リソース · 24
安全な復旧機能を備えたフィッシング耐性認証を導入する。
正規サービスに紐づけられた要素を使用し、登録、紛失、および失効を保護する。
更新済み · 18 min
このガイドが達成するのに役立つこと
- アクセスパスのマッピング
- 耐性のあるプロトコルの選択
- 登録の保護
- 復旧訓練
クイックチェック
- どのAアカウントが重要なデータまたは機能にアクセスできるか?
- 認証要素は正規のサービスに暗号的に紐付けられているか?
- 新しい認証デバイスを承認するのは誰か?
- 紛失したデバイスはどのように取り消されるか?
- 例外には所有者と終了日が設定されているか?
手順
- 1
アクセスパスのインベントリ
アプリケーション、フェデレーション、管理者、緊急アカウント、および現在の認証方法を一覧表示する。 手動で入力されたコードを受け入れるサインインを特定する。
成果物:アカウント、アプリケーション、および認証要素のマトリックス。
- 2
必要な耐性の選択
アプリケーションがサポートしている場合、WebAuthn/FIDO2など、チャネルまたは検証者名に紐付けられた暗号プロトコルを評価する。 NISTは、偽サイトが手動で入力されたOTPを中継する可能性があるため、手動で入力されたOTPをフィッシング耐性があるとはみなさない。
成果物:方法の選択と既知の制限事項。
- 3
機密性の高いアカウントの試験運用。
代表的なグループを用いて、ブラウザ、デバイス、委任、オフラインでの使用可能性、およびアクセシビリティをテストする。 休眠アクセスを蓄積することなく、複数の承認済みパスを提供する。
成果物:パイロットシナリオと成功基準
- 4
登録の保護
キーを追加する前にIDとセッションを確認し、ユーザーに通知してイベントを記録する。 疑わしいコンテキストからの登録要求の拒否をテストする。
成果物:登録手順とイベント記録
- 5
紛失と失効の計画
紛失した認証デバイスに関する報告、無効化、復旧、およびIDチェックを文書化する。 脆弱なチャネルを介して保護を迂回することなく、一連のプロセスをテストする。
成果物:復旧と失効の演習
- 6
展開と監視
グループごとに展開し、カバレッジを測定し、障害と例外を追跡し、テスト済みの復旧プロセスが許容するようになった時点で従来の方法を廃止する。
成果物:移行ダッシュボードと例外レジスター
管理指標
| 指標 | 測定対象 | 最初のアクション |
|---|---|---|
| 網羅性 | 機密性の高いアカウントを耐性のある方法で管理する | ロールアウトの拡張 |
| 登録 | チェックと通知を伴う追加機能 | 脆弱なパスを修正する |
| 復旧 | バイパスなしで解決された模擬損失 | 演習を繰り返す |
| 例外 | 所有者と有効期限付きの残りのアクセス | レガシー要素を廃止する |
よくある間違い
- すべてのMFA方法をフィッシング耐性があるとみなす
- サインインは保護されているが、登録は脆弱なまま
- 管理者と緊急アカウントが見つからない
- 復旧が機能する前にレガシー方法を廃止する
よくある質問
ワンタイムコードで十分か?
NISTは、手動で入力されたコードはなりすましサービスによって中継される可能性があり、フィッシング耐性がないと説明しています。
すべてのユーザーにハードウェアキーが必要か?
選択は保証と状況によって異なります。 同期可能なWebAuthn認証器の中には、適切な復旧オプションを選択すれば、特定の用途に適したものもあります。
デバイス紛失後の対応
影響を受けた認証器を無効化し、検証済みの復旧プロセスに従い、サービスポリシーに基づいてユーザーに通知します。
ID:認証要素、セッション、復旧
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
An authentication method must be assessed alongside enrolment, recovery and the sessions it opens. A passkey label, a phone or a biometric sensor does not by itself establish the assurance level of the entire service.
References use NIST SP 800-63B-4, finalised in July 2025, and WebAuthn Level 3, a W3C Recommendation since 25 August 2026. AALs describe authentication transactions rather than product scores or certifications earned by ticking this table. Application depends on service scope and risk assessment.
