资源 · 01
开源情报指南:生成可靠的决策情报
将分散的开源信息转化为可追溯、细致入微且可操作的简报的六步方法
已更新 · 30 min
本指南有助于实现的目标
- 停止无目的的收集
- 避免将重复与佐证混淆
- 明确不确定性
- 将建议与决策联系起来
快速检查
- 问题是否能用一句话概括?
- 是否明确了有效性截止日期?
- 两个信息源是否真正独立?
- 个人信息对于推理是否必要?
- 读者是否知道哪些因素会改变结论?
分步指南
- 1
构建决策框架
明确决策、决策者、截止日期以及可能出现的错误成本。 一个好的问题能够限定范围,而不会强加结论。
交付成果:一份一页纸的简报。
- 2
制定收集计划
将问题分解为子假设,并绘制可能证实、限定或反驳每个子假设的信息源。 定义终止条件。
交付成果:假设、信息源和状态表。
- 3
追溯来源
保留原始网址或参考文献、作者、发布日期、访问日期以及合法情况下的合规副本。
交付成果:来源日志。
- 4
评估时避免过度评分
分别评估来源的可靠性和信息的可信度。 可靠的来源可能存在利益冲突;不知名的来源也可能发布真实文件。
交付成果:置信度矩阵。
- 5
核实并质疑
寻找独立的来源,并积极尝试反驳主要假设。 同一份稿件的多次改写仍被视为同一来源。
交付成果:核实矩阵。
- 6
行动报告
先给出简短的答案,然后是决定性的事实、局限性、情景和下一步行动。 将收集细节放在附录中。
交付成果:决策简报和附录。
虚构示例
示例情境
管理团队必须决定有关合作伙伴的公开信号是否需要进行更深入的审查。 团队会将原始记录与转发和评论区分开来,记录每项信息的日期,并记录哪些信息仍然未知。
决策及预期证据
简报中应列出可能改变决策的两项事实、每项结论的置信度以及刷新搜索的日期。
管理指标
| 指标 | 衡量内容 | 首要行动 |
|---|---|---|
| 覆盖面 | 决策子问题至少包含一个相关来源 | 在添加类似来源之前,先找到尚未涵盖的角度 |
| 独立性 | 关键主张由不同的来源证实 | 将每次重复追溯到其原始来源 |
| 新鲜度 | 证据的时效性与主题变化速度的关系 | 为每个结论设定有效期 |
| 可追溯性 | 关键主张与可验证的参考文献相关联 | 在收集过程中添加引用 |
常见错误
- 在构建决策之前进行收集
- 引用聚合器而非原始来源
- 将缺乏证据转化为不存在的证据
- 隐藏矛盾以简化结论
常见问题解答
开源情报与网络搜索有何不同?
开源情报 (OSINT) 增加了明确的目标、收集方法、可追溯性、来源评估和报告机制,这些都与决策风险成比例。
多少个来源才足够?
没有统一的标准。 应寻求独立的来源,并确保对可能改变决策的信息进行充分的覆盖。
收集可以自动化吗?
可以,但仅限于发现、规范化和监控。 范围、合法性、来源身份、矛盾之处和结论仍需人工审核。
OSINT:来源、转载与佐证
OSINT:五份文档不等于五个源头
转载次数不能衡量独立性。应将每份文档追溯到原始观测或采集。本图为虚构练习:关系由题目给定,并非自动推断。
| 虚构文档 | 给定关系 | 审慎解读 |
|---|---|---|
| A · 第一台传感器 | 保留采集A供练习使用。 | 第一条来源链;传感器准确性需另行评估。 |
| B · 引用A的文章 | B引用A,没有新增采集。 | 增加了一次转载,而非一次独立观测。 |
| C · 引用B的讨论串 | C依赖B,进而依赖A。 | 第二次转载仍可追溯至A。 |
| D · 第二台传感器 | 虚构数据中D为另一次采集。 | 第二条来源链;用于佐证前应检查采集条件。 |
| E · 无参考信息的截图 | 给定数据未能确定其来源。 | 不能默认算作独立来源或虚假材料。 |
五份文档、两条已记录来源链(A和D)、一个未明来源(E)。这不是可信度评分,也不能证明两次观测支持同一主张。
得出结论前的四个问题
- 文档是否涉及同一主张、时期和对象?
