リソース · 23

脆弱性の優先順位付けと修復の検証

既知の悪用、露出した資産、ビジネスへの影響、および修正が機能していることの証明を関連付ける。

更新済み · 20 min

通知、資産一覧、修正の証拠を別のトレーに分けた、無人の架空のサイバー観測室 AIで生成した編集用イラスト

このガイドが達成するのに役立つこと

  • アラートをアセットに照合する
  • 実際の緊急度をランク付けする
  • 安全に展開する
  • 検証して完了する

クイックチェック

  • 影響を受ける製品とバージョンは実際に展開されているか?
  • アセットにアクセス可能で、ビジネス上重要なものか?
  • 悪用事例は文書化されているか?
  • パッチ適用前にサービスを保護するものは何か?
  • チェックによって、アセットから問題が解消されたことが確認されているか?

手順

  1. 1

    インベントリを統合する

    サービス、製品、バージョン、環境、露出、所有者をマッピングする。 コンポーネントアドバイザリだけでは、脆弱なインスタンスが展開されていることを証明できない。

    成果物:日付付きの影響を受けるアセットリストと不確実性。

  2. 2

    発見事項の検証

    ベンダーのアドバイザリ、CVE識別子、悪用条件、および該当する場合はCISAの既知の悪用された脆弱性カタログを比較します。 各情報源を確認した日時を記録します。

    成果物:主要な参照資料を含む発見事項。

  3. 3

    妥当な優先順位の設定

    既知の悪用、資産へのアクセス可能性、必要な権限、処理されるデータ、サービスへの影響、および利用可能な修復策を考慮します。 担当者と状況に応じた期限を設定します。

    成果物:理由を付した優先順位決定。

  4. 4

    変更の準備

    依存関係、変更ウィンドウ、バックアップ、およびロールバックをマッピングします。 更新を速やかに適用できない場合は、一時的な制御とその有効期限を記録します。

    成果物:ロールアウト計画と限定的な例外。

  5. 5

    展開とテスト

    承認されたプロセスを使用して、ベンダーの修正プログラムまたは緩和策を適用します。 結果として生じるバージョン、業務プロセス、および後退する可能性のある統合を確認してください。

    成果物:デプロイメント記録と機能結果。

  6. 6

    クローズの確認

    適切な方法で実際のアセットを確認し、見落としたインスタンスを特定し、例外を再検討してください。 更新がスケジュールされただけという理由でチケットをクローズしないでください。

    成果物:検証証拠と更新された登録簿。

管理指標

指標測定対象最初のアクション
網羅性バージョンと所有者が既知の重要資産インベントリの完了
遅延認定から検証済み修正までの時間繰り返し発生するボトルネックの解消
検証実際の資産で修正を再テスト証拠なしにクローズを再開
例外管理、所有者、有効期限付きの免除期限切れの例外をクローズ

よくある間違い

  • 資産を確認せずに一般的なスコアのみでランキング付け
  • KEVリストに掲載されているということは、製品が自社環境に存在することを意味すると想定する
  • サービス動作をテストせずに展開する
  • レビュー日を設定せずに補償制御を放置する

よくある質問

スコアが最も高いCVEを常に最初に処理する必要があるか?

スコアは技術的な深刻度を表します。 既知の悪用、露出、ローカルサービスへの影響に基づいて運用順序を決定します。

パッチが存在しない場合はどうすればよいか?

ベンダーの緩和策に従い、可能な限りリスクを低減し、担当者、レビュー日、および残存リスクを文書化する。

作業はいつ完了するのか?

影響を受けるインスタンスでバージョンまたは緩和策が検証され、重要な機能がテストされた後。

参照資料:データ・用途・限界

資料確認日 .

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

Vulnerability: three complementary viewsCVE · Identify. CVSS · Technical severity. EPSS · Probability. KEV · Known exploitation. Affected version and product. Score from 0.0 to 10.0. 30-day horizon. Official CISA catalogue. Local decision: exposure, impact, evidence and remediation checks.Vulnerability: three complementary viewsCVE · IdentifyAffected version and productCVSS · Technical severityScore from 0.0 to 10.0EPSS · Probability30-day horizonKEV · Known exploitationOfficial CISA catalogueLocal decision: exposure, impact, evidence and remediation checks
Vulnerability: three complementary views
参照資料:データ・用途・限界
出典と目的確認済みのデータ・指標利用方法留意する限界
FIRST · CVSS

Describe technical vulnerability severity using an explicit method and vector.

