Resources · 29
Make security event logs ready for detection
Choose events, protect records, correlate systems and rehearse the response.
· 15 min
What this guide helps achieve
- Define events
- Protect records
- Correlate signals
- Test detection
Quick check
- Which systems support critical journeys?
- Can clocks and identifiers reconstruct a timeline?
- Who can read or alter records?
- What scenario triggers an alert?
- Does someone know what to do next?
Step-by-step method
- 01
Choose sources
Start from services and threat scenarios: sign-in, privilege change, data access, API, network and infrastructure. Define required events and their owners.
Deliverable: source-level logging policy.
- 02
Normalize context
Specify clocks, time zones, request identifiers, actor, outcome and originating system. Keep unnecessary secrets and personal data out of messages.
Deliverable: event schema and minimization rules.
- 03
Centralize and protect
Test transfer, availability, permissions, retention and tamper detection. A compromised system should not silently erase the only useful evidence.
Deliverable: transfer and integrity check.
- 04
Correlate a scenario
Rehearse a suspicious sign-in followed by an API call or sensitive change. Verify that events align by time and identifier.
Deliverable: reconstructed timeline and gap list.
- 05
Tune detection
Write a rule with condition, threshold, exceptions, owner and priority. Measure false positives and missed events using authorized scenarios.
Deliverable: tested rule and validation cases.
- 06
Rehearse response
Route an alert to the responsible person, open an investigation, preserve evidence and verify closure. Improve schema or rule after the exercise.
Deliverable: dated exercise and follow-up actions.
Understand · try · decide
From a received log to a verified response
A recorded event is not yet a handled alert. Separate production, collection, correlation, alerting and acknowledgement. Arrival delay and clock quality affect what an analyst can reconstruct; volume alone does not establish detection capability.
Retain event time separately from receipt time. Specify source, type, outcome and useful correlation identifier. Comparing two clocks requires known synchronisation: a negative or inconsistent delay calls for a check rather than silently correcting the timeline.
Security data should remain proportionate to its purpose. Avoid copying passwords, access tokens, keys and complete request bodies into logs. Test log access, integrity and collector failure too. The scenario should reach an accountable person and a recorded decision.
Reference points and evidence to retain
| Reference point | What you can conclude | Evidence to retain |
|---|---|---|
| Event | An action and its outcome are observed; an isolated anomaly does not establish an incident. | Source, time, type, outcome and minimal context. |
| Collection | The log has arrived; late arrival can affect real-time correlation. | Receipt time, clocks, losses and delays. |
| Detection | A rule connects events through an explicit scenario. | Rule version, identifiers, window and test evidence. |
| Response | A person qualifies the alert and acts or dismisses it with reasons. | Owner, acknowledgement times and decision. |
From observation to decision
- Produce and protect
- Receive and check
- Correlate and alert
- Qualify and respond
One timeline, two reading orders
Fictional exercise on 15 October 2026, in UTC. Source and collector clocks are assumed synchronised. Rows follow event time; A1 and A2 concern fictional account U-17, while A3 is an unrelated session.
- Event sequence
- 35 s09:00:00 to 09:00:35 for fictional account U-17.
- Maximum delay
- 120 sE2 received at 09:02:20 for an event at 09:00:20.
- Acknowledgement
- 30 sAlert at 09:02:25, analyst at 09:02:55 in this exercise.
| Event / interaction | Event time UTC | Receipt UTC | Delay |
|---|---|---|---|
| E1 — Failed sign-in / A1 / U-17 | 2026-10-15 09:00:00Z | 2026-10-15 09:00:02Z | 2 s |
| E2 — Failed sign-in / A2 / U-17 | 2026-10-15 09:00:20Z | 2026-10-15 09:02:20Z | 120 s |
| E3 — Successful sign-in / A2 / U-17 | 2026-10-15 09:00:35Z | 2026-10-15 09:00:36Z | 1 s |
| E4 — Session end / A3 / U-42 | 2026-10-15 09:00:40Z | 2026-10-15 09:00:41Z | 1 s |
Receipt order: E1, E3, E4, E2. A 60-second window based only on arrival can miss E1–E2–E3; test the lateness policy rather than presume its behaviour.
| Stage | Interval | Duration | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Late E2 log arrival | 09:00:20 → 09:02:20 | 120 s | Collection delay under the synchronised-clock assumption. |
| Sequence end → alert | 09:00:35 → 09:02:25 | 110 s | Includes waiting for the late log and processing, rather than only the rule engine. |
| Alert → acknowledgement | 09:02:25 → 09:02:55 | 30 s | Acknowledgement time, not resolution time. |
| First event → acknowledgement | 09:00:00 → 09:02:55 | 175 s | End-to-end delay for this exercise, not a production average. |
The rule is assumed to accept the late log and emit an alert at 09:02:25. These times describe a fictional result to reproduce rather than impose a universal deadline.
