リソース · 01
OSINTガイド:信頼性の高い意思決定情報を作成する
散在するオープンソースを追跡可能で、詳細かつ実行可能なブリーフィングに変換するための6ステップメソッド。
更新済み · 31 min
このガイドが達成するのに役立つこと
- 目的のない情報収集は中止する
- 繰り返しと裏付けを混同しない
- 不確実性を可視化する
- 推奨事項と意思決定を結びつける
クイックチェック
- 質問は1文に収まるか?
- 有効期限は明確に定義されているか?
- 2つの情報源は真に独立しているか?
- 個人情報は推論に必要か?
- 読者は結論を変える要因を知っているか?
手順
- 1
意思決定の枠組みを示す
意思決定、その担当者、期限、および誤りが発生した場合の想定コストを明記する。 明確な質問は、結論を押し付けることなく範囲を限定する。
成果物:1ページの概要
- 2
情報収集計画を作成する
質問を複数の副仮説に分解し、それぞれの副仮説を裏付け、限定し、または反証する可能性のある情報源をマッピングする。 停止条件を定義する。
成果物:仮説、情報源、およびステータス表
- 3
出所追跡
主要なURLまたは参照情報、著者、発行日、アクセス日、および法的に許容される範囲で準拠したコピーを保持する。
成果物:情報源ログ
- 4
過大評価を避けた評価
情報源の信頼性と情報の信憑性を別々に評価する。 有能な情報源は利害関係を持っている可能性があり、未知の情報源は信頼できる文書を公開している可能性がある。
成果物:信頼度グリッド
- 5
裏付けと反証
独立した情報源を探し、主要な仮説を積極的に反証する。 同一の文書が複数回書き換えられていても、情報源は同一である。
成果物:裏付けマトリックス
- 6
行動のための報告
簡潔な回答から始め、決定的な事実、制約、シナリオ、次の行動を述べる。 収集の詳細は付録に記載する。
成果物:決定概要と付録
架空の事例
具体的な状況
経営陣は、パートナーに関する公開シグナルが強化されたレビューを必要とするかどうかを決定しなければなりません。 チームは、元の記録を転載やコメントから分離し、各項目に日付を記入し、不明な点を記録します。
決定と期待される証拠
ブリーフィングでは、意思決定に影響を与える可能性のある2つの事実、各結論に対する信頼度、および検索を更新する日付を明記します。
管理指標
| 指標 | 測定対象 | 最初のアクション |
|---|---|---|
| 網羅性 | 少なくとも1つの関連情報源を持つ意思決定のサブ質問 | 類似の情報源を追加する前に、未解決の視点を見つける |
| 独立性 | 主要な主張は、明確な情報源によって裏付けられている | すべての繰り返しを一次情報源まで遡って追跡する |
| 鮮度 | 主題の変化の速さに照らした証拠の古さ | 各結論に有効期限を設ける |
| トレーサビリティ | 主要な主張は、検証可能な参照元と結びついている | 収集中に引用を追加する |
よくある間違い
- 意思決定を行う前に収集を行う
- 一次情報源ではなく、アグリゲーターを引用する
- 証拠の欠如を、存在しないことの証拠に変える
- 結論を単純化するために矛盾を隠す
よくある質問
OSINTはWeb検索とどう違うのか?
OSINTは、明確な目的、収集方法、トレーサビリティ、情報源の評価、および意思決定リスクに見合った報告を追加します。
情報源はいくつあれば十分ですか?
万能な数はありません。 独立した情報源を探し、意思決定に影響を与える可能性のある主張を十分に網羅する必要があります。
収集は自動化できますか?