CVSS 4.0 scores run from 0.0 to 10.0. Base, Threat, Environmental and Supplemental metric groups serve different purposes. Retain the score version, vector and date. Compare it with the installed version, access paths and business consequences before ordering remediation.

手法を詳しく読む →

A high score is not evidence of exploitation; a low score does not mean a service has no risk.
FIRST · EPSS

Estimate exploitation probability for a published CVE.

The model looks ahead 30 days. Its score is a probability; its percentile ranks that score relative to other CVEs. Record the data date and distinguish probability from percentile. Add asset exposure and confirmed exploitation evidence.

手法を詳しく読む →

The model does not predict harm to your organisation. Low probability does not cancel a critical exposure.
CISA · Known Exploited Vulnerabilities

Identify vulnerabilities listed by CISA as known to be exploited.

The catalogue includes CVE, product, date added and required action. Its official repository also provides the data schema. Check applicability to your products and retain the access date. Review the requested action and vendor advisory before confirming remediation.

手法を詳しく読む →

Absence from the catalogue does not establish safety. Administrative deadlines in it are not automatically binding on every organisation.

CVSS・EPSS・KEV・VEX

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

Vulnerability prioritisation: four signals to connect to the asset

A vulnerability queue often mixes information answering different questions. CVSS describes technical severity, EPSS estimates a probability of observed exploitation, KEV records known exploitation and VEX carries a product applicability assertion. A local decision still needs the deployed version, access paths and consequences of exploitation.

These are documentary reference points. EPSS examples, situations and the VEX product are fictional; no current CVE score, real inventory or scan result is presented. This page calculates neither CVSS, organisational risk nor an automatic priority. Proposed evidence and decisions are a local editorial method.

Four distinct signals for a local decision
Four distinct signals for a local decision Four independent panels: CVSS describes severity; EPSS estimates observed exploitation within thirty days; KEV records known exploitation; VEX states declared applicability. Compare them with the deployed product and its context without adding them into one score. CVSS · Severity Metrics and vector Version and author EPSS · Probability Thirty-day horizon Separate date and rank KEV · Known exploitation Product and requested action Catalogue edition VEX · Applicability Issuer, product and time Status and justification Local decision: deployed asset, exposure, consequences, owner and evidence.

Four independent panels: CVSS describes severity; EPSS estimates observed exploitation within thirty days; KEV records known exploitation; VEX states declared applicability. Compare them with the deployed product and its context without adding them into one score.

Four questions and four kinds of information

Four questions and four kinds of information
SourceUseful questionWhat it cannot establish alone
CVSS 4.0What is the technical severity under the assessed metrics?The score proves neither exploitation nor consequences for your service.
EPSSWhat is the estimated probability of observing exploitation of this CVE in the next thirty days?It does not describe compromise of your instance, its controls or business loss.
CISA KEVIs the vulnerability listed as known to be exploited?Listing does not establish that the product exists in your estate; absence does not establish safety.
VEXWhat does an issuer assert about a vulnerability for identified products at a stated time?An assertion alone proves neither deployment of the relevant version nor issuer trustworthiness.

CVSS 4.0: preserve groups, vector and assessment author

A number from 0 to 10 loses meaning when its version, vector and assessed groups disappear. FIRST distinguishes CVSS-B, CVSS-BT, CVSS-BE and CVSS-BTE. Undefined Threat and Environmental metrics take default values rather than disappearing from the calculation.

CVSS 4.0: preserve groups, vector and assessment author
GroupRoleReading check
BaseIntrinsic vulnerability characteristics.A supplier’s CVSS-B is not your priority decision.
ThreatThreat characteristics that can change over time.Date the assessment and explain exploitation information used.
EnvironmentalCharacteristics specific to the consumer’s environment.State the controls and system importance considered rather than silently changing a score.
SupplementalAdditional context, such as Safety or Recovery.These metrics do not modify the final CVSS score; they may inform a separate local analysis.

EPSS: probability, percentile and missing data

FIRST describes a probability from 0 to 1, updated daily, over a thirty-day horizon. The percentile is a relative rank among currently scored vulnerabilities. Do not add probability and percentile or turn their pair into the probability of an attack on your organisation.

EPSS: probability, percentile and missing data
Fictional exampleProvided valuesCorrect reading
A probabilityProbability : 0.05 · Percentile : Unspecified0.05 means a 5% estimated probability of observed exploitation within the model horizon, rather than an estate compromise rate.
Probability and rankProbability : 0.02 · Percentile : 0.97In this fictional example 0.02 means 2%, while 0.97 places the score at the 97th percentile. The rank does not turn a 2% probability into 97%.
No received valueProbability : Unspecified · Percentile : UnspecifiedMissing data remains unknown; it is neither zero nor evidence of no exploitation. Record the failure or the date of the last available value.

Seven useful readings of the KEV schema

The official CISA repository schema describes the catalogue and its entries. The following selection helps retain consultation context rather than enumerate every field. Match each entry to the supplier advisory and actual asset.

Seven useful readings of the KEV schema
FieldsMeaningProposed check
catalogVersion / dateReleasedCatalogue version and publication time.Keep a reference to the consulted edition; distinguish publication time from your assessment time.
cveID / vendorProject / productIdentifier and product associated with the entry.Match name, version, distribution and embedded components before declaring an asset affected.
dateAddedDate the vulnerability entered the catalogue.Do not present it as the first exploitation date or CVE publication date.
requiredActionRequested action to address the vulnerability.Read the complete instruction and supplier references, then document local implementation.
dueDateCatalogue deadline for the requested action.Check the context and scope of the CISA instruction before adopting it as a local deadline.
knownRansomwareCampaignUseKnown indicates confirmed ransomware campaign use; Unknown means CISA lacks confirmation.Do not translate Unknown into never used or a definite false value.
cwesWeakness category codes associated with the entry.Use categories to group causes; they do not replace the CVE identifier or affected version.

Six fictional situations: what is missing before a decision?

High severity, product not located

An advisory reports high severity; the inventory cannot locate that version in the estate.

Confirm presence and version with the owner, including embedded dependencies.

Retain applicability unknown. Absence from an incomplete inventory does not justify closure.

Known exploitation, exposed instance

The vulnerability is listed as known to be exploited and an owner confirms an affected internet-accessible instance.

Review supplier actions and arrange exposure reduction and remediation suited to the service.

Name the owner, interim control and expected verification evidence; a severity score alone supplies none of this traceability.

Low probability, essential service

The fictional EPSS probability is low, but the affected instance supports an essential service.

Assess consequences and access paths before agreeing a change window.

Do not treat a low score as insurance; that instance’s controls are not contextual inputs to EPSS.

VEX for another version

The supplier declares version 2.4.0 not affected; the asset still runs 2.3.0.

Seek an assertion applicable to the installed version and verify its provenance.

Do not extend a conclusion across versions. A VEX document deploys no update.

Temporary control becomes permanent

A temporary rule reduces access; its review date has passed.

Check that it still protects the relevant path, then decide whether to maintain it or apply the fix.

Keep the owner, limits and a new review date. A perimeter control is not automatically an OpenVEX built-in product mitigation.

Patch announced, deployment unverified

A fixed release is available, but the ticket contains only a download link.

Check the version actually deployed, remaining instances and critical functionality.

Close on implementation and verification evidence, rather than the supplier’s availability of a patch.

Eight records for a traceable remediation decision

  • Product, version or build, environment and asset owner.
  • Vulnerability identifier, supplier advisory and relevant exploitation conditions.
  • CVSS version, vector, metric-group nomenclature and assessment author.
  • EPSS date, probability and percentile in separate fields, or an explicit missing value.
  • Dated KEV status, requested action and consulted catalogue edition.
  • Applicable VEX assertion: issuer, product, version, time and any justification.
  • Reasoned local decision, interim control, owner and review date.
  • Deployment or mitigation evidence, verification result and remaining limits.

Read VEX statuses and applicability conditions →

Primary sources and scope

Sources checked on

ビルドの署名と来歴

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

Verify patch origin and then its application

A fixed version needs connecting to the received package and updated instance. Provenance verification helps establish expected origin; remediation confirmation still requires checking the active version and relevant behaviour.

  • Keep the accepted patch digest and signature/provenance verification results.
  • Match that package to the version actually deployed on each targeted instance.
  • Do not close on authenticity alone: document remediation checks, regressions and remaining limits.

Read the pre-deployment provenance reference →

Sources checked on · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Verifying artifacts · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Provenance · SLSA 1.2 · Build: Track Basics · in-toto · Statement v1 · Sigstore · Verifying Signatures

CISA KEVカタログを調べる

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

KEV is CISA’s catalogue of vulnerabilities known to be exploited. This explorer contains a complete dated snapshot, not a live feed. A CVE or product-name match is a lead to compare with the exact deployed product and version; it does not prove that a visitor’s system is vulnerable or compromised.

Entry names, products, descriptions, required actions and links retain CISA’s language and values. Explanations are editorial. Entries may be added or corrected after this snapshot; consult the official source before an operational decision.

項目
1769
異なるベンダー/プロジェクト表記
291
カタログ公開日時

Counters describe this snapshot only. They do not measure attack counts, vulnerability prevalence or an organisation’s risk. Distinct vendorProject labels are counted exactly as published, without merging aliases or treating them as distinct companies.

Unknown means CISA lacks confirmation of use in a ransomware campaign; it does not mean no exploitation. forensicTriage Yes/No is a separate field described by the schema with a reference to BOD 26-04. An absent field stays unreported. Neither No nor Unknown demonstrates that your asset has not been compromised.

dueDate is the deadline published in the CISA entry for the stated action. It is not a universal SLA, a patch release date or evidence that a patch was installed. The forensicTriage field alone cannot determine your obligations or define an investigation plan. The FedRAMP notice explains how its federal cloud certification programme aligns with BOD 26-04. Check which scope applies before adopting a deadline.

Six readings that prevent a misleading priority

Six readings that prevent a misleading priority
Published fieldUseful readingConclusion to avoid
cveIDJoin sources discussing the same vulnerability.The identifier year does not date KEV inclusion.
vendorProject · productFind the vendor advisory and local inventory.A product name does not replace affected versions and configurations.
dateAddedDate the entry’s inclusion in this catalogue.Do not call it discovery or first-exploitation date.
dueDate · requiredActionRead the published action and deadline together.Do not turn the date into a universal obligation or proof of remediation.
knownRansomwareCampaignUsePreserve Known, Unknown or an absent field.Unknown is not No and does not remove the known exploitation signal underlying KEV.
forensicTriage · cwesSeparate CISA’s indicator from published weakness classes.A CWE is not a specific product or score; No is not a certificate that no incident occurred.

年別のカタログ追加件数

年別のカタログ追加件数Each bar counts entries retained in this snapshot by the year of dateAdded. It is not a discovery year or an exploitation frequency. The first year starts at this snapshot’s earliest entry and the release year is incomplete; these totals are not an annual attack trend.311202155520221872023186202424520252852026
Each bar counts entries retained in this snapshot by the year of dateAdded. It is not a discovery year or an exploitation frequency. The first year starts at this snapshot’s earliest entry and the release year is incomplete; these totals are not an annual attack trend.
年別のカタログ追加件数 · dateAdded
追加年項目
2021311
2022555
2023187
2024186
2025245
2026285

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CISA KEVカタログを調べる · 2026.11.06
CVEベンダーまたはプロジェクト · product追加日 / 項目の対応期限ランサムウェア活動での利用 / forensicTriage
CVE-2019-9670

CWE-611

Synacor

Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS)

CISAが公開した項目と対応

Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) Improper Restriction of XML External Entity Reference

Synacor Zimbra Collaboration Suite (ZCS) contains an improper restriction of XML external entity (XXE) vulnerability in the mailboxd component.

requiredAction
Apply updates per vendor instructions.
notes
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9670

nvd.nist.gov ↗

dateAdded
dueDate
knownRansomwareCampaignUse
Unknown
forensicTriage
No
CVE-2020-6572

CWE-416

Google

Chrome Media

CISAが公開した項目と対応

Google Chrome Media Use-After-Free Vulnerability

Google Chrome Media contains a use-after-free vulnerability that allows a remote attacker to execute code via a crafted HTML page.

requiredAction
Apply updates per vendor instructions.
notes
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-6572

nvd.nist.gov ↗

dateAdded
dueDate
knownRansomwareCampaignUse
Unknown
forensicTriage
No
CVE-2021-22017

CWE-23

VMware

vCenter Server

CISAが公開した項目と対応

VMware vCenter Server Improper Access Control

Rhttproxy as used in vCenter Server contains a vulnerability due to improper implementation of URI normalization.

requiredAction
Apply updates per vendor instructions.
notes
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22017

nvd.nist.gov ↗

dateAdded
dueDate
knownRansomwareCampaignUse
Unknown
forensicTriage
No
CVE-2021-27860

CWE-434

FatPipe

WARP, IPVPN, and MPVPN software

CISAが公開した項目と対応

FatPipe WARP, IPVPN, and MPVPN Configuration Upload exploit

A vulnerability in the web management interface of FatPipe WARP, IPVPN, and MPVPN software allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to upload a file to any location on the filesystem.

requiredAction
Apply updates per vendor instructions.
notes
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27860

nvd.nist.gov ↗

dateAdded
dueDate
knownRansomwareCampaignUse
Unknown
forensicTriage
No
CVE-2021-36260

CWE-78

Hikvision

Security cameras web server

CISAが公開した項目と対応

Hikvision Improper Input Validation

A command injection vulnerability in the web server of some Hikvision product. Due to the insufficient input validation.

requiredAction
Apply updates per vendor instructions.
notes
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36260

nvd.nist.gov ↗

dateAdded
dueDate
knownRansomwareCampaignUse
Unknown
forensicTriage
No

An old identifier can enter the catalogue recently

CVE-2015-5477, associated with ISC BIND in this snapshot, has identifier year 2015 and dateAdded 8 October 2026. These dates answer different questions. The entry calls for following vendor instructions; it does not establish your BIND version, exposure or installation of a fix.

From a public signal to a documented decision

  1. Qualify the match

    Keep the CVE, source and date, then establish product, version, embedded component and exposure. An SBOM may locate a component without proving its runtime condition.

  2. Read the action at its source

    Open the vendor advisory and updates. Separate updating, mitigation, discontinuing a product and searching for compromise evidence; a patch does not replace these other decisions.

  3. Document the change

    Assign an owner, prepare rollback and verify dependencies. A mitigation remains a scoped measure with an explicit validity period.

  4. Verify the resulting state

    Retain an observed version, checked configuration and service test. Closing a task needs evidence concerning the actual asset, beyond a console status.

Source release : · Documentary review :

CISA KEV data reused under CC0 1.0. Reuse implies no CISA affiliation or endorsement and grants no right to use the CISA logo or DHS seal.

資料の詳細 · CISA KEV

How we publish this official snapshot

この言語版の詳しい参照メモは英語で提供しています。

The copy is identified by its catalogue version, dateReleased, official mirror commit and source-file digest. CISA publication, GitHub synchronisation and our review are distinct events. Aggregates are computed from the retained entries; no visitor inventory collection or vulnerability scan takes place.

catalogVersion
2026.11.06
dateReleased
GitHub commit
e5b3a9b25050a8da26c96266c5bfe438ee0bdebc ·
SHA-256
47e0406b2be5a40420eff66f3d90e83eb8883dae6ff4d08e1b2a942c366f6cc2

Counters describe this snapshot only. They do not measure attack counts, vulnerability prevalence or an organisation’s risk. Distinct vendorProject labels are counted exactly as published, without merging aliases or treating them as distinct companies.

カタログと方法を見る →

Source release : · Documentary review :

CISA KEV data reused under CC0 1.0. Reuse implies no CISA affiliation or endorsement and grants no right to use the CISA logo or DHS seal.

公式参照文献

参照文献はメソッドを裏付けるものです。 チェックは状況に合わせて調整してください。 これらは認証ではありません。 元の参照文献のタイトルやソース文書は別の言語で書かれている場合があります。

参照資料の確認日 .