- 采集是否独立,还是共享信息源、设备、错误或偏差?
- 哪些假设连接观测与结论?什么信息会推翻这些假设?
- 哪些副本、采集日期和准确链接能让他人复现比较?
ICD 203涉及来源质量、不确定性、信息与判断的区分及替代解释。这里借用其方法指引;本练习并非官方情报产品或认证。
ODNI · ICD 203, Analytic Standards · D.6.e(1)–(4) · 参考资料核查日期
STIX 指标与 TLP 共享
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
Qualify the source before using an indicator
Structured intelligence retains provenance and a version history. For an actionable OSINT note, separate collected facts, the producer’s assertion and the local conclusion, then state what still needs confirmation.
- Distinguish the declared object creator from the service relaying it.
- Compare versions, validity window and any revocation before reusing an old indicator.
- Present producer confidence as a contextual assessment, including its limits and available independent corroboration.
Read the STIX, observations and TLP sharing reference →
Sources checked on · OASIS · STIX 2.1
OSINT:证据保全
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
Connect source context, preserved bytes and each handling action
Usable OSINT work retains more than a link and a screenshot. It connects collected material to context, handling roles and transformations used during analysis. The dossier must distinguish observations, technical copies, redacted versions and analytical conclusions.
This editorial method adapts NIST preservation principles for organisational review of sources and files. NIST IR 8387 primarily addresses evidence-management professionals; SP 800-86 covers IT forensics within incident response. Fields and scenarios below are local examples, not a NIST form, certification or guarantee of admissibility.
Five questions the dossier must keep separate
| Question | Useful evidence | Limit to retain |
|---|---|---|
| Byte integrity | Compare a calculated digest with a protected reference for a specific object and scope. | A match identifies neither the author nor the first custodian. A reference rewritten alongside the file no longer protects that comparison. |
| Origin and context | Record the claimed source, collection method, useful identifiers and observation conditions. | A filename, title or domain visible in an image does not by itself establish provenance. |
| Custody continuity | Connect transfers, receipts, access and actions to identifiable roles and times. | An unchanged digest does not fill undocumented periods or transfers. |
| Transformation and lineage | Give an extract, transcription or redacted version a new identifier and retain its parent link. | A derivative can have a different digest without being a covert alteration of the preserved object. |
| Analytical interpretation | Cite material used, assumptions, alternatives and coverage limits. | Intact bytes may contain false, partial or out-of-context information. |
Ten proposed preservation-record fields
| Proposed field | Useful content | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| Identity and scope | Case, object, version, collection type and links to related material. | Identify a precise object without conflating a file, whole archive and extract. |
| Observed source | URL or system, publication identifier, provider and authorised access context. | Separate claimed source, direct observation and material copied by a third party. |
| Time and clock | Raw time, known timezone or offset, collection time and any normalization. | Retain clock uncertainty; do not invent ordering between poorly dated events. |
| Collection method | Tool, version, relevant parameters and responsible operator or role. | Make the procedure understandable; a logical export is not automatically a complete media image. |
| Reference digest | Algorithm, value, byte count and exact scope of hashed data. | Keep the reference protected against changes made alongside the object. |
| Location and access | Internal storage reference, access level, owner and useful history. | Check who can read, modify, replace or delete both material and its reference record. |
| Handover and receipt | Sender, recipient, time, object, purpose and acknowledgement. | A declared handover differs from confirmed receipt. |
| Copies and derivatives | Parent, new identifier, transformation, tool and digest for each result. | Preserve the reference object and state what was removed or transformed. |
| Preservation incidents | Digest mismatch, unexplained access, missing transfer and handling action. | Retain the observed discrepancy; never silently replace the reference to make the check pass. |
| Purpose and retention | Analysis purpose, intended recipients, retention policy and review point. | Adapt access and retention to the case; the example establishes no universal duration. |
Three objects, two binary contents in the exercise
All three objects are invented. Digests below are calculated over their exact UTF-8 strings, with LF after each line including the final line. E01 and E02 have identical content; D01 is documented new content.