Sources consulted on .
Compare eight methods without confusing their guarantees
| Method and reference | Property and conditions | Recovery and dependencies | Evidence to request |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entered password | Knowledge factor; a false site can relay or capture the secret. | Depends on the password manager and the password replacement path. | Length policy, compromised-secret blocking and a tested replacement journey. |
| Manually entered TOTP | Possession of a shared secret; manual entry does not bind the output to the legitimate session. | Plan for loss of the generator and protection of seeds or provider backups. | Authorised enrolment, secret protection and revocation; do not call every OTP phishing-resistant. |
| SMS or voice code | PSTN out-of-band channel, restricted in the NIST framework; manual codes are not phishing-resistant. | The number, carrier and SIM or line changes are dependencies. | Channel justification, risk signals, alternatives and number-change procedure. |
| Simple push approval | Approval without cryptographic verifier-name or channel binding does not establish phishing resistance. | Lost phones and application re-enrolment require handling. | Actual protocol, user intent and enrolment controls; the push label alone is insufficient. |
| Syncable WebAuthn with UV | Cryptographic binding to the service; user verification (UV) must be requested and checked when required. Syncable keys are exportable in NIST terminology. | The sync account, its devices and its recovery enter the trust boundary. | Sync and UV requirements. Syncable methods do not fit AAL3, which prohibits key export. |
| Device-bound WebAuthn with UV | Service binding and user verification. Device-bound alone does not establish non-exportable hardware protection. | Device loss requires another authorised method or controlled recovery. | Storage properties, UV, proof of non-exportability when needed and tests of actual clients. |
| WebAuthn key without UV | Service binding, but possession alone in this case. A touch or user presence (UP) flag is not proof of user verification (UV). | Plan a second authorised method and lost-key revocation. | UP/UV checks and the factor combination required by the service; hardware form alone does not establish MFA. |
| Biometrics considered alone | In the NIST framework, biometrics accompany a physical authenticator in MFA; they are neither secrets nor sufficient standalone mechanisms. | Provide a non-biometric alternative and protect biometric information appropriately. | Comparison location, activation role and accessible alternative; distinguish biometric comparison from cryptographic proof. |
No method matches the filters.
Three AALs: distinguish requirements and recommendations
| Level and factors | Resistance and key export | Overall reauthentication timeout | Inactivity |
|---|---|---|---|
| AAL1 One factor can suffice at this level. | Phishing resistance not imposed by this level; key export permitted. | At most 30 days: SHOULD recommendation. | No numeric ceiling in this reference; define the service policy. |
| AAL2 Two distinct factors. | A phishing-resistant option must be offered; key export permitted under applicable conditions. | At most 24 hours: SHOULD recommendation; establishing a definite overall limit remains mandatory. | At most 1 hour: SHOULD recommendation. |
| AAL3 Cryptographic authenticator and additional or activation factor. | Phishing resistance and a non-exportable private key required. | At most 12 hours: SHALL requirement. | At most 15 minutes: SHOULD recommendation. |
These values are not cookie lifetimes to copy blindly. NIST distinguishes overall and inactivity limits and then defines reauthentication rules. Applications may choose shorter periods based on risk. IAL concerns identity proofing and FAL federation: AAL does not replace either dimension. NIST §2 →
Passwords: seven precise NIST reference points
- Single factor
- Minimum 15 characters required.
- Within MFA
- Minimum 8 characters required when the password is used only in a multifactor process.
- Accepted length
- Allowing a maximum length of at least 64 characters is recommended.
- Composition
- No imposed mixture of character types.
- Replacement
- No arbitrary periodic changes; force a change when there is evidence of compromise.
- Secrets to reject
- Compare against commonly used, expected or compromised passwords.
- Entry assistance
- Allow password managers and autofill; permitting paste is recommended.
Recovery: four classes and their conditions
- Previously saved code
- At least 64 random bits in the NIST framework; offline subscriber storage, hashed server storage and invalidation after use.
- Code issued on demand
- Codes sent by text or voice are valid for at most 10 minutes; email codes for at most 24 hours. Verify addresses and apply the target level’s conditions.