発見、標準化、および監視については自動化できます。 範囲、合法性、情報源の特定、矛盾、および結論については、依然として明確な人間のレビューが必要です。
OSINT:出所、転載、裏付け
OSINT:文書が5件あっても出所は5つとは限らない
転載の数は独立性を示しません。各文書を観測や収集までたどります。この図は架空の演習であり、関係はあらかじめ与えられたもので、自動推定ではありません。
| 架空の文書 | 与えられた関係 | 慎重な読み方 |
|---|---|---|
| A · 最初のセンサー | 演習用に収集Aを保存。 | 最初の系列。センサーの精度は別途評価する。 |
| B · Aを引用する記事 | 新たな収集なしでAを引用。 | 転載の追加であり、独立した観測の追加ではない。 |
| C · Bを引用する投稿 | Bを介してAに依存。 | 2件目の転載も出所Aにさかのぼる。 |
| D · 別のセンサー | 架空データでは収集Dを別と設定。 | 2つ目の系列。裏付けに使う前に収集条件を調べる。 |
| E · 参照のない画像 | データ内で出所は確認できない。 | 独立とも偽物とも自動的には数えない。 |
文書5件、確認できる出所の系列2つ(AとD)、不明な出所1つ(E)。これは信頼性スコアでも、2つの観測が同じ主張を裏付ける証明でもありません。
結論の前に確かめる4つの問い
- 主張、期間、対象は同じか。
- 収集は別か。それとも情報源、機器、誤り、偏りを共有するか。
- 観測と結論をつなぐ仮定は何か。何があれば反証されるか。
- どの複製、収集日、正確なリンクがあれば他者も比較を再現できるか。
ICD 203は情報源の質、不確実性、情報と判断の区別、代替仮説を扱います。演習の方法上の参考であり、公式の情報分析成果物や認定を意味しません。
ODNI · ICD 203, Analytic Standards · D.6.e(1)–(4) · 参照確認日
STIX指標とTLPによる共有
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
Qualify the source before using an indicator
Structured intelligence retains provenance and a version history. For an actionable OSINT note, separate collected facts, the producer’s assertion and the local conclusion, then state what still needs confirmation.
- Distinguish the declared object creator from the service relaying it.
- Compare versions, validity window and any revocation before reusing an old indicator.
- Present producer confidence as a contextual assessment, including its limits and available independent corroboration.
Read the STIX, observations and TLP sharing reference →
Sources checked on · OASIS · STIX 2.1
OSINT:証拠の保全
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
Connect source context, preserved bytes and each handling action
Usable OSINT work retains more than a link and a screenshot. It connects collected material to context, handling roles and transformations used during analysis. The dossier must distinguish observations, technical copies, redacted versions and analytical conclusions.
This editorial method adapts NIST preservation principles for organisational review of sources and files. NIST IR 8387 primarily addresses evidence-management professionals; SP 800-86 covers IT forensics within incident response. Fields and scenarios below are local examples, not a NIST form, certification or guarantee of admissibility.
Five questions the dossier must keep separate
| Question | Useful evidence | Limit to retain |
|---|---|---|
| Byte integrity | Compare a calculated digest with a protected reference for a specific object and scope. | A match identifies neither the author nor the first custodian. A reference rewritten alongside the file no longer protects that comparison. |
| Origin and context | Record the claimed source, collection method, useful identifiers and observation conditions. | A filename, title or domain visible in an image does not by itself establish provenance. |
| Custody continuity | Connect transfers, receipts, access and actions to identifiable roles and times. | An unchanged digest does not fill undocumented periods or transfers. |
| Transformation and lineage | Give an extract, transcription or redacted version a new identifier and retain its parent link. | A derivative can have a different digest without being a covert alteration of the preserved object. |
| Analytical interpretation | Cite material used, assumptions, alternatives and coverage limits. | Intact bytes may contain false, partial or out-of-context information. |
Ten proposed preservation-record fields
| Proposed field | Useful content | Review check |
|---|---|---|
| Identity and scope | Case, object, version, collection type and links to related material. | Identify a precise object without conflating a file, whole archive and extract. |
| Observed source | URL or system, publication identifier, provider and authorised access context. | Separate claimed source, direct observation and material copied by a third party. |
| Time and clock | Raw time, known timezone or offset, collection time and any normalization. | Retain clock uncertainty; do not invent ordering between poorly dated events. |
| Collection method | Tool, version, relevant parameters and responsible operator or role. | Make the procedure understandable; a logical export is not automatically a complete media image. |
| Reference digest | Algorithm, value, byte count and exact scope of hashed data. | Keep the reference protected against changes made alongside the object. |
| Location and access | Internal storage reference, access level, owner and useful history. | Check who can read, modify, replace or delete both material and its reference record. |
| Handover and receipt | Sender, recipient, time, object, purpose and acknowledgement. | A declared handover differs from confirmed receipt. |
| Copies and derivatives | Parent, new identifier, transformation, tool and digest for each result. | Preserve the reference object and state what was removed or transformed. |
| Preservation incidents | Digest mismatch, unexplained access, missing transfer and handling action. | Retain the observed discrepancy; never silently replace the reference to make the check pass. |
| Purpose and retention | Analysis purpose, intended recipients, retention policy and review point. | Adapt access and retention to the case; the example establishes no universal duration. |
Three objects, two binary contents in the exercise
All three objects are invented. Digests below are calculated over their exact UTF-8 strings, with LF after each line including the final line. E01 and E02 have identical content; D01 is documented new content.
