Bronnen · 54
Webhooks: omgaan met herhalingen, vertragingen en herstel
Zet een ontvangen melding om in een uniek, traceerbaar bedrijfseffect dat na een storing kan worden hersteld.
Bijgewerkt · 9 min
Wat deze handleiding helpt bereiken
- Authenticatie van meldingen
- Scheid ontvangst van verwerking
- Voorkom dubbele effecten
- Herstel geblokkeerde gebeurtenissen
Snelle controle
- Welke bytes zijn ondertekend?
- Wanneer is een ontvangstbewijs duurzaam?
- Kunnen twee medewerkers samenwerken?
- Garandeert de provider de volgorde?
- Hoe wordt een verloren gebeurtenis gevonden?
Stapsgewijze methode
- 1
Lees het providercontract
Recordtypen, versie, accountcontext, handtekeningen, timing en herhalingsregels. Stripe stelt dat de leveringsvolgorde niet gegarandeerd is en dat duplicaten kunnen voorkomen; pas geen Stripe-specifieke vertraging toe op elke API.
Resultaat: gedateerd providercontract.
- 2
Valideren vóór effecten
Controleer handtekeningen met de bibliotheek en de ruwe body die de provider vereist. Beperk de geaccepteerde groottes en typen. Test ongeldige handtekeningen en onverwachte accountcontext in een geautoriseerde omgeving zonder geheimen te loggen.
Resultaat: weigeringen zonder effecten.
- 3
Persisteren vóór bevestiging
Scheid duurzame ontvangst van trage verwerking. Als de wachtrij de gebeurtenis niet kan accepteren, rapporteer deze dan niet als bewaard. Succes duidt op ontvangst volgens uw contract, niet noodzakelijkerwijs op voltooiing van de bedrijfsactie.
Resultaat: ontvangen, verwerkende, voltooide en geblokkeerde statussen.
- 4
Idempotentie afdwingen
Definieer gebeurtenissleutels en identiteit van bedrijfseffecten. Test gelijktijdige herhalingen in plaats van alleen sequentiële levering. Een voorlopige controle zonder atomaire beperkingen of vergrendeling kan twee workers in staat stellen hetzelfde effect te creëren.
Resultaat: bewijs van de uniciteit van het effect.
- 5
Omgaan met vertraging en wanorde
Ga er niet van uit dat een oude melding de huidige status beschrijft. Raadpleeg de bron wanneer het contract dit toestaat en pas gevalideerde bedrijfstransities toe. Bewaar gebeurtenissen die nog niet kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd.
Resultaat: transities en tests in omgekeerde volgorde.
- 6
Afstemmen en opnieuw afspelen
Stel een foutenwachtrij op met eigenaar, oorzaak, pogingen en afsluiting. Behoud bescherming tegen duplicaten tijdens het opnieuw afspelen. Vergelijk periodiek de provider en de applicatie: succesvol herstel bewijst niet dat er geen gebeurtenis is gemist.
Resultaat: herstelprocedure en discrepantierapport.
Herbruikbaar werkblad
Vul in met uw geautoriseerde observaties. Deze velden zijn een werksjabloon, geen waargenomen resultaten.
| Veld | Informatie om vast te leggen |
|---|---|
| Gebeurtenis | Aanbieder, account, identificatie en versie |
| Ontvangstbewijs | Gevalideerde handtekening en duurzaam tijdstempel |
| Effect | Bedrijfssleutel, status en bewijs van uniciteit |
| Herstel | Oorzaak, poging, eigenaar en afsluiting |
Fictief uitgewerkt voorbeeld
Illustratieve situatie
Fictief voorbeeld: deze gegevens beschrijven geen klant of waargenomen resultaat. Dezelfde betaalmelding komt tweemaal binnen en de verwerking probeert één abonnement tweemaal te activeren.
Beslissing en verwachte bewijs
Controleer echtheid, herken herhalingen en vergelijk factuur- en abonnementsstatus met de bevoegde bron. Bevestig één bedrijfseffect en registreer de herhaling zonder geheimen te kopiëren. Een HTTP-bevestiging bewijst geen correcte activering.
Onderscheid de mechanismen
| Mechanisme | Doel | Verificatie of beperking |
|---|---|---|
| Handtekening | Valideer de oorsprong volgens het contract | Maakt effecten niet uniek |
| Dubbele vermeldingen verwijderen | Herhaalde meldingen herkennen | Controleer ook gelijktijdigheid en zakelijke effecten |
| Afstemming | Zoek naar weglatingen en verschillen | Benoem de bron en periode |
Managementindicatoren
| Indicator | Wat het meet | Eerste actie |
|---|---|---|
| Wachtrijleeftijd | Vertraging van onvoltooide gebeurtenissen | Inspecteer de oudste |
| Dubbele effecten | Zakelijke acties die per ongeluk herhaald worden | Corrigeer atomiciteit |
| Bron-/applicatieverschillen | Afwezige of afwijkende statussen | Afstemmen met bewijs van afsluiting |
Veelvoorkomende fouten
- Parsen vóór verificatie van ondertekende body
- Bevestiging vóór duurzame ontvangst
- Aannemen van geordende levering
- Test duplicaten alleen sequentieel
Veelgestelde vragen
Betekent HTTP-succes dat de verwerking is voltooid?
Dat hangt af van het contract. Bij asynchrone verwerking zou dit een duurzame ontvangst moeten betekenen, terwijl de bedrijfsstatus afzonderlijk wordt bijgehouden.
Kan er worden uitgegaan van een eenmalige levering?
Ontwerp voor herhalingen en fouten onder het daadwerkelijke contract, met unieke effecten en afstemming.
Moet de volledige inhoud worden bewaard?
Alleen wanneer nodig, met geschikte toegang en bewaring. Minimale sporen moeten diagnose en herstel ondersteunen zonder geheimen te bewaren.
Idempotentie en API-herhaalcontracten
De uitgebreide toelichtingen zijn in deze editie beschikbaar in het Engels.
Separate request retries from notification repeats
An outgoing API request key, a received-event identifier and a business-effect identity serve different roles.
- Define provider, account, event and effect before selecting a deduplication key.
- Test concurrent workers and an unknown external-effect outcome.
- Reconcile business state with the source; a valid signature does not make processing unique.
Compare idempotency contracts →
References reviewed · RFC 9110 · §9.2.2, §10.2.3 · RFC 6585 · §4 · Stripe
Webhooks: handtekening en herhaling
De uitgebreide toelichtingen zijn in deze editie beschikbaar in het Engels.
Authenticate a delivery, retain the event and control its effect
A webhook signature answers a specific question: do the received bytes match those authenticated with the expected key? It guarantees neither freshness nor uniqueness nor successful business processing. Separate these decisions in the receipt contract so that the integration can be observed and recovered.
The signature and recovery rules below belong to the cited Stripe and GitHub contracts. The timeline and ten cases are fictional exercises; this page activates no endpoint, real secret or payment mechanism. Use official libraries and test the relevant provider configuration for a real integration.
Stripe and GitHub: six differences to retain
| Control | Stripe | GitHub |
|---|---|---|
| Signature header | Stripe-Signature contains t and one or more v1 signatures. The documented active scheme is v1. | X-Hub-Signature-256 contains a SHA256 HMAC prefixed with sha256=. |
| Authenticated message | Text timestamp, a period and the raw body: timestamp + "." + body. | The raw delivery body. Transport headers are not added to this HMAC message. |
| Freshness and replay | The timestamp is authenticated. Documentation states a five-minute default tolerance in its libraries; each retry receives a new timestamp and signature. | The body HMAC alone provides no freshness proof equivalent to Stripe’s timestamp. Plan duplicate detection and recovery according to the contract. |
| Identity to track | event.id identifies repeated delivery. Stripe also describes distinct events that may require correlation using data.object.id and event.type. | X-GitHub-Delivery identifies the delivery; requested redelivery retains that identifier. Its value remains outside the body authenticated by the HMAC described here. |
| Delivery failure | Live-mode automatic retries for up to three days with exponential backoff. A manual resend does not automatically cancel these retries. | GitHub does not automatically redeliver failures. Arrange manual redelivery or application-managed recovery using the available APIs. |
| Fast acknowledgement | Return a 2xx quickly, before lengthy work. Durable receipt before acknowledgement is the architectural policy of our exercise. | Respond with 2xx within ten seconds according to the documentation. A queue separates receipt from business processing. |
Retain three separate identities
| Identity | Fictional example | Purpose and limit |
|---|---|---|
| Transport attempt | delivery_attempt_02 | One event can arrive several times. An attempt’s timestamp and signature are not a business key. |
| Provider event | provider + account + environment + evt_training_001 | Recognise the same event within its scope. Define retention and recovery behaviour; a bare identifier without context may be insufficient. |
| Business effect | tenant_7 + case_42 + initial_activation | Prevent a second initial activation here. The key belongs to this operation; do not discard all future object updates by reducing them to the object identifier alone. |
Three bodies, six HMACs: what reformatting changes
Public exercise-only key: training-only-key-not-a-secret. Fixed timestamp: 1792663200, corresponding to 2026-10-22 at 10:00:00 UTC. Strings use UTF-8 with no trailing newline. A and B represent the same JSON object but have different bytes; C changes case_42 to case_43.
| Body | UTF-8 bytes | Exact string, written as a JSON string |
|---|---|---|
| A | 68 | "{\"id\":\"evt_training_001\",\"type\":\"evidence.ready\",\"object\":\"case_42\"}" |
| B | 73 | "{\"id\": \"evt_training_001\", \"type\": \"evidence.ready\", \"object\": \"case_42\"}" |
| C | 68 | "{\"id\":\"evt_training_001\",\"type\":\"evidence.ready\",\"object\":\"case_43\"}" |
| Body / scheme | Message used | Calculated hexadecimal HMAC-SHA256 |
|---|---|---|
| A · GitHub | body | d6ac0a608c901617782f3b7aef64198718e3affd410a219b22b84da008235364 |
| A · Stripe v1 | timestamp + "." + body | 0ad9c9f7c0df2d8a8265113e641d92f57ce0dffd703a7cf9f13c4163e21bf6dc |
| B · GitHub | body | c9c47b1432282b9a3c2cbf4aded2c750deed235ac948dffe248488b84a4af73d |
| B · Stripe v1 | timestamp + "." + body | 0ad8e262a5870766d4cce864f50a5feac65a3004e3c3208184da9cc075c7abd6 |
| C · GitHub | body | 55162fc08e3cb0efd0eb082978ba61a88cf3624ffc5322f19ab73d91466a616d |
| C · Stripe v1 | timestamp + "." + body | d7f4014489a900399a7049daa3e8f1ce2b208bf95b93c43492cb68f7d6f1b791 |
These results use the documented message constructions with a publicly displayed key and invented data. They are not authentic Stripe or GitHub deliveries. Different JSON serialization, even if semantically equivalent, must not replace the original body before verification. In production, compare in constant time and manage key rotation according to the selected library and contract.
Stripe tolerance parameter: the value 0 disables recency checking in the libraries described by its documentation. It does not mean “accept only the exact second”. Do not transfer the OAuth/OIDC example’s clock policy to this parameter.
Seven records for one local effect
Fictional scenario on 2026-10-22, all times UTC. Authenticate before admission and persist receipt before responding. An atomic constraint protects initial activation in the same database as its business state. Counts below are calculated for this exercise and describe no client outcome.
| UTC time | Observed signal | Scenario decision | Cumulative local effects |
|---|---|---|---|
| 10:00:00 | evt_training_001 admitted; response lost | Durable receipt, pending state; no business effect executed yet. | 0 |
| 10:00:01 | Worker A claims the event | Atomic work reservation; processing state. | 0 |
| 10:00:01 | Worker B sees the same event | Do not create a second processing owner or execute again. | 0 |
| 10:00:02 | Worker A commits the local transaction | Atomically write initial activation and its completed state. | 1 |
| 10:00:03 | New delivery of evt_training_001 | Authenticate the new attempt, find the completed event and acknowledge without a second effect. | 1 |
| 10:00:04 | evt_training_002 targets the same initial activation | Retain the distinct event; this business-operation key already exists. | 1 |
| 10:00:05 | evt_training_003 carries an earlier state | Reject a regressive transition under the exercise policy and reconcile the source. | 1 |
The transaction described protects a local effect. It does not make an external service call atomic. After an unknown external result, retain uncertainty, query the source and apply the available idempotency mechanism before retrying. A transactional outbox can organise emission; it does not establish a universal exactly-once guarantee.
Ten denial and recovery tests to prepare
01 · Invalid signature: no effect
Present a delivery whose HMAC does not match the received body.
Expected: reject before admission and any effect. Retain a redacted reason and configuration version, without recording the key, token or sensitive body content.
02 · Reformatted JSON with the original signature
Replace A with B while keeping the signature computed for A. Both JSON strings decode to the same object.
Expected: verification failure. Capture the raw body at the right framework stage; do not try different reformattings to recover the signature.
03 · Correct signature, stale timestamp
In a Stripe test, authenticate a 09:50:00 timestamp while the acceptance-test clock is 10:00:00, with a configured five-minute tolerance.
Expected: reject freshness despite a correct HMAC. Separate message integrity, delivery age and event creation age.
04 · Same event, newly authenticated attempt
Receive two deliveries of the same event.id; the Stripe retry has its own timestamp and signature.
Expected: authenticate each attempt, then find durable state. A different signature does not justify a second business effect.
05 · Two events, one initial activation
Receive two event identifiers requesting the same fictional initial activation of case_42.
Expected: record both events and protect this operation with its business key. Do not apply this rule blindly to legitimate successive updates of the same object.
06 · Two workers at the same instant
Start two workers on the same pending item in the authorised test environment.
Expected: atomic acquisition and one effect transaction. “Read absent, then insert” without a constraint can allow both workers through; inspect business results, not logs alone.
07 · Queue unavailable before acknowledgement
Simulate queue or database failure before receipt has been durably confirmed.
Expected under our architecture: do not acknowledge as though the event were retained. Exercise the provider’s recovery strategy; GitHub does not automatically redeliver failures.
08 · Response lost after durable receipt
Drop the response after notification persistence; let processing continue under the exercise policy.
Expected: the next attempt finds pending, processing or completed state. The sender may not know receipt succeeded; network uncertainty must not duplicate the effect.
09 · Old event after a newer state
Deliver a notification with an earlier state after a newer notification.
Expected: apply permitted business transitions and reconcile current state when necessary. A fresh signing timestamp can carry an old event; it does not prove business-state novelty.
10 · Manual recovery overlaps automatic retry
Send manual recovery and Stripe automatic retry towards the same event.
Expected: both paths use the same concurrency and idempotency controls. A successful manual resend does not itself cancel automatic retries; verify closure with the provider.
Six useful operating records
- Dated provider contract: environment, account, type, version, signature, timing and recovery.
- Redacted admission trace: internal reference, verification result, clock and policy version.
- Durable event state, work owner and evidence that the uniqueness constraint was tested.
- Effect identity and legitimately repeatable operations; separate the event from the business object.
- Failure queue with cause, attempt count, owner, next action and verified closure.
- Source/application reconciliation over a defined period, including never-received notifications and uncertain external effects.
Provider contracts and primary sources
- Stripe · Webhooks · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
Event delivery behaviors · Handle duplicate events · Verify manually · Preventing replay attacks - Stripe · Manage webhook endpoints · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
Process undelivered events · Resolve signature verification errors - GitHub · Validating webhook deliveries · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
HMAC-SHA256 · X-Hub-Signature-256 · raw payload · constant-time comparison - GitHub · Best practices for using webhooks · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
Respond within 10 seconds · X-GitHub-Delivery · redelivery retains the identifier - GitHub · Handling failed webhook deliveries · Living documentation · reviewed 2026-10-22
No automatic redelivery · manual or application-managed recovery
Sources reviewed on
API-fouten: typen, statussen en bewijs
De uitgebreide toelichtingen zijn in deze editie beschikbaar in het Engels.
An error response establishes neither failure nor safe replay
After interruption or an inconsistent response, a call may have produced an effect. Problem Details improves description; it does not prove no processing occurred or provide a universal retry policy.
- Preserve HTTP status, received body and permitted operation identifier in controlled traces.
- Check business state and idempotency rules before repeating an action.
- Test public messages without exposing secrets, internal paths or account details.
Explore problem types and eight fictional responses →
IETF · M. Nottingham, E. Wilde, S. Dalal · RFC 9457 · July 2023 · obsoletes RFC 7807 · §3.1, §3.2, §4.2, §5
Officiële referenties
Referenties ondersteunen de methode. Pas controles aan uw context aan; ze zijn geen certificering. Originele referentietitels en brondocumenten kunnen in een andere taal zijn.
Bronnen geraadpleegd op .
- Stripe — Webhooks
- Stripe — Process undelivered webhook events
- GitHub · Validating webhook deliveries
- GitHub · Best practices for using webhooks
- GitHub · Handling failed webhook deliveries
- IETF · M. Nottingham, E. Wilde, S. Dalal · RFC 9457
- IETF · RFC 9110 — Retry-After et idempotence HTTP
- IETF · RFC 6585 — 429 Too Many Requests
- AWS Builders’ Library · Timeouts, retries, and backoff with jitter
- Stripe · Idempotent requests
- Stripe · API v2 overview — Idempotency
- Stripe · Advanced error handling
