinct factors.

A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions.At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory.At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation.
AAL3

Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor.

Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required.At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement.At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation.

These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →

Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points

Single factor
Minimum 15 characters required.
Within MFA
Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
Accepted length
Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
Composition
No imposed mixture of character types.
Replacement
No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
Secrets to reject
Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
Entry assistance
Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.

NIST §3.1.1.2 →

Recovery: four classes and their conditions

Previously saved code
At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
Code issued on demand
Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
Recovery contact
Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
Repeated identity proofing
An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.

Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents

Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
StageProposed practical checkObservable evidence
EnrolCheck who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path.Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis.
AuthenticateCheck the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access.Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated.
Manage the sessionDefine overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation.Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests.
Report lossIdentify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise.Report timeline and observed access result after handling.
RecoverFollow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks.Successful recovery case and refused bypass case.
Leave the serviceRemove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too.Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies.

WebAuthn: verify the response at the service

The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →

Include people who use a different journey

WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →

Continue with identity governance →

Primary references and scope

Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.

양식: 기준, 오류 및 명암비

이 언어판의 상세 참고 설명은 영어로 제공됩니다.

Authenticate without avoidable cognitive effort

SC 3.3.8 addresses cognitive tests at each authentication step, with specific alternatives, assistance mechanisms and exceptions. Verify security and usability together.

  • Try password managers and paste where relevant.
  • Examine recovery mechanisms in the actual journey.
  • Do not infer screen accessibility from the chosen authentication technology alone.

Open the WCAG review grid and contrast calculator →

W3C WAI · Understanding SC 3.3.8 · Accessible Authentication (Minimum) · Informative explanation · consulted 2026-10-23

공식 참조

참조는 방법을 뒷받침합니다. 상황에 맞게 검사를 조정하십시오. 이는 인증이 아닙니다. 원본 참조 제목 및 소스 문서는 다른 언어로 작성되었을 수 있습니다.

참고 자료 확인일 .