| Object / parent | Scenario role | UTF-8 size and SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
| E01 | Fictional captured object; no parent within this dossier. | 72 bytes · SHA-256: 26b8f611a7e9a53474ffc21f3e7b7be89ca1bb8cf69f85f526171e9b91eee963 |
| E02 ← E01 | Exact copy of E01 for technical review. | 72 bytes · SHA-256: 26b8f611a7e9a53474ffc21f3e7b7be89ca1bb8cf69f85f526171e9b91eee963 |
| D01 ← E02 | Version of E02 with the textual source replaced by [redacted]. | 51 bytes · SHA-256: 98fd0d2daa0e77e87bfe1f497150a5c8cde80dc5d6b4a14489caacdc54f7f2cc |
Inspect the exact strings used to calculate the digests
| Object | JSON string representing the UTF-8 bytes |
|---|---|
| E01 | "CASE-TRAINING-07\nstatus=observed\nsource=https://public.example/report/7\n" |
| E02 | "CASE-TRAINING-07\nstatus=observed\nsource=https://public.example/report/7\n" |
| D01 | "CASE-TRAINING-07\nstatus=observed\nsource=[redacted]\n" |
SHA-256 covers text content only here: not the filename, path, permissions or filesystem timestamps. Matching digests therefore do not establish equal metadata, origin or creation time.
Seven records in a fictional chain of custody
All times in this scenario are UTC on 2026-10-22. Roles A–D are fictional. Timestamps express recorded exercise events; they are not qualified timestamp tokens or digital signatures.
| UTC time / object | Role and action | Recorded outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 10:00:00 · E01 | Collector A: record capture and context. | Initial digest and collection reference retained in the scenario. |
| 10:02:00 · E01 | Custodian B: confirm receipt into preservation storage. | Receipt and protected reference recorded; preservation separate from workspace. |
| 10:05:00 · E02 | Analyst C: create a working copy of E01. | Size and digest compared with E01; parent link retained. |
| 10:08:00 · E02 | Analyst C: declare handover for controlled review. | Handover recorded; receipt still pending at this instant. |
| 10:09:00 · E02 | Reviewer D: acknowledge receipt and check the copy. | Receipt linked to the preceding handover; content comparison recorded. |
| 10:15:00 · D01 | Analyst C: create a redacted derivative of E02. | New identifier, transformation and D01 digest recorded; E01 and E02 preserved. |
| 10:20:00 · D01 | Reviewer D: review the release scope. | Redaction review recorded; this example performs no actual publication. |
A log does not become tamper-proof because it contains digests. Storage, individual authentication, permissions and reference protection require separate checks. Report a gap explicitly; adding a plausible time afterwards does not repair it.
Eight situations requiring a bounded conclusion
01 · Identical copy, origin still uncorroborated
Fictional observation: E01 and E02 share size and SHA-256; the claimed source of E01 has not been corroborated.
Bounded conclusion: comparison is consistent with a byte-identical copy. It does not prove the claimed author or origin. Next evidence: collection context and independent corroboration.
02 · First digest calculated after a change
Fictional observation: the first available digest was calculated after an edit of unknown extent.
Bounded conclusion: the reference describes the version hashed at that time. It does not establish absence of changes before calculation. Retain this limit and seek a documented earlier copy.
03 · File and reference replaced together
Fictional observation: one account can replace both object and control reference without an independent trail.
Bounded conclusion: a check can become self-consistent after alteration. Preserve protected references and examine rights and logs; comparison alone is insufficient.
04 · Redacted derivative with a new digest
Fictional observation: D01 removes the textual source and has a different digest from E02. The transformation is documented.
Bounded conclusion: this derivative’s difference is expected and must remain visible. Check lineage, removed content and release suitability. A redacted label does not prove absence of residual data.
05 · Digest mismatch on a claimed exact copy
Fictional observation: a claimed exact copy does not match the expected reference digest.