Common scale from 0 to 150 seconds after 09:00:00 UTC. Light circle: event; gold square: receipt; segment: delay. The table contains the same values.
- E10 s → 2 s (+2 s)
- E220 s → 140 s (+120 s)
- E335 s → 36 s (+1 s)
- E440 s → 41 s (+1 s)
Does a correlation identifier join every sign-in for one account?
No. A1 and A2 are separate interactions for the same fictional account. An account-level rule needs the appropriate identity; an interaction identifier joins events within that interaction.
Do 175 seconds establish resolution time?
No. In this exercise they span first event to acknowledgement. Qualification, containment and resolution are later stages to measure separately.
Checks before concluding
- Replay E1–E2–E3 with E2 late, missing and duplicated; retain each variant’s result.
- Test clock disagreement without changing original logs.
- Check for the absence of secrets and limit the view to useful fields.
- Connect the alert to a person and then a qualification; measure each delay with its endpoints.
Decision: accept the scenario when collection, correlation and acknowledgement have been observed, then document tolerated delays, missing events, owner and limits.
Change an assumption
A received event does not prove an actionable alert
In this fictional exercise, a test login attempt must produce an alert and a response. Every time uses the same reference clock.
- Event
Action at 10:00:00; original timestamp retained.
- Receipt
Log received at 10:00:40: a 40-second collection delay.
- Response
Check alert triggering, recipient and acknowledgement separately.
Reading exercise: the variations describe fictional situations.
What if the dashboard shows only receipt time?
- New evidence
- The delay between action and collection becomes invisible.
- What changes
- Retain both timestamps and clock synchronisation information. An event received at 10:00:40 did not necessarily occur at that time.
What if the rule works but nobody responds?
- New evidence
- The alert appears without an acknowledgement in the tested scenario.
- What changes
- The test demonstrates detection, not operational response. Exercise routing, backup coverage and escalation before calling the complete chain verified.
Management indicators
| Indicator | What it measures | First action |
|---|---|---|
| Coverage | Critical sources with expected events | Add missing sources |
| Delay | Time from action to searchable record | Repair transfer |
| Correlation | Scenarios reconstructed end to end | Add context or identifiers |
| Response | Tested alerts with owner and action | Fix rule or on-call path |
Common pitfalls
- Collecting everything without prioritizing scenarios
- Logging secrets or sensitive data in clear text
- Centralizing without integrity and permission checks
- Adding alerts without a handling procedure
Frequently asked questions
Do more logs always mean better detection?
No. Quality, context and response capacity matter alongside volume.
Why synchronize clocks?
An inconsistent timeline makes correlation and incident decisions less reliable.
When is a rule ready?
When an authorized scenario yields the expected signal and the owner can triage it.
References: data, uses and limitations
Documentation reviewed on .
| Source and purpose | Verified data or benchmark | How to use it | Limitation to retain |
|---|---|---|---|
| OASIS · STIX 2.1 Describe threat intelligence through structured objects and relationships. |
STIX 2.1 is an OASIS Standard dated 10 June 2021. It defines objects, properties and JSON serialisation. | Keep identifiers, dates, provenance and relationships. Check that the recipient interprets the same object type and validity period. | A syntactically valid object can still be stale, misattributed or weakly supported. |
| MITRE ATT&CK Connect observations with adversary tactics and techniques. |
ATT&CK is a knowledge base grounded in observations. Its domains include Enterprise, Mobile and ICS. | Connect a technique with a trace and detection hypothesis. Distinguish having a log source from actually testing detection. | A shared technique cannot establish actor attribution. Technique coverage counts do not fully measure security. |
STIX indicators and TLP sharing
Cyber threat intelligence: from an indicator to a defensible detection
A threat intelligence feed may deliver a domain, a detection pattern and a confidence assessment. A SOC still needs its provenance, useful time window, telemetry capable of recognising it and a retirement procedure. This reference helps prepare that decision and explain its limits to the recipient.