| Object / parent | Scenario role | UTF-8 size and SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
| E01 | Fictional captured object; no parent within this dossier. | 72 bytes · SHA-256: 26b8f611a7e9a53474ffc21f3e7b7be89ca1bb8cf69f85f526171e9b91eee963 |
| E02 ← E01 | Exact copy of E01 for technical review. | 72 bytes · SHA-256: 26b8f611a7e9a53474ffc21f3e7b7be89ca1bb8cf69f85f526171e9b91eee963 |
| D01 ← E02 | Version of E02 with the textual source replaced by [redacted]. | 51 bytes · SHA-256: 98fd0d2daa0e77e87bfe1f497150a5c8cde80dc5d6b4a14489caacdc54f7f2cc |
Inspect the exact strings used to calculate the digests
| Object | JSON string representing the UTF-8 bytes |
|---|---|
| E01 | "CASE-TRAINING-07\nstatus=observed\nsource=https://public.example/report/7\n" |
| E02 | "CASE-TRAINING-07\nstatus=observed\nsource=https://public.example/report/7\n" |
| D01 | "CASE-TRAINING-07\nstatus=observed\nsource=[redacted]\n" |
SHA-256 covers text content only here: not the filename, path, permissions or filesystem timestamps. Matching digests therefore do not establish equal metadata, origin or creation time.
Seven records in a fictional chain of custody
All times in this scenario are UTC on 2026-10-22. Roles A–D are fictional. Timestamps express recorded exercise events; they are not qualified timestamp tokens or digital signatures.
| UTC time / object | Role and action | Recorded outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 10:00:00 · E01 | Collector A: record capture and context. | Initial digest and collection reference retained in the scenario. |
| 10:02:00 · E01 | Custodian B: confirm receipt into preservation storage. | Receipt and protected reference recorded; preservation separate from workspace. |
| 10:05:00 · E02 | Analyst C: create a working copy of E01. | Size and digest compared with E01; parent link retained. |
| 10:08:00 · E02 | Analyst C: declare handover for controlled review. | Handover recorded; receipt still pending at this instant. |
| 10:09:00 · E02 | Reviewer D: acknowledge receipt and check the copy. | Receipt linked to the preceding handover; content comparison recorded. |
| 10:15:00 · D01 | Analyst C: create a redacted derivative of E02. | New identifier, transformation and D01 digest recorded; E01 and E02 preserved. |
| 10:20:00 · D01 | Reviewer D: review the release scope. | Redaction review recorded; this example performs no actual publication. |
A log does not become tamper-proof because it contains digests. Storage, individual authentication, permissions and reference protection require separate checks. Report a gap explicitly; adding a plausible time afterwards does not repair it.
Eight situations requiring a bounded conclusion
01 · Identical copy, origin still uncorroborated
Fictional observation: E01 and E02 share size and SHA-256; the claimed source of E01 has not been corroborated.
Bounded conclusion: comparison is consistent with a byte-identical copy. It does not prove the claimed author or origin. Next evidence: collection context and independent corroboration.
02 · First digest calculated after a change
Fictional observation: the first available digest was calculated after an edit of unknown extent.
Bounded conclusion: the reference describes the version hashed at that time. It does not establish absence of changes before calculation. Retain this limit and seek a documented earlier copy.
03 · File and reference replaced together
Fictional observation: one account can replace both object and control reference without an independent trail.
Bounded conclusion: a check can become self-consistent after alteration. Preserve protected references and examine rights and logs; comparison alone is insufficient.
04 · Redacted derivative with a new digest
Fictional observation: D01 removes the textual source and has a different digest from E02. The transformation is documented.
Bounded conclusion: this derivative’s difference is expected and must remain visible. Check lineage, removed content and release suitability. A redacted label does not prove absence of residual data.
05 · Digest mismatch on a claimed exact copy
Fictional observation: a claimed exact copy does not match the expected reference digest.
Bounded conclusion: comparison fails for the hashed scope. Isolate the working copy, retain the observation and investigate cause; infer neither malicious intent nor permission to overwrite the reference.