Bounded conclusion: comparison fails for the hashed scope. Isolate the working copy, retain the observation and investigate cause; infer neither malicious intent nor permission to overwrite the reference.
06 · Declared handover without receipt
Fictional observation: a record declares handover at 10:08 but no confirmed receipt is available.
Bounded conclusion: handover is declared; receipt remains unestablished. An unchanged digest does not identify the custodian during the interval. Seek receipt records and disclose the gap.
07 · Unknown timezone in a timeline
Fictional observation: two logs show 10:05 and 10:07, but one clock’s timezone and offset are unknown.
Bounded conclusion: retain raw times and uncertainty; do not infer causality from apparent order. Any normalization must retain an explicit, revisable assumption.
08 · Screenshot with incomplete source coverage
Fictional observation: an intact screenshot shows neither the whole publication nor its display conditions.
Bounded conclusion: it retains an observed view, not necessarily the whole source. Record visible content, missing coverage and possible dynamic versions; distinguish capture fidelity from content truthfulness.
Six checks before handing over an assessment
- Each important assertion points to an identified object and its collection scope.
- Digests retain algorithm, exact byte scope and a protected reference.
- Working copies and derivatives retain parents, versions and transformations.
- Handover and receipt remain distinct; gaps and uncertain times stay visible.
- Release uses the intended versions and a review of removed or remaining information.
- The assessment separates observation, interpretation, assumption and unproven conclusion.
Field numbers, three objects and seven records are a local teaching construction. Document editions and scope are stated so they are not presented as a universal judicial procedure.
Primary sources and method adaptation
- NIST · Digital Evidence Preservation · NIST IR 8387 · September 2022
Preservation scope and publication record - NIST IR 8387 · Full report · September 2022 · reviewed 2026-10-22
§3.2 · printed pp. 7–11: custody, copies, storage and protection of reference hashes - NIST · SP 800-86 · August 2006 · IT forensics guidance
Scope: integration of forensic techniques into incident response - NIST SP 800-86 · Full report · August 2006 · reviewed 2026-10-22
§3.1 · printed pp. 3-2–3-5: acquire, verify and document custody - NIST · FIPS 180-4 · Secure Hash Standard · August 2015 · revision planning note dated 2023-03-07
Hash algorithms and message-change detection; a digest is not proof of origin
Sources reviewed on
PDF:墨消しと共有
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
Redact the assessment without replacing preserved sources
A shareable version and a working reference serve different purposes. Retain lineage and review visible information, hidden content and recipients of the derivative.
- Give the redacted copy an identifier and retain its parent link.
- Do not repeat removed values in a widely accessible ticket or screenshot.
- Test the delivered file, including its text layer and attachments.
See surfaces and the pre-sharing review matrix →
Sources reviewed on · Adobe · Redacting and sanitizing PDFs · Adobe · Redact sensitive content · Adobe · Sanitize PDFs · ICO · Avoid accidental breaches when redacting · ICO · Hidden information in documents · Microsoft · Document Inspector
時系列:UTCとタイムゾーン
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
A displayed date cannot by itself order sources
Collection can encounter repeated local times or receive a publication late. Preserve original text, offset, zone and observation traceability before constructing an OSINT timeline.
- Seek clarification when one local time has two possible instants.
- Retain the time-zone rule version used for conversion.
- Separate computed temporal order, clock quality and causal interpretation.
Read the 12 cases and three dated snapshots →
Sources reviewed on · IETF · RFC 3339 · Python · PEP 495 · Python 3.12 · zoneinfo · IANA · Time Zone Database 2026e · IANA · 2026e Europe rules · OpenTelemetry · Logs Data Model
IANA参照とDNSSECの解釈
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
DNS evidence alone cannot attribute a website
An authenticated DNS response concerns zone data in a trust chain. It does not by itself identify the organisation deciding what content is published.
- Keep queried name, type, time, resolver and observed response.
- Separate RDAP registration data, hosting, DNS publication and editorial content.
- Reconcile independent evidence and preserve unresolved points.
Read the registries and try the cache model →
IETF · RFC 4033 · §3–5 · 2026-10-23
TLS証明書と公開情報調査
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
Certificate Transparency (CT) makes TLS certificates and precertificates observable in public logs. For OSINT and attack-surface research, this is documentary evidence to corroborate: a certificate trace does not establish a live service, current domain control or the identity of a publisher.
Documentary snapshot of Chrome’s list, version 96.3, generated on 7 November 2026 at 13:35:38 UTC and checked on 7 November 2026. Scope: log_list.json only, not every CT log in existence. States and interfaces describe this edition; this page performs no network checks of the logs.
Four different evidence objects
| Object | What it helps examine | What it does not establish alone |
|---|---|---|
| Certificate / precertificate | Declared names, issuer, public key and validity period; a precertificate is a distinct object. | Server deployment, present DNS resolution or the responsible party’s legal identity. |
| SCT · Signed Certificate Timestamp | A log’s signed commitment to incorporate an entry within its MMD. | Already demonstrated membership in a tree: a promise is not an inclusion proof. |
| STH + inclusion proof | Membership of a leaf in the root of a tree of a specified size, following cryptographic verification. | Consistency of every view of the log or current TLS validity of the certificate. |
| Consistency proof | A relationship between two states of the same tree: the later state extends the earlier one without changing old entries. | Worldwide absence of divergent views; observations also need comparison between observers. |
IETF · RFC 6962 · Certificate Transparency · June 2013 · Experimental · §§2.1, 3, 5.4, 7
Two interface families in the snapshot
The source’s “logs” entries correspond to RFC 6962; “tiled_logs” entries to static-ct-api. The latter separates submission and static-resource monitoring prefixes while producing SCTs according to RFC 6962. It is not another name for CT v2. RFC 9162 describes version 2.0 and obsoletes RFC 6962 as a document; that does not automatically turn deployed interfaces into v2.
C2SP · Static Certificate Transparency API · v1.1.0
IETF · RFC 9162 · Certificate Transparency Version 2.0 · December 2021 · Experimental · obsoletes RFC 6962
Read the fields without changing their meaning
| Source field | Correct reading | Analytical pitfall |
|---|---|---|
| log_id | SHA-256 of the DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo public key, encoded as base64. | A human-readable log name does not replace this cryptographic identifier. |
| state + timestamp | The distributor’s state for the log and the instant it entered that state. | That instant is not a certificate’s issuance date. |
| mmd | Declared maximum merge delay in seconds. | It is neither measured uptime nor certificate validity duration. |
| temporal_interval | Accepted NotAfter expiry dates: inclusive start, exclusive end. | It is not the log’s operational lifetime. |
| url / monitoring_url / submission_url | Log interface prefixes, retaining their respective roles. | A static monitoring prefix is not an RFC 6962 get-entries API. |
Google Chrome · Log list schema v3 · Schema v3 checked against signed snapshot 96.3 · 2026-11-07
Understand the four states present
| State at list time | Documentary interpretation |
|---|---|
| usable | Usable in Chrome’s described lifecycle; this label is not a health measurement performed by CIE. |
| qualified | Admitted following initial monitoring; recognition propagates through client releases. |
| readonly | The log stops issuing new SCTs; a final tree size and root are published in the source. |
| retired | The log is no longer relied on to create new SCTs. Analysis of old SCTs depends on their dates and the client’s policy, among other factors. |
Other states exist, including pending and rejected, but are absent from this snapshot. This table explains labels; it does not calculate a certificate’s compliance with a browser policy.
Google Chrome · CT Log Lifecycle · Consulted 2026-10-23
Explore the 89 logs in the dated list
Filters apply to the local snapshot only. All 89 rows remain available without JavaScript. Global counts retain the complete scope; filtered results have a separate counter. Prefixes are displayed as documentary data without automatic requests. The table has its own vertical and horizontal scrolling region, accessible by keyboard.
- スナップショット内のログ
- 89
- 運営者
- 11
- usable
- 43
- readonly
- 2
- qualified
- 41
- retired
- 3
- RFC 6962
- 26
- static-ct-api
- 63
表示ログ数 : 89 / 89
該当するログはありません。
| Log and LogID | Operator | State at list time | MMD (s) | Accepted NotAfter · UTC | Interface and prefixes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Google Argon2026h2技術情報LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: | |
Google Argon2027h1技術情報LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: | |
Google Xenon2026h2技術情報LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: | |
Google Xenon2027h1技術情報LogID: | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: | |
Google ParcelYard2026h2技術情報LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google ParcelYard2027h1技術情報LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google ParcelYard2027h2技術情報LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google PlumbersArms2026h2技術情報LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google PlumbersArms2027h1技術情報LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Google PlumbersArms2027h2技術情報LogID: | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: | |
Cloudflare Nimbus2026技術情報LogID: | Cloudflare | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Cloudflare Nimbus2027技術情報LogID: | Cloudflare | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
DigiCert Wyvern2026h2技術情報LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
DigiCert Wyvern2027h1技術情報LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
DigiCert Wyvern2027h2技術情報LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
DigiCert Sphinx2026h2技術情報LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
DigiCert Sphinx2027h1技術情報LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
DigiCert Sphinx2027h2技術情報LogID: | DigiCert | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Mammoth2026h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | readonly | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Sabre2026h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | readonly | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Elephant2026h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Elephant2027h1技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Elephant2027h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Tiger2026h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Tiger2027h1技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Tiger2027h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Sectigo Monument2027h1技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Monument2027h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Monument2028h1技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Monument2028h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2027h1技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2027h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2028h1技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Sectigo Statue2028h2技術情報LogID: | Sectigo | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Oak2026h2技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | retired | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2026h2技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2027h1技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2027h2技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2026h2技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2027h1技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2027h2技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2028h1技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Sycamore2028h2技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2028h1技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Let's Encrypt Willow2028h2技術情報LogID: | Let's Encrypt | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia log2026a技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
TrustAsia log2026b技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
TrustAsia HETU2027技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
TrustAsia Luoshu2027技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Luoshu2028h1技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Luoshu2028h2技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Taiji2028h1技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
TrustAsia Taiji2028h2技術情報LogID: | TrustAsia | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Bogus placeholder log to unbreak misbehaving CT libraries技術情報LogID: | Geomys | retired | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2026h2技術情報LogID: | Geomys | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2027h1技術情報LogID: | Geomys | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2027h2技術情報LogID: | Geomys | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2028h1技術情報LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Tuscolo2028h2技術情報LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2026h2技術情報LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2027h1技術情報LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2027h2技術情報LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2028h1技術情報LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Geomys Trastevere2028h2技術情報LogID: | Geomys | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Bogus RFC6962 log to avoid breaking misbehaving CT libraries技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | retired | 86400 |
| RFC 6962技術情報url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2026h2a技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2027h1技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2027h2技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2026h2技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2027h1技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2027h2技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | usable | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2028h1技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Gouda2028h2技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2028h1技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
IPng Networks Halloumi2028h2技術情報LogID: | IPng Networks | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2026h2技術情報LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2027h1技術情報LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2027h2技術情報LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2028h1技術情報LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Microsec Eszigno2028h2技術情報LogID: | Microsec | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2026h2技術情報LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2027h1技術情報LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2027h2技術情報LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2028h1技術情報LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
GoDaddy Aquamarine2028h2技術情報LogID: | GoDaddy | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2027h1技術情報LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2027h2技術情報LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2028h1技術情報LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
HARICA Selene2028h2技術情報LogID: | HARICA | qualified | 60 |
| static-ct-api技術情報submission_url: monitoring_url: |
Source provenance and file checks
Source-file checks: JSON schema v3 validated; detached signature verified with Google’s published RSA 4096-bit key, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 / SHA-256; all 89 LogIDs checked against SHA-256 of DER keys. These checks concern the downloaded list, not certificate or SCT signatures, inclusion proofs or current service state.
- Source JSON SHA-256
d950288c2750fb6f7725880e897a3eaf7b7c769cf822d5940c2b3b213e32a211- Public key PEM SHA-256
a284e4ad744211a6636a03c59aca9446ecd5ff2c14d7cb6edd69f7ba2108bf95
Investigation cases: turn a signal into a question
| Fictional observation | Check to prepare | Proportionate conclusion |
|---|---|---|
| A name appears in certificate SANs | Record exact name, issuer, serial number, dates and source. Separately check authorised, dated DNS and TLS observations. | “Name present in an observed certificate”, without claiming the server still exists. |
| The same certificate appears in multiple logs | Match the exact object by its fingerprint and distinguish logging occurrences. Separate final certificates, precertificates and renewals. | Multiple occurrences are not multiple services or multiple compromises. |
| A certificate contains *.example.org | Preserve the wildcard as such. Do not manufacture hostnames from that entry alone. | The pattern does not enumerate deployed subdomains. |
| A search returns no result | Document the tool, covered logs, query, time and possible collection delay. | No result within this scope, without claiming no certificate or asset exists. |
| An SCT is dated 12:00 UTC, with MMD = 60 s | The theoretical incorporation deadline is 12:01 UTC. Examine the promise using the appropriate log objects and proofs. | A missing search result at 12:00:30 does not demonstrate an MMD violation. |
Google Chrome · Certificate Transparency for Site Operators · Domain Privacy · consulted 2026-10-23
IETF · RFC 5280 · X.509 certificate profile · May 2008 · §§4.1.2.5, 4.2.1.6, 6
Make a trace usable in an intelligence note
- Define collection scope
Record domain or pattern, primary source or aggregator, UTC time and scope. A search source may have its own coverage and lag.