The properties and objects described here refer to the OASIS STIX 2.1 Standard dated 10 June 2021. Deployment checks, review deadlines and case decisions are local editorial proposals. This page is neither a STIX validator, a blocking rule nor an assessment of a real feed.
Version note: at review time the OASIS latest-stage URL points to a document dated 2 April 2025 titled STIX 2.1 Errata 01, incorporating Draft 01. Its draft errata status is retained in the citation; it is not presented as a newly approved final version. Agree marking encodings with the recipient and check the edition actually used.
Four steps: preserve source and version; qualify validity and context; test detection against logs; review and propagate retirement. TLP scope is checked at every disclosure, independently of confidence.
12 reading checks before importing an indicator
| STIX 2.1 property | What it tells you | Operational check to record |
|---|---|---|
| id / modified | A versioned object retains its id; modified identifies its version. | Compare received versions before overwriting local state. A later delivery can contain an older version. |
| created_by_ref | Optional reference to the creator’s Identity; when absent, this property leaves the source undefined. | Also preserve collection provenance. A TAXII relay is not necessarily the intelligence creator. |
| created / modified | Object creation and version modification times; modified is at least equal to created. | Do not treat them as first and last observed activity times. |
| pattern / pattern_type | Both the pattern and its language are required; a STIX pattern describes a condition to recognise. | Check language, version, parser and available telemetry fields before translating it into a SIEM rule. |
| valid_from | Required start of the Indicator’s validity window. | A future start calls for holding or review; it does not establish current activity. |
| valid_until | Optional end, strictly later than valid_from when present. At this time the indicator should no longer be considered valid. | Without an end the standard sets no upper time bound. Still assign a local review date without inventing a producer expiry. |
| revoked | Permanent withdrawal by the creator. No future version of the same id may be created after revocation. | Propagate withdrawal to derived uses and preserve the record. Expiry or a local false positive does not automatically mean revoked=true. |
| confidence | Optional integer from 0 to 100 expressing the creator’s confidence in data correctness; absence means unspecified. | Preserve the producer’s method. Do not turn 60 into a 60% probability of compromise, or absence into zero. |
| external_references | Links, descriptions or identifiers referring to external information. | Check origin and access to cited evidence. Multiple copies of one report are not independent sources. |
| object_marking_refs | References to marking-definition objects applying to the object. | Resolve references and preserve restrictions in copies, tickets and summaries. |
| granular_markings | Markings or languages applying to specific parts of an object. | Check the relevant fields before quoting an excerpt; a title’s marking does not establish the pattern’s marking. |
| description / indicator_types | Narrative context and categories help interpretation; these properties are optional. | Explain the behaviour sought, prerequisites, possible legitimate uses and person responsible for review. |
Four objects answering four different questions
| Object | Question it answers | Analytical limit |
|---|---|---|
| Indicator | What pattern could recognise suspicious activity? | A usable pattern is not evidence that the activity occurred in your environment. |
| Observed Data | What data was observed, and during which window? | Observed facts alone do not establish attribution or malicious intent. |
| Sighting | Which intelligence entity does the reporter believe they saw? | The assertion may reference Observed Data. Sighting count and number_observed measure different things. |
| Relationship | What link is asserted between two objects? | An indicates or based-on link has a specific meaning. A dense graph does not prove attribution. |
Read a fictional object without turning it into an alert
A standalone training example written for this page; no real threat intelligence. RFC 2606 reserves .example for documentation. Dates and confidence 60 are fictional. Creator and marking are deliberately absent: this establishes neither a verified source nor permission to publish. This is neither a complete bundle nor an OASIS-tool compliance validation.
{
"type": "indicator",
"spec_version": "2.1",
"id": "indicator--643d2844-11ca-4f63-8d5d-e5d938db1854",
"created": "2026-10-22T09:00:00.000Z",
"modified": "2026-10-22T09:00:00.000Z",
"lang": "en",
"name": "Fictional training indicator",
"description": "Documentation only. Never deploy this example as a detection or blocking rule.",
"pattern": "[domain-name:value = 'training-beacon.example']",
"pattern_type": "stix",
"pattern_version": "2.1",
"valid_from": "2026-10-22T09:00:00Z",
"valid_until": "2026-10-23T09:00:00Z",
"confidence": 60
}At 10:00 UTC on 22 October 2026, the time falls inside the stated window. This establishes neither a log match nor maliciousness. Deriving a detection would still require the producer, context, restrictions, telemetry, exceptions and retirement owner.
Eight fictional qualification and sharing cases
Each case isolates one difficulty. Suggested decisions belong to a local working method, rather than automatic verdicts from STIX syntax alone. The filter only hides examples already in the page; it sends no data.
Validity starts tomorrow
The pattern arrives today; valid_from is tomorrow.
Retain the object for review and schedule assessment at the appropriate time; receipt alone does not justify immediate blocking.
Keep receipt time, evaluation time and object version. Historical investigation has a different purpose.
Validity end reached
At 09:00 UTC, valid_until is reached; a derived rule remains active.
Remove the object from active candidates or trigger the planned retirement process, then check derived rules.
Retain history and the withdrawal rationale. The deadline does not prove past events were benign.
Revocation received after import
A new version of the same id contains revoked=true.
Propagate withdrawal to dependent uses and verify each consumer’s state.
Keep the received version and propagation record; do not reactivate the object from an older copy.
Confidence unspecified
The feed provides no confidence; an interface proposes displaying 0.
Display unspecified, request provenance and describe available corroboration.
An internal scoring convention may exist, but must be named and kept separate from the producer’s value.
Shared domain and DNS log
A cited domain appears in a DNS log; it also hosts legitimate uses.
Inspect the exact name, time, host and related events; prepare a focused search before broad action.
DNS resolution demonstrates neither download, execution nor compromise. Plan exceptions and rollback.
Sighting count=0
A producer publishes a Sighting with count=0.
Read this as a non-observation statement in its context, then ask about window and coverage.
Zero does not measure worldwide absence of the threat. It does not replace checks of your own sensors.
Client and AMBER+STRICT
A recipient wants to forward a TLP:AMBER+STRICT note to a client.
The restriction limits sharing to the organisation on a need-to-know basis; obtain explicit source permission to widen it.
Do not mistakenly apply the client-sharing scope associated with AMBER without STRICT.
GREEN message to a public channel
A TLP:GREEN note is proposed for a public article.
Keep the note inside the permitted community; ask the source for permission to share more widely.
A publicly accessible web page exceeds GREEN’s scope. Source attribution does not lift the restriction.
TLP 2.0: recipients, need to know and restrictions
FIRST defines four labels; AMBER+STRICT restricts AMBER rather than adding a fifth colour. Labels remain unchanged across languages. This matrix summarises TLP scope and does not replace additional source restrictions or applicable document rules.
| Marking | Sharing scope | Check |
|---|---|---|
| TLP:RED | Individual recipients only; no further disclosure. | A colleague’s membership of the same organisation does not authorise forwarding. |
| TLP:AMBER | Organisation and clients on a need-to-know basis to protect them and prevent further harm. | Check that the recipient needs the information and no additional restriction narrows this scope. |
| TLP:AMBER+STRICT | Organisation only, on a need-to-know basis. | Clients are not included by default under this restriction. |
| TLP:GREEN | The relevant community; no publicly accessible channels. | When the community is undefined, FIRST assumes the cybersecurity/defence community. |
| TLP:CLEAR | No TLP disclosure limit, subject in particular to copyright rules. | Preserve origin, separate restrictions and applicable public-release procedures. |
TLP describes a sharing scope; it certifies neither accuracy, official classification nor a usage licence. Encryption and retention rules need separate definition. Obtain explicit source permission before widening the received scope.
Interoperability check: predefined TLP markings in the 2021 STIX 2.1 edition include TLP:WHITE. FIRST’s TLP 2.0 vocabulary uses TLP:CLEAR and specifies AMBER+STRICT. Do not invent a tlp=clear encoding or silently rename historical markings: document the version and exchange profile actually supported by the tools.
Six elements to hand over with the decision
- Object identifier and version, declared producer and collection provenance.
- UTC timestamps: receipt, validity window and a clearly separate local review date.
- Detection hypothesis, required logs, fields used and known sensor coverage.
- Search results and limits: absence, match, ambiguity or a justified false positive.
- Recipients, markings, additional restrictions and permission to widen scope where applicable.
- Owner, derived rule or ticket, decision, planned retirement and propagation verification.