06 · Declared handover without receipt
Fictional observation: a record declares handover at 10:08 but no confirmed receipt is available.
Bounded conclusion: handover is declared; receipt remains unestablished. An unchanged digest does not identify the custodian during the interval. Seek receipt records and disclose the gap.
07 · Unknown timezone in a timeline
Fictional observation: two logs show 10:05 and 10:07, but one clock’s timezone and offset are unknown.
Bounded conclusion: retain raw times and uncertainty; do not infer causality from apparent order. Any normalization must retain an explicit, revisable assumption.
08 · Screenshot with incomplete source coverage
Fictional observation: an intact screenshot shows neither the whole publication nor its display conditions.
Bounded conclusion: it retains an observed view, not necessarily the whole source. Record visible content, missing coverage and possible dynamic versions; distinguish capture fidelity from content truthfulness.
Six checks before handing over an assessment
- Each important assertion points to an identified object and its collection scope.
- Digests retain algorithm, exact byte scope and a protected reference.
- Working copies and derivatives retain parents, versions and transformations.
- Handover and receipt remain distinct; gaps and uncertain times stay visible.
- Release uses the intended versions and a review of removed or remaining information.
- The assessment separates observation, interpretation, assumption and unproven conclusion.
Field numbers, three objects and seven records are a local teaching construction. Document editions and scope are stated so they are not presented as a universal judicial procedure.
Primary sources and method adaptation
- NIST · Digital Evidence Preservation · NIST IR 8387 · September 2022
Preservation scope and publication record - NIST IR 8387 · Full report · September 2022 · reviewed 2026-10-22
§3.2 · printed pp. 7–11: custody, copies, storage and protection of reference hashes - NIST · SP 800-86 · August 2006 · IT forensics guidance
Scope: integration of forensic techniques into incident response - NIST SP 800-86 · Full report · August 2006 · reviewed 2026-10-22
§3.1 · printed pp. 3-2–3-5: acquire, verify and document custody - NIST · FIPS 180-4 · Secure Hash Standard · August 2015 · revision planning note dated 2023-03-07
Hash algorithms and message-change detection; a digest is not proof of origin
Sources reviewed on
PDF:内容删改与分发
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
Redact the assessment without replacing preserved sources
A shareable version and a working reference serve different purposes. Retain lineage and review visible information, hidden content and recipients of the derivative.
- Give the redacted copy an identifier and retain its parent link.
- Do not repeat removed values in a widely accessible ticket or screenshot.
- Test the delivered file, including its text layer and attachments.
See surfaces and the pre-sharing review matrix →
Sources reviewed on · Adobe · Redacting and sanitizing PDFs · Adobe · Redact sensitive content · Adobe · Sanitize PDFs · ICO · Avoid accidental breaches when redacting · ICO · Hidden information in documents · Microsoft · Document Inspector
时间线:UTC与时区
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
A displayed date cannot by itself order sources
Collection can encounter repeated local times or receive a publication late. Preserve original text, offset, zone and observation traceability before constructing an OSINT timeline.
- Seek clarification when one local time has two possible instants.
- Retain the time-zone rule version used for conversion.
- Separate computed temporal order, clock quality and causal interpretation.
Read the 12 cases and three dated snapshots →
Sources reviewed on · IETF · RFC 3339 · Python · PEP 495 · Python 3.12 · zoneinfo · IANA · Time Zone Database 2026e · IANA · 2026e Europe rules · OpenTelemetry · Logs Data Model
IANA 参考与 DNSSEC 解读
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
DNS evidence alone cannot attribute a website
An authenticated DNS response concerns zone data in a trust chain. It does not by itself identify the organisation deciding what content is published.
- Keep queried name, type, time, resolver and observed response.
- Separate RDAP registration data, hosting, DNS publication and editorial content.
- Reconcile independent evidence and preserve unresolved points.
Read the registries and try the cache model →
IETF · RFC 4033 · §3–5 · 2026-10-23
TLS 证书与开源情报
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
Certificate Transparency (CT) makes TLS certificates and precertificates observable in public logs. For OSINT and attack-surface research, this is documentary evidence to corroborate: a certificate trace does not establish a live service, current domain control or the identity of a publisher.