- Keep object and context
Distinguish certificate, precertificate, SCT and proof. Associate object fingerprint, LogID, leaf index or tree size where available, and consultation time.
- Corroborate across layers
Compare registration data, DNS, TLS and web content with their respective dates. Shared infrastructure can explain technical links without an organisational relationship.
- Express uncertainty
Separate observations, inferences and points still requiring confirmation. Assign an owner and next check to any hypothesis that influences a decision.
Data: Google Chrome, documentary investigation and audit use under its usage policy. The snapshot is not a trust store and is not used for CT enforcement in a TLS client. Analysis tables, prose and fictional examples are CIE editorial synthesis; linked documents retain their own terms.
Google Chrome · CT Log Lists and usage policy · Consulted 2026-11-07
RDAP:登録情報・役割・非公開データ
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
RDAP: qualify the role before naming an actor
Registrar, registrant and technical contact answer different questions. A public registration response is dated and may contain unpublished data.
- Read declared roles instead of matching names alone.
- Separate registration, change, synchronisation and collection dates.
- Retain redactions and access limitations without inventing the missing identity.
Open the RDAP dossier and local reader →
IETF · RFC 9083 · RDAP JSON Responses · June 2021 · §§4–5, 9–10
引用の連鎖とソーシャルリスニング
この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。
Separate origin, repost and corroboration
A capture or provenance signature may document a record without proving its claim. Before citing multiple publications, check whether they reference the same document.
- Keep the consulted version and its exact reference.
- Name missing citations instead of assuming their contents.
- Treat distinct documents as records to compare, without assuming independence.
Read the method and explore citation chains →
Government Communications · RESIST 3 · RESIST 3 · 2025 · consulted 2026-10-23
Government Communications · RESIST 3 quick reference · RESIST 3 · 2025 · consulted 2026-10-23
公式参照文献
参照文献はメソッドを裏付けるものです。 チェックは状況に合わせて調整してください。 これらは認証ではありません。 元の参照文献のタイトルやソース文書は別の言語で書かれている場合があります。
参照資料の確認日 .
- UC Berkeley / OHCHR — Berkeley Protocol on Digital Open Source Investigations
- OECD — Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Business Conduct
- ODNI · ICD 203, Analytic Standards
- NIST · Digital Evidence Preservation
- NIST IR 8387 · Full report
- NIST · SP 800-86
- NIST SP 800-86 · Full report
- NIST · FIPS 180-4 · Secure Hash Standard
- Adobe · Redacting and sanitizing PDFs
- Adobe · Redact sensitive content
- Adobe · Sanitize PDFs
- ICO · Avoid accidental breaches when redacting
- ICO · Hidden information in documents
- Microsoft · Document Inspector
- IETF · RFC 3339
- Python · PEP 495
- Python 3.12 · zoneinfo
- IANA · Time Zone Database 2026e
- IANA · 2026e Europe rules
- OpenTelemetry · Logs Data Model
- Government Communications · RESIST 3
- Government Communications · RESIST 3 quick reference
- IETF · RFC 9083 · RDAP JSON Responses
- IETF · RFC 9537 · Redacted Fields in RDAP
- IETF · RFC 6962 · Certificate Transparency
- IETF · RFC 9162 · Certificate Transparency Version 2.0
- Google Chrome · CT Log Lists and usage policy
- Google Chrome · Log list schema v3
- Google Chrome · CT Log Lifecycle
- C2SP · Static Certificate Transparency API
- Google Chrome · Certificate Transparency for Site Operators
- IETF · RFC 5280 · X.509 certificate profile
- IETF · RFC 4033 · DNSSEC introduction and requirements
- IETF · RFC 4035 · DNSSEC validation and caching
- OASIS · STIX 2.1
