Recursos · 54
Webhooks: manejan repeticiones, retrasos y recuperación
Convierte una notificación recibida en un efecto empresarial único, trazable y recuperable tras un fallo.
Actualizado · 9 min
Lo que esta guía ayuda a lograr
- Autenticar notificaciones
- Separar recibo del procesamiento
- Evitar efectos duplicados
- Recuperar eventos bloqueados
Comprobación rápida
- ¿Qué bytes están firmados?
- ¿Cuándo es perdurable el recibo?
- ¿Pueden dos trabajadores actuar juntos?
- ¿El proveedor garantiza el pedido?
- ¿Cómo se encuentra un evento perdido?
Método paso a paso
- 1
Leer el contrato del proveedor
Tipos de registro, versión, contexto de cuenta, firmas, tiempos y reglas de reintento. Stripe afirma que los pedidos de entrega no están garantizados y pueden producirse duplicados; no aplique un retraso específico de Stripe a cada API.
Entregable: contrato de proveedor fechado.
- 2
Validar antes de efectos
Verificar firmas con la biblioteca y raw body requeridas por el proveedor. Limite los tamaños y tipos aceptados. Pruebe firmas no válidas y contextos de cuentas inesperados en un entorno autorizado sin registrar secretos.
Entregable: denegaciones sin efectos.
- 3
Persistir antes de reconocer
Separar recibo duradero de procesamiento lento. Si la cola no puede aceptar el evento, no lo informe como retenido. El éxito indica la recepción de su contrato, no necesariamente la finalización de la acción comercial.
Entregable: estados recibido, procesando, completado y bloqueado.
- 4
Aplicar idempotencia
Definir claves de eventos e identidad de efecto empresarial. Pruebe repeticiones simultáneas en lugar de solo entregas secuenciales. Una verificación preliminar sin restricciones atómicas ni bloqueos puede permitir que dos trabajadores creen el mismo efecto.
Entregable: evidencia de unicidad del efecto.
- 5
Manejar retrasos y desorden
No asuma que una notificación antigua describe el estado actual. Consultar la fuente cuando el contrato lo permita y aplicar transiciones comerciales validadas. Retener eventos que aún no se pueden interpretar.
Entregable: transiciones y pruebas de orden inverso.
- 6
Conciliar y reproducir
Preparar una cola de errores con propietario, causa, intentos y cierre. Mantenga la protección duplicada durante la reproducción. Compare periódicamente el proveedor y la aplicación: la recuperación exitosa no prueba que no se haya perdido ningún evento.
Entregable: procedimiento de recuperación y reporte de discrepancias.
Hoja de cálculo reutilizable
Complete con sus observaciones autorizadas. Estos campos son una plantilla de trabajo, no resultados observados.
| Campo | Información a registrar |
|---|---|
| Evento | Proveedor, cuenta, identificador y versión |
| Recibo | Firma validada y marca de tiempo duradera |
| Efecto | Evidencias de clave, estado y unicidad de negocio |
| Recuperación | Causa, intento, titular y cierre |
Ejemplo trabajado ficticio
Situación ilustrativa
Ejemplo ficticio: estos datos no describen clientes ni resultados observados. La misma notificación de pago llega dos veces y el proceso intenta activar dos veces una suscripción.
Decisión y pruebas esperadas
Verificar la autenticidad, reconocer las repeticiones y contrastar el estado de factura y suscripción con la fuente autorizada. Confirmar un único efecto de negocio y registrar la repetición sin copiar secretos. Un acuse HTTP no demuestra que la activación sea correcta.
Distinguir los mecanismos
| Mecanismo | Propósito | Verificación o limitación |
|---|---|---|
| Firma | Validar origen según el contrato | No hace que los efectos sean únicos |
| Deduplicación | Reconocer notificaciones repetidas | Verificar también simultaneidad y efectos de negocio |
| Conciliación | Encuentra omisiones y diferencias | Nombra la fuente y el periodo |
Indicadores de gestión
| Indicador | Qué mide | Primera acción |
|---|---|---|
| Edad de la cola | Retraso de eventos no finalizados | Inspeccionar los más antiguos |
| Efectos duplicados | Acciones comerciales repetidas por error | Atomicidad correcta |
| Lagunas en fuente/aplicación | Estados ausentes o divergentes | Conciliar con evidencia de cierre |
Errores comunes
- Análisis previo a la verificación del cuerpo firmado
- Acuse de recibo antes del recibo duradero
- Asumiendo entrega ordenada
- Probando duplicados solo de forma secuencial
Preguntas frecuentes
¿El éxito de HTTP significa que el procesamiento está completo?
Depende del contrato. Con el procesamiento asincrónico, debería significar un recibo duradero mientras que el estado del negocio se rastrea por separado.
¿Se puede asumir la entrega exactamente una vez?
Diseño para repeticiones y fallos bajo el contrato real, con efectos únicos y conciliación.
¿Se debe conservar todo el cuerpo?
Sólo cuando sea necesario con acceso y retención adecuados. Los rastros mínimos deberían respaldar el diagnóstico y la recuperación sin guardar secretos.
Idempotencia y contratos de reintento API
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
Separate request retries from notification repeats
An outgoing API request key, a received-event identifier and a business-effect identity serve different roles.
- Define provider, account, event and effect before selecting a deduplication key.
- Test concurrent workers and an unknown external-effect outcome.
- Reconcile business state with the source; a valid signature does not make processing unique.
Compare idempotency contracts →
References reviewed · RFC 9110 · §9.2.2, §10.2.3 · RFC 6585 · §4 · Stripe
Webhooks: firmas y reenvíos
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
Authenticate a delivery, retain the event and control its effect
A webhook signature answers a specific question: do the received bytes match those authenticated with the expected key? It guarantees neither freshness nor uniqueness nor successful business processing. Separate these decisions in the receipt contract so that the integration can be observed and recovered.
The signature and recovery rules below belong to the cited Stripe and GitHub contracts. The timeline and ten cases are fictional exercises; this page activates no endpoint, real secret or payment mechanism. Use official libraries and test the relevant provider configuration for a real integration.
Stripe and GitHub: six differences to retain
| Control | Stripe | GitHub |
|---|---|---|
| Signature header | Stripe-Signature contains t and one or more v1 signatures. The documented active scheme is v1. | X-Hub-Signature-256 contains a SHA256 HMAC prefixed with sha256=. |
| Authenticated message | Text timestamp, a period and the raw body: timestamp + "." + body. | The raw delivery body. Transport headers are not added to this HMAC message. |
| Freshness and replay | The timestamp is authenticated. Documentation states a five-minute default tolerance in its libraries; each retry receives a new timestamp and signature. | The body HMAC alone provides no freshness proof equivalent to Stripe’s timestamp. Plan duplicate detection and recovery according to the contract. |
| Identity to track | event.id identifies repeated delivery. Stripe also describes distinct events that may require correlation using data.object.id and event.type. | X-GitHub-Delivery identifies the delivery; requested redelivery retains that identifier. Its value remains outside the body authenticated by the HMAC described here. |
| Delivery failure | Live-mode automatic retries for up to three days with exponential backoff. A manual resend does not automatically cancel these retries. | GitHub does not automatically redeliver failures. Arrange manual redelivery or application-managed recovery using the available APIs. |
| Fast acknowledgement | Return a 2xx quickly, before lengthy work. Durable receipt before acknowledgement is the architectural policy of our exercise. | Respond with 2xx within ten seconds according to the documentation. A queue separates receipt from business processing. |
Retain three separate identities
| Identity | Fictional example | Purpose and limit |
|---|---|---|
| Transport attempt | delivery_attempt_02 | One event can arrive several times. An attempt’s timestamp and signature are not a business key. |
| Provider event | provider + account + environment + evt_training_001 | Recognise the same event within its scope. Define retention and recovery behaviour; a bare identifier without context may be insufficient. |
| Business effect | tenant_7 + case_42 + initial_activation | Prevent a second initial activation here. The key belongs to this operation; do not discard all future object updates by reducing them to the object identifier alone. |
Three bodies, six HMACs: what reformatting changes
Public exercise-only key: training-only-key-not-a-secret. Fixed timestamp: 1792663200, corresponding to 2026-10-22 at 10:00:00 UTC. Strings use UTF-8 with no trailing newline. A and B represent the same JSON object but have different bytes; C changes case_42 to case_43.
| Body | UTF-8 bytes | Exact string, written as a JSON string |
|---|---|---|
| A | 68 | "{\"id\":\"evt_training_001\",\"type\":\"evidence.ready\",\"object\":\"case_42\"}" |
| B | 73 | "{\"id\": \"evt_training_001\", \"type\": \"evidence.ready\", \"object\": \"case_42\"}" |
| C | 68 | "{\"id\":\"evt_training_001\",\"type\":\"evidence.ready\",\"object\":\"case_43\"}" |
| Body / scheme | Message used | Calculated hexadecimal HMAC-SHA256 |
|---|---|---|
| A · GitHub | body | d6ac0a608c901617782f3b7aef64198718e3affd410a219b22b84da008235364 |
| A · Stripe v1 | timestamp + "." + body | 0ad9c9f7c0df2d8a8265113e641d92f57ce0dffd703a7cf9f13c4163e21bf6dc |
| B · GitHub | body | c9c47b1432282b9a3c2cbf4aded2c750deed235ac948dffe248488b84a4af73d |
| B · Stripe v1 | timestamp + "." + body | 0ad8e262a5870766d4cce864f50a5feac65a3004e3c3208184da9cc075c7abd6 |
| C · GitHub | body | 55162fc08e3cb0efd0eb082978ba61a88cf3624ffc5322f19ab73d91466a616d |
| C · Stripe v1 | timestamp + "." + body | d7f4014489a900399a7049daa3e8f1ce2b208bf95b93c43492cb68f7d6f1b791 |
These results use the documented message constructions with a publicly displayed key and invented data. They are not authentic Stripe or GitHub deliveries. Different JSON serialization, even if semantically equivalent, must not replace the original body before verification. In production, compare in constant time and manage key rotation according to the selected library and contract.
Stripe tolerance parameter: the value 0 disables recency checking in the libraries described by its documentation. It does not mean “accept only the exact second”. Do not transfer the OAuth/OIDC example’s clock policy to this parameter.
Seven records for one local effect
Fictional scenario on 2026-10-22, all times UTC. Authenticate before admission and persist receipt before responding. An atomic constraint protects initial activation in the same database as its business state. Counts below are calculated for this exercise and describe no client outcome.
| UTC time | Observed signal | Scenario decision | Cumulative local effects |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10:00:00 | evt_training_001 admitted; response lost | Durable receipt, pending state; no business effect executed yet. | 0 |
| 10:00:01 | Worker A claims the event | Atomic work reservation; processing state. | 0 |
| 10:00:01 | Worker B sees the same event | Do not create a second processing owner or execute again. | 0 |
| 10:00:02 | Worker A commits the local transaction | Atomically write initial activation and its completed state. | 1 |
| 10:00:03 | New delivery of evt_training_001 | Authenticate the new attempt, find the completed event and acknowledge without a second effect. | 1 |
| 10:00:04 | evt_training_002 targets the same initial activation | Retain the distinct event; this business-operation key already exists. | 1 |
| 10:00:05 | evt_training_003 carries an earlier state | Reject a regressive transition under the exercise policy and reconcile the source. | 1 |
The transaction described protects a local effect. It does not make an external service call atomic. After an unknown external result, retain uncertainty, query the source and apply the available idempotency mechanism before retrying. A transactional outbox can organise emission; it does not establish a universal exactly-once guarantee.
Ten denial and recovery tests to prepare
01 · Invalid signature: no effect
Present a delivery whose HMAC does not match the received body.
Expected: reject before admission and any effect. Retain a redacted reason and configuration version, without recording the key, token or sensitive body content.
02 · Reformatted JSON with the original signature
Replace A with B while keeping the signature computed for A. Both JSON strings decode to the same object.
Expected: verification failure. Capture the raw body at the right framework stage; do not try different reformattings to recover the signature.
03 · Correct signature, stale timestamp
In a Stripe test, authenticate a 09:50:00 timestamp while the acceptance-test clock is 10:00:00, with a configured five-minute tolerance.
Expected: reject freshness despite a correct HMAC. Separate message integrity, delivery age and event creation age.
04 · Same event, newly authenticated attempt
Receive two deliveries of the same event.id; the Stripe retry has its own timestamp and signature.
Expected: authenticate each attempt, then find durable state. A different signature does not justify a second business effect.
05 · Two events, one initial activation
Receive two event identifiers requesting the same fictional initial activation of case_42.
Expected: record both events and protect this operation with its business key. Do not apply this rule blindly to legitimate successive updates of the same object.
06 · Two workers at the same instant
Start two workers on the same pending item in the authorised test environment.
Expected: atomic acquisition and one effect transaction. “Read absent, then insert” without a constraint can allow both workers through; inspect business results, not logs alone.
07 · Queue unavailable before acknowledgement
Simulate queue or database failure before receipt has been durably confirmed.
Expected under our architecture: do not acknowledge as though the event were retained. Exercise the provider’s recovery strategy; GitHub does not automatically redeliver failures.
08 · Response lost after durable receipt
Drop the response after notification persistence; let processing continue under the exercise policy.
Expected: the next attempt finds pending, processing or completed state. The sender may not know receipt succeeded; network uncertainty must not duplicate the effect.
09 · Old event after a newer state
Deliver a notification with an earlier state after a newer notification.
Expected: apply permitted business transitions and reconcile current state when necessary. A fresh signing timestamp can carry an old event; it does not prove business-state novelty.
10 · Manual recovery overlaps automatic retry
Send manual recovery and Stripe automatic retry towards the same event.
Expected: both paths use the same concurrency and idempotency controls. A successful manual resend does not itself cancel automatic retries; verify closure with the provider.
Six useful operating records
- Dated provider contract: environment, account, type, version, signature, timing and recovery.
- Redacted admission trace: internal reference, verification result, clock and policy version.
- Durable event state, work owner and evidence that the uniqueness constraint was tested.
- Effect identity and legitimately repeatable operations; separate the event from the business object.
- Failure queue with cause, attempt count, owner, next action and verified closure.
- Source/application reconciliation over a defined period, including never-received notifications and uncertain external effects.
Provider contracts and primary sources
- Stripe · Webhooks · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
Event delivery behaviors · Handle duplicate events · Verify manually · Preventing replay attacks - Stripe · Manage webhook endpoints · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
Process undelivered events · Resolve signature verification errors - GitHub · Validating webhook deliveries · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
HMAC-SHA256 · X-Hub-Signature-256 · raw payload · constant-time comparison - GitHub · Best practices for using webhooks · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
Respond within 10 seconds · X-GitHub-Delivery · redelivery retains the identifier - GitHub · Handling failed webhook deliveries · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
No automatic redelivery · manual or application-managed recovery
Sources reviewed on
Errores API: tipos, estados y pruebas
Las notas detalladas de esta edición están disponibles en inglés.
An error response establishes neither failure nor safe replay
After interruption or an inconsistent response, a call may have produced an effect. Problem Details improves description; it does not prove no processing occurred or provide a universal retry policy.
- Preserve HTTP status, received body and permitted operation identifier in controlled traces.
- Check business state and idempotency rules before repeating an action.
- Test public messages without exposing secrets, internal paths or account details.
Explore problem types and eight fictional responses →
IETF · M. Nottingham, E. Wilde, S. Dalal · RFC 9457 · July 2023 · obsoletes RFC 7807 · §3.1, §3.2, §4.2, §5
Referencias oficiales
Las referencias respaldan el método. Adapte los controles a su contexto; no constituyen certificación. Los títulos de referencia originales y los documentos fuente pueden estar en otro idioma.
Referencias consultadas el .
- Stripe — Webhooks
- Stripe — Process undelivered webhook events
- GitHub · Validating webhook deliveries
- GitHub · Best practices for using webhooks
- GitHub · Handling failed webhook deliveries
- IETF · M. Nottingham, E. Wilde, S. Dalal · RFC 9457
- IETF · RFC 9110 — Retry-After et idempotence HTTP
- IETF · RFC 6585 — 429 Too Many Requests
- AWS Builders’ Library · Timeouts, retries, and backoff with jitter
- Stripe · Idempotent requests
- Stripe · API v2 overview — Idempotency
- Stripe · Advanced error handling