Documentary snapshot of Chrome’s list, version 96.3, generated on 7 November 2026 at 13:35:38 UTC and checked on 7 November 2026. Scope: log_list.json only, not every CT log in existence. States and interfaces describe this edition; this page performs no network checks of the logs.
Four different evidence objects
| Object | What it helps examine | What it does not establish alone |
|---|---|---|
| Certificate / precertificate | Declared names, issuer, public key and validity period; a precertificate is a distinct object. | Server deployment, present DNS resolution or the responsible party’s legal identity. |
| SCT · Signed Certificate Timestamp | A log’s signed commitment to incorporate an entry within its MMD. | Already demonstrated membership in a tree: a promise is not an inclusion proof. |
| STH + inclusion proof | Membership of a leaf in the root of a tree of a specified size, following cryptographic verification. | Consistency of every view of the log or current TLS validity of the certificate. |
| Consistency proof | A relationship between two states of the same tree: the later state extends the earlier one without changing old entries. | Worldwide absence of divergent views; observations also need comparison between observers. |
IETF · RFC 6962 · Certificate Transparency · June 2013 · Experimental · §§2.1, 3, 5.4, 7
Two interface families in the snapshot
The source’s “logs” entries correspond to RFC 6962; “tiled_logs” entries to static-ct-api. The latter separates submission and static-resource monitoring prefixes while producing SCTs according to RFC 6962. It is not another name for CT v2. RFC 9162 describes version 2.0 and obsoletes RFC 6962 as a document; that does not automatically turn deployed interfaces into v2.
C2SP · Static Certificate Transparency API · v1.1.0
IETF · RFC 9162 · Certificate Transparency Version 2.0 · December 2021 · Experimental · obsoletes RFC 6962
Read the fields without changing their meaning
| Source field | Correct reading | Analytical pitfall |
|---|---|---|
| log_id | SHA-256 of the DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo public key, encoded as base64. | A human-readable log name does not replace this cryptographic identifier. |
| state + timestamp | The distributor’s state for the log and the instant it entered that state. | That instant is not a certificate’s issuance date. |
| mmd | Declared maximum merge delay in seconds. | It is neither measured uptime nor certificate validity duration. |
| temporal_interval | Accepted NotAfter expiry dates: inclusive start, exclusive end. | It is not the log’s operational lifetime. |
| url / monitoring_url / submission_url | Log interface prefixes, retaining their respective roles. | A static monitoring prefix is not an RFC 6962 get-entries API. |
Google Chrome · Log list schema v3 · Schema v3 checked against signed snapshot 96.3 · 2026-11-07
Understand the four states present
| State at list time | Documentary interpretation |
|---|---|
| usable | Usable in Chrome’s described lifecycle; this label is not a health measurement performed by CIE. |
| qualified | Admitted following initial monitoring; recognition propagates through client releases. |
| readonly | The log stops issuing new SCTs; a final tree size and root are published in the source. |
| retired | The log is no longer relied on to create new SCTs. Analysis of old SCTs depends on their dates and the client’s policy, among other factors. |
Other states exist, including pending and rejected, but are absent from this snapshot. This table explains labels; it does not calculate a certificate’s compliance with a browser policy.
Google Chrome · CT Log Lifecycle · Consulted 2026-10-23
Explore the 89 logs in the dated list
Filters apply to the local snapshot only. All 89 rows remain available without JavaScript. Global counts retain the complete scope; filtered results have a separate counter. Prefixes are displayed as documentary data without automatic requests. The table has its own vertical and horizontal scrolling region, accessible by keyboard.