References and verification scope
- OASIS · STIX 2.1 · OASIS Standard · 2021-06-10
§3.2, §3.6, §4.7, §4.14, §5.2, §7.2 - OASIS · STIX 2.1 Errata 01 · Draft 01 · 2025-04-02 · OASIS Standard incorporating Draft 01 of Errata 01
Status / Citation format · draft status identified separately - FIRST · Traffic Light Protocol 2.0 · TLP 2.0 · 2022-08
§1, §2, §3 · TLP:AMBER+STRICT - IETF · RFC 2606 · BCP 32 · 1999-06
§2 · .example reserved for documentation
Sources checked on
Syslog codes and collection evidence
Syslog priority combines a message family (facility) and a declared severity. It helps interpret a log stream but measures neither attack likelihood nor business incident urgency. Check what the sender encodes and what the collector preserves.
32 official values: 24 facilities and 8 severities. IANA registry updated 26 April 2016, consulted 23 October 2026. Cases and acceptance questions below are original CIE editorial examples.
IANA · syslog Parameters · Registry updated 2016-04-26 · consulted 2026-10-23
How do you calculate and decode syslog priority?
PRI = facility × 8 + severity. Reverse it with facility = integer quotient of PRI / 8 and severity = remainder of PRI / 8. The 192 combinations span 0–191. The field uses angle brackets and no leading zero except <0>. Example: 20 × 8 + 5 = 165, written <165>.
PRI is not a global danger ranking: <184> combines local7 and Emergency while <7> combines kernel and Debug. Interpret severity in the source context. A declared value or hostname does not authenticate a message.
IETF · R. Gerhards · RFC 5424 · The Syslog Protocol · March 2009 · §6.2.1 PRI · §6 format · §8 security
Calculate PRI
Choose two codes or enter only a PRI integer, with or without angle brackets. Accepted examples: 0, 165, <165>, <191>. Spaces, signs, decimals, leading zeros and complete messages are rejected. Calculation stays on this page; it does not connect to your equipment.
Enter an integer 0–191, optionally in angle brackets, without spaces or leading zeros.
Official facility and severity tables
The registry’s English labels are preserved. A local0–local7 code does not identify the product or service that emitted it: your organisation must document its operational meaning.
24 facilities · codes 0–23
| Code | Official IANA label | Registry note |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | kernel messages | |
| 1 | user-level messages | |
| 2 | mail system | |
| 3 | system daemons | |
| 4 | security/authorization messages | Codes 4, 10, 13 and 14 have similar security, authorization, audit and alert uses across operating systems. |
| 5 | messages generated internally by syslogd | |
| 6 | line printer subsystem | |
| 7 | network news subsystem | |
| 8 | UUCP subsystem | |
| 9 | clock daemon | Both codes 9 and 15 are used for clock or scheduled-job messages across operating systems. |
| 10 | security/authorization messages | Codes 4, 10, 13 and 14 have similar security, authorization, audit and alert uses across operating systems. |
| 11 | FTP daemon | |
| 12 | NTP subsystem | |
| 13 | log audit | Codes 4, 10, 13 and 14 have similar security, authorization, audit and alert uses across operating systems. |
| 14 | log alert | Codes 4, 10, 13 and 14 have similar security, authorization, audit and alert uses across operating systems. |
| 15 | clock daemon | Both codes 9 and 15 are used for clock or scheduled-job messages across operating systems. |
| 16 | local use 0 (local0) | |
| 17 | local use 1 (local1) | |
| 18 | local use 2 (local2) | |
| 19 | local use 3 (local3) | |
| 20 | local use 4 (local4) | |
| 21 | local use 5 (local5) | |
| 22 | local use 6 (local6) | |
| 23 | local use 7 (local7) |
8 severities · codes 0–7
| Code | Official IANA label | Registry note |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | Emergency: system is unusable | |
| 1 | Alert: action must be taken immediately | |
| 2 | Critical: critical conditions | |
| 3 | Error: error conditions | |
| 4 | Warning: warning conditions | |
| 5 | Notice: normal but significant condition | |
| 6 | Informational: informational messages | |
| 7 | Debug: debug-level messages |
IANA · Licensing Terms · Protocol Registries CC0 1.0 · Revised 2021-11-10 · original CIE commentary identified separately
Read a message before building a rule
Fictional example, containing no production data:
<165>1 2026-10-23T09:14:00Z gateway.example.net app 742 EVT42 [meta sequenceId="12"] Cache refreshed| Element | Reading this example | Acceptance consideration |
|---|---|---|
| <165> | facility 20, severity 5 | Document the sender’s convention. |
| 1 | Format version | Distinguish the received format from collector-added labels. |
| TIMESTAMP | Source timestamp in UTC | Check reception time and clock drift as well. |
| HOSTNAME / APP-NAME | gateway.example.net / app | Connect the declaration to your equipment inventory. |
| PROCID / MSGID | 742 / EVT42 | Do not treat a process number as a universal identifier. |
| STRUCTURED-DATA | meta with sequenceId 12 | Preserve names and parameters without flattening distinct identifiers. |
| MSG | Cache refreshed | Do not log secrets to enrich an event. |
A NILVALUE hyphen marks unavailable information in fields that allow it; it does not mean zero. Decoding PRI alone validates neither the rest of a message, its timestamp nor its transport.
Eight explained calculations · fictional situations
| Facility / severity | Calculation and PRI | Interpretation and limit |
|---|---|---|
| 0 / 0 | 0 × 8 + 0 = 0 · <0> | Kernel / Emergency: encoding an outage does not establish its cause. |
| 1 / 5 | 1 × 8 + 5 = 13 · <13> | User-level / Notice: a notable condition may still be normal. |
| 4 / 2 | 4 × 8 + 2 = 34 · <34> | Security / Critical: qualify the rule and asset before escalating. |
| 10 / 5 | 10 × 8 + 5 = 85 · <85> | Security / Notice: one family can carry a different severity. |
| 13 / 6 | 13 × 8 + 6 = 110 · <110> | Audit / Informational: an informative event can be decisive in an investigation. |
| 20 / 5 | 20 × 8 + 5 = 165 · <165> | Local4 / Notice: document the local convention; no universal product meaning. |
| 23 / 0 | 23 × 8 + 0 = 184 · <184> | Local7 / Emergency: high PRI, most severe level on this severity scale. |
| 23 / 7 | 23 × 8 + 7 = 191 · <191> | Local7 / Debug: same facility, eighth level, not evidence of harmlessness. |
Collection acceptance: what evidence should you request?
Correct decoding does not establish useful detection. The joint guidance published by ASD ACSC and partners in 2024 addresses policy, centralisation, protected storage and detection strategy. This CIE acceptance proposal should be adapted to the service.
| CIE check | Practical exercise | Expected evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Source coverage | Trigger an identified test event on a critical source. | Find source, collector, index and owner; record absent sources. |
| Severity convention | Compare a known event before and after normalisation. | Preserve raw code, normalised value and versioned conversion rule. |
| Identity and correlation | Follow a fictional sign-in and subsequent application action. | Connect useful identifiers without logging tokens, passwords or sensitive content. |
| Time and delay | Compare source time, reception and search availability. | Separate clock drift, transport delay and indexing delay. |
| Loss and recovery | Interrupt an authorised test stream and restore it. | Observe gaps, queues, possible duplicates and missing-stream alerts. |
| Truncation and parsing | Feed a long message and malformed event into the test pipeline. | Record received size, lost fields or rejection; do not equate rejection with inactivity. |
| Path protection | Review transfer, access and retention with the owners. | Identify every hop, permissions and the protection mechanisms actually configured. |
| Detection and response | Trigger a rule in an authorised scenario and follow handling. | Connect event, alert, qualification, decision and observed result. |
ASD ACSC and partners · Best practices for event logging and threat detection · Published and reviewed 2024-08-22 · consulted 2026-10-23
Set retention, scope and thresholds according to investigation needs and the service’s applicable constraints. This table defines neither a universal retention period nor SIEM certification. A format check cannot replace an end-to-end exercise.
Value provenance and consulted edition
IANA · 32 codes · registry 2016-04-26 · reviewed 2026-10-23 · CC0 1.0
IANA XML SHA-256: 10eb91ad6e29dc6fdebe5320cc0b2711ce840c1ed7a6d2c33c4bc716423b4ec6
RFC 5424 TXT SHA-256: 24d91f90a05d2536730ada929c296f45ae9cd72226e22b6775ad8c04cae37a53
Commentary, cases and acceptance proposal: Cyber Intelligence Embassy. IANA labels are reproduced for reference.
Official references
References consulted: . The method and worksheet propose checks to adapt to your context; they do not constitute certification.
- ACSC and partners — Best practices for event logging and threat detection
- NIST SP 800-92 — Guide to Computer Security Log Management
- OASIS · STIX 2.1
- MITRE ATT&CK
- IANA · syslog Parameters
- IETF · R. Gerhards · RFC 5424 · The Syslog Protocol
- OASIS · STIX 2.1 Errata 01 · Draft 01
- FIRST · Traffic Light Protocol 2.0
- IETF · RFC 2606