- Recovery contact
- Organise contact addresses and associated checks; a personal relationship does not replace technical recovery requirements.
- Repeated identity proofing
- An option for previously identity-proofed accounts. Without prior identity proofing, do not claim to re-verify an unknown identity.
Replacing a forgotten password through another still-valid authenticator is binding a new authenticator rather than necessarily account recovery. Document notifications, delays, revocations and responsibilities so support does not become a bypass. NIST §4 →
Connect authentication, sessions and incidents
| Stage | Proposed practical check | Observable evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Enrol | Check who authorises a new authenticator and notify the subscriber through a known path. | Record of binding, associated method and authorisation basis. |
| Authenticate | Check the protocol, expected domain and required factors before granting access. | Results on chosen clients, with presence and verification indicators separated. |
| Manage the session | Define overall expiry, inactivity, reauthentication for sensitive actions and logout invalidation. | Expired-session, logout and post-revocation access tests. |
| Report loss | Identify the affected authenticator, preserve useful evidence and decide invalidation based on suspected compromise. | Report timeline and observed access result after handling. |
| Recover | Follow a documented path, notify and prevent an old session from adding a new method without appropriate checks. | Successful recovery case and refused bypass case. |
| Leave the service | Remove obsolete authenticators and access; address relevant sessions, devices and sync authorisations too. | Revoked methods, removed access and remaining dependencies. |
WebAuthn: verify the response at the service
The server must correlate the challenge, authorised origin, RP ID hash and signature with the expected ceremony and check required flags. UP signals presence; UV signals user verification. BE and BS describe credential backup eligibility and state without independently certifying the sync system. Use a maintained library and the complete procedures in specification sections 7.1 and 7.2. WebAuthn Level 3 →
Include people who use a different journey
WCAG 2.2 criterion 3.3.8, level AA, addresses cognitive tests during authentication with specific exceptions and assistance mechanisms. Test password managers, paste, labels, keyboard, cancellation and fallback in practice. NIST requires a non-biometric alternative; making it usable is part of design. WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 →
Continue with identity governance →
Primary references and scope
Publication and consultation dates are distinct. Proposed tests and evidence are editorial; linked normative texts govern. Vendor documentation describes its own product and does not establish your application’s AAL.
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication · Publication :
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels · Publication :
§2.1–2.3 - NIST · Authenticators and password requirements · Publication :
§3.1.1; §3.2.3; §3.2.5 - NIST · Authenticator Event Management · Publication :
§4.1; §4.2; §4.6 - NIST · Session Management · Publication :
§5 - NIST · Syncable Authenticators · Publication :
Appendix B - W3C · WebAuthn Level 3 · Publication : · W3C Recommendation
§6.1; §7.1–7.2 - W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum) · Publication :
WCAG 2.2 · 3.3.8 · AA
フォーム:基準・エラー・コントラスト
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
Authenticate without avoidable cognitive effort
SC 3.3.8 addresses cognitive tests at each authentication step, with specific alternatives, assistance mechanisms and exceptions. Verify security and usability together.
- Try password managers and paste where relevant.
- Examine recovery mechanisms in the actual journey.
- Do not infer screen accessibility from the chosen authentication technology alone.
Open the WCAG review grid and contrast calculator →
W3C WAI · Understanding SC 3.3.8 · Accessible Authentication (Minimum) · Informative explanation · consulted 2026-10-23
公式参照文献
参照文献はメソッドを裏付けるものです。 チェックは状況に合わせて調整してください。 これらは認証ではありません。 元の参照文献のタイトルやソース文書は別の言語で書かれている場合があります。
参照資料の確認日 .
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 — phishing resistance and authenticator lifecycle
- CISA — Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals
- NIST SP 800-63B-4 · final publication
- NIST · Authentication Assurance Levels
- NIST · Authenticators and password requirements
- NIST · Authenticator Event Management
- NIST · Session Management
- NIST · Syncable Authenticators
- W3C · WebAuthn Level 3
- W3C · Accessible Authentication (Minimum)
- W3C · Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.2
- W3C WAI · Understanding SC 3.3.8 · Accessible Authentication (Minimum)