- 快照中的日志
- 89
- 运营者
- 11
- usable
- 43
- readonly
- 2
- qualified
- 41
- retired
- 3
- RFC 6962
- 26
- static-ct-api
- 63
显示日志数 : 89 / 89
没有匹配的日志。
| Log and LogID | Operator | State at list time | MMD (s) | Accepted NotAfter · UTC | Interface and prefixes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Google Argon2026h2技术详情LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: | |
Google Argon2027h1技术详情LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: | |
Google Xenon2026h2技术详情LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: | |
Google Xenon2027h1技术详情LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: | |
Google ParcelYard2026h2技术详情LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google ParcelYard2027h1技术详情LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google ParcelYard2027h2技术详情LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google PlumbersArms2026h2技术详情LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google PlumbersArms2027h1技术详情LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google PlumbersArms2027h2技术详情LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Cloudflare Nimbus2026技术详情LogID: | Cloudflare | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Cloudflare Nimbus2027技术详情LogID: | Cloudflare | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
DigiCert Wyvern2026h2技术详情LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
DigiCert Wyvern2027h1技术详情LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
DigiCert Wyvern2027h2技术详情LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
DigiCert Sphinx2026h2技术详情LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
DigiCert Sphinx2027h1技术详情LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
DigiCert Sphinx2027h2技术详情LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Mammoth2026h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | readonly | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Sabre2026h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | readonly | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Elephant2026h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Elephant2027h1技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Elephant2027h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Tiger2026h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Tiger2027h1技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Tiger2027h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Sectigo Monument2027h1技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Monument2027h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Monument2028h1技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Monument2028h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2027h1技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2027h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2028h1技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2028h2技术详情LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Oak2026h2技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | retired | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2026h2技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2027h1技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2027h2技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2026h2技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2027h1技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2027h2技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2028h1技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2028h2技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2028h1技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2028h2技术详情LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia log2026a技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
TrustAsia log2026b技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
TrustAsia HETU2027技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
TrustAsia Luoshu2027技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Luoshu2028h1技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Luoshu2028h2技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Taiji2028h1技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Taiji2028h2技术详情LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Bogus placeholder log to unbreak misbehaving CT libraries技术详情LogID: | Geomys | retired | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2026h2技术详情LogID: | Geomys | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2027h1技术详情LogID: | Geomys | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2027h2技术详情LogID: | Geomys | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2028h1技术详情LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2028h2技术详情LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2026h2技术详情LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2027h1技术详情LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2027h2技术详情LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2028h1技术详情LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2028h2技术详情LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Bogus RFC6962 log to avoid breaking misbehaving CT libraries技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | retired | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技术详情url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2026h2a技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2027h1技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2027h2技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2026h2技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2027h1技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2027h2技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2028h1技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2028h2技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2028h1技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2028h2技术详情LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2026h2技术详情LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2027h1技术详情LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2027h2技术详情LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2028h1技术详情LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2028h2技术详情LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2026h2技术详情LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2027h1技术详情LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2027h2技术详情LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2028h1技术详情LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2028h2技术详情LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2027h1技术详情LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2027h2技术详情LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2028h1技术详情LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2028h2技术详情LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技术详情submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Source provenance and file checks
Source-file checks: JSON schema v3 validated; detached signature verified with Google’s published RSA 4096-bit key, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 / SHA-256; all 89 LogIDs checked against SHA-256 of DER keys. These checks concern the downloaded list, not certificate or SCT signatures, inclusion proofs or current service state.
- Source JSON SHA-256
d950288c2750fb6f7725880e897a3eaf7b7c769cf822d5940c2b3b213e32a211- Public key PEM SHA-256
a284e4ad744211a6636a03c59aca9446ecd5ff2c14d7cb6edd69f7ba2108bf95
Investigation cases: turn a signal into a question
| Fictional observation | Check to prepare | Proportionate conclusion |
|---|---|---|
| A name appears in certificate SANs | Record exact name, issuer, serial number, dates and source. Separately check authorised, dated DNS and TLS observations. | “Name present in an observed certificate”, without claiming the server still exists. |
| The same certificate appears in multiple logs | Match the exact object by its fingerprint and distinguish logging occurrences. Separate final certificates, precertificates and renewals. | Multiple occurrences are not multiple services or multiple compromises. |
| A certificate contains *.example.org | Preserve the wildcard as such. Do not manufacture hostnames from that entry alone. | The pattern does not enumerate deployed subdomains. |
| A search returns no result | Document the tool, covered logs, query, time and possible collection delay. | No result within this scope, without claiming no certificate or asset exists. |
| An SCT is dated 12:00 UTC, with MMD = 60 s | The theoretical incorporation deadline is 12:01 UTC. Examine the promise using the appropriate log objects and proofs. | A missing search result at 12:00:30 does not demonstrate an MMD violation. |
Google Chrome · Certificate Transparency for Site Operators · Domain Privacy · consulted 2026-10-23
IETF · RFC 5280 · X.509 certificate profile · May 2008 · §§4.1.2.5, 4.2.1.6, 6
Make a trace usable in an intelligence note
- Define collection scope
Record domain or pattern, primary source or aggregator, UTC time and scope. A search source may have its own coverage and lag.
- Keep object and context
Distinguish certificate, precertificate, SCT and proof. Associate object fingerprint, LogID, leaf index or tree size where available, and consultation time.
- Corroborate across layers
Compare registration data, DNS, TLS and web content with their respective dates. Shared infrastructure can explain technical links without an organisational relationship.
- Express uncertainty
Separate observations, inferences and points still requiring confirmation. Assign an owner and next check to any hypothesis that influences a decision.
Data: Google Chrome, documentary investigation and audit use under its usage policy. The snapshot is not a trust store and is not used for CT enforcement in a TLS client. Analysis tables, prose and fictional examples are CIE editorial synthesis; linked documents retain their own terms.
Google Chrome · CT Log Lists and usage policy · Consulted 2026-11-07
RDAP:注册、角色与隐藏数据
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
RDAP: qualify the role before naming an actor
Registrar, registrant and technical contact answer different questions. A public registration response is dated and may contain unpublished data.
- Read declared roles instead of matching names alone.
- Separate registration, change, synchronisation and collection dates.
- Retain redactions and access limitations without inventing the missing identity.
Open the RDAP dossier and local reader →
IETF · RFC 9083 · RDAP JSON Responses · June 2021 · §§4–5, 9–10
引用链与社交监听
此语言版本的详细参考说明以英语提供。
Separate origin, repost and corroboration
A capture or provenance signature may document a record without proving its claim. Before citing multiple publications, check whether they reference the same document.
- Keep the consulted version and its exact reference.
- Name missing citations instead of assuming their contents.
- Treat distinct documents as records to compare, without assuming independence.
Read the method and explore citation chains →
Government Communications · RESIST 3 · RESIST 3 · 2025 · consulted 2026-10-23
Government Communications · RESIST 3 quick reference · RESIST 3 · 2025 · consulted 2026-10-23
官方参考文献
参考文献支持该方法。 请根据您的实际情况调整检查;它们并非认证。 原始参考文献标题和源文档可能使用其他语言。
参考资料查阅日期 .
- UC Berkeley / OHCHR — Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations
- OECD — Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
- ODNI · ICD 203, Analytic Standards
- NIST · Digital Evidence Preservation
- NIST IR 8387 · Full report
- NIST · SP 800-86
- NIST SP 800-86 · Full report
- NIST · FIPS 180-4 · Secure Hash Standard
- Adobe · Redacting and sanitizing PDFs
- Adobe · Redact sensitive content
- Adobe · Sanitize PDFs
- ICO · Avoid accidental breaches when redacting
- ICO · Hidden information in documents
- Microsoft · Document Inspector
- IETF · RFC 3339
- Python · PEP 495
- Python 3.12 · zoneinfo
- IANA · Time Zone Database 2026e
- IANA · 2026e Europe rules
- OpenTelemetry · Logs Data Model
- Government Communications · RESIST 3
- Government Communications · RESIST 3 quick reference
- IETF · RFC 9083 · RDAP JSON Responses
- IETF · RFC 9537 · Redacted Fields in RDAP
- IETF · RFC 6962 · Certificate Transparency
- IETF · RFC 9162 · Certificate Transparency Version 2.0
- Google Chrome · CT Log Lists and usage policy
- Google Chrome · Log list schema v3
- Google Chrome · CT Log Lifecycle
- C2SP · Static Certificate Transparency API
- Google Chrome · Certificate Transparency for Site Operators
- IETF · RFC 5280 · X.509 certificate profile
- IETF · RFC 4033 · DNSSEC introduction and requirements
- IETF · RFC 4035 · DNSSEC validation and caching
- OASIS · STIX 2.1
