Lista de ações
- 01
Define the task and boundaries
Describe inputs, expected outputs, users and decisions the AI must not make. Compare the expected benefit with a simpler solution without a generative model. Example: retrieve the internal procedure applicable to a request, including the cited passage and version date. Success requires a correct source accessible to the requester. A plausible answer without evidence should fail even when it reads convincingly.
- 02
Map the data
Document the data sent, its location, retention and provider terms. Minimise sensitive information and check permissions on indexed documents. For RAG, distinguish permission to index, retrieve and disclose. A document accessible to an administrator must not become accessible to everyone. Test the same topic with different roles and preserve expected refusals.
- 03
Evaluate representative cases
Build normal, difficult and adversarial cases with explicit pass criteria. Measure factual errors, citations, refusals, cost and latency, and retain the tested versions. Keep a control set separate from examples used to tune instructions. Have a competent reviewer annotate responses and track incorrect citations, incomplete answers and justified refusals separately. Compare results with straightforward document search.
- 04
Constrain agent capabilities
Grant minimum permissions. Require human approval for consequential actions, separate environments and provide a stop mechanism and rollback. A correct answer does not authorise sending a message, changing an account or deleting a document. Constrain tools by action and resource; require explicit confirmation when an operation commits its recipient or changes sensitive data.
- 05
Test hostile inputs
Treat retrieved documents and pages as untrusted data. Test prompt injection, exfiltration, tool misuse and unsupported answers; do not assume filtering solves every issue. Put a conflicting instruction in a test document and observe whether the system treats it as content. Also verify that a tool result cannot become an authorisation. Test the complete workflow rather than the model alone.
- 06
Monitor and reassess
Assign an owner, monitor incidents and repeat evaluations when models, prompts or the corpus change. Define a stop threshold and a manual alternative. Retain proportionate logs that identify the case, sources and human decision without unnecessarily duplicating sensitive data. Replay critical cases after changes and provide a documented manual fallback.
Worked example: an assistant answers contract questions. Test the same file with an authorised role and an excluded role. The first should receive an answer grounded in the right passage; the second must not reveal restricted content or excerpts. Add an unrelated document instructing the assistant to email a file: inclusion in the corpus must not authorise that action.
Referências: dados, usos e limites
Documentação consultada em .
As notas detalhadas desta edição estão disponíveis em inglês.
| Fonte e finalidade | Dado ou referência verificada | Como utilizar | Limite a preservar |
|---|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATLAS Examine documented tactics, techniques and cases involving AI systems. |
The official repository publishes ATLAS tactics, techniques and case-study data. They support analysis of the actual deployed system. | Select scenarios matching your application’s data, interfaces and tools. Test permissions and consequences, not only model responses. | A technique catalogue is neither an exhaustive coverage guarantee nor a test result for your system. |
| NIST · AI Risk Management Framework Organise management of AI-related risks. |
The AI RMF Core is organised around Govern, Map, Measure and Manage. It is a voluntary risk-management framework. | Define intended use, affected people and error consequences. Connect each risk to an evaluation, owner and stop or recovery mechanism. | The framework certifies neither a model nor an application. Using it does not remove the need to examine applicable requirements. |
| OWASP · LLM Top 10 Prepare tests for language-model application risks. |
The 2025 edition includes Prompt Injection, Sensitive Information Disclosure and Excessive Agency. | Turn a risk into an observable scenario: hostile document, restricted data or out-of-scope tool. Record expected behaviour and evidence of refusal. | A risk list is not a complete assessment. Input filtering alone does not establish authorisation for every action. |
RAG: permissões, citações e caches
As notas detalhadas desta edição estão disponíveis em inglês.
RAG does not delegate permissions to the model
The corpus supplies information; the access service decides which passages an identity may receive. Distinguish relevance selection, object permission and authority to act after reading.
- Cover vector retrieval, lexical branches, citations and caches.
- Apply rights removal to existing conversations.
- Verify answer quality and absence of disclosure separately.
Explore the RAG access matrix and replay cases →
References consulted on · OWASP · LLM08:2025 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses OWASP · API1:2023 Broken Object Level Authorization
OAuth/OIDC: público e acesso
As notas detalhadas desta edição estão disponíveis em inglês.
An AI agent retains each tool’s authorisation boundaries
A model instruction does not create a grant. For every tool, identify the calling client, resource server, audience and object policy.
- Restrict permissions to the operation and recipient needed for the use case.
- Do not forward one tool’s token to another API merely for convenience.
- Test that an agent cannot read another tenant’s objects despite having a read scope.
See token recipients and the ten OAuth/OIDC cases →
Sources reviewed on · IETF · RFC 9700 · OAuth 2.0 Security BCP · IETF · RFC 9068 · JWT access token profile · OpenID Foundation · OpenID Connect Core 1.0 · IETF · RFC 8725 · JWT Best Current Practices · IETF · RFC 6749 · OAuth 2.0 framework
SSRF: URLs e conexões
As notas detalhadas desta edição estão disponíveis em inglês.
An AI agent tool keeps bounded network access
Text produced by a model, retrieved document or search result must not expand an allowed tool destination. Defining the connector by operation and service makes the agent’s actual network reach controllable.
- Reconstruct requests from business identifiers when the service is known.
- Enforce resolution, connection, proxy and each redirect at the egress component.
- Keep a traceable decision and response limits, including after retry or fallback.
Read the 12 cases and connection controls →
Sources reviewed on · OWASP · SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet · WHATWG · URL Living Standard · AWS EC2 · Instance metadata options · IETF · RFC 3849
IA: verificar um resultado JSON
As notas detalhadas desta edição estão disponíveis em inglês.
An extraction contract precedes every agent action
An AI-generated object remains an input to validate. Correct types establish neither document values, actor identity nor permission to write into the target system.
- Validate fields before handing them to the connector.
- Route unknown values and missing evidence into an explicit review path.
- Apply context and authorization controls to every downstream operation.
Compare the 14 outputs and their reasons →
Sources reviewed on · IETF · RFC 8259 · JSON Schema · Object reference · JSON Schema · Draft 2020-12 validation · Python 3.12 · json decoder · python-jsonschema · Schema validation · OWASP · LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